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Transfer and adoption of western management concepts, structures and instruments often face 
cultural barriers and problems of misfit in developing countries.  This study sought to establish 
the parameters and pre-conditions for results-based management (RBM) policy and management 
innovation transfer, taking UN-Habitat, the United Nations agency that has been mandated by 
the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities 
to provide adequate shelter for all, as a case study.  The study utilised a cross-sectional design.  
The main field site was the coordinating programme office at the headquarters of UN-Habitat in 
Nairobi.  Each of the three regional offices, including the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) country office located in Nairobi, was visited, however.  The respondents 
were persons who had experience working with UN-Habitat while the key informants were those 
persons who had been key players in the design and implementation of the programme. 
 
The study found that UN-Habitat is a highly complex, dynamic and image-conscious 
organisation. It appears to have many established habits, but at the same time is able to 
continually reflect, self-assess, and align itself with the external environment. UN-Habitat had 
many opportunities that were conducive to the successful transfer and adoption of the outlined 
RBM technology (Figure 2.3).  These were the existence of in-house RBM expertise, UN-
Habitat‘s Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices, the existence of good 
communication channels and competent Programme Officers. 
 
The RBM policy innovation transfer process at UN-Habitat had been incremental, and was 
partially successful, but remained largely incomplete. Some critical components, like systematic 
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monitoring systems, had not been adequately transferred, while others, like results-oriented 
budgeting, were still in the early stages of the transfer process.  Although RBM was appreciated 
by all at UN-Habitat, there were organisational cultures that hindered the acceptance of RBM. 
These cultures concerned governance, the reward system, and internal capacity, which may be 
summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to speak out and also 
management‘s failure to read between the lines concerning why the staff close up. The study 
revealed that the transfer of RBM policy innovation faced several barriers related to a lack of 
compatibility and congruence with the organisation-wide systems and interests of individual 
programme officers.  
 
From the findings, the study concludes that RBM policy innovation transfer comprises a 
continuous and conscious effort to systematically improve programme efficiency and 
effectiveness that will have no end. Technology designs and end user considerations should 
feature in discussions between developers and users before the commencement of the transfer 
process. The depth of RBM policy innovation transfer at UN-Habitat concerns the extent to 
which management is willing to go into the organisational culture to solve transfer problems. 
Change that occurs at the formal level rarely penetrates deep inside the organisation in such a 
way that would improve effectiveness or performance capacity. Findings of this study indicated 
that UN-Habitat had made multiple corrective changes in an effort to align the organisational 
culture with the mission.   
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It is recommended that, for successful RBM policy innovation transfer to occur, UN-Habitat has 
to stop being oversensitive to criticism. Successful transfer in an organisation should thus not be 
characterised by fear. RBM is about learning and adaptive management (Figure 2.3). 
Sustained commitment by top management is required and strong leadership is necessary.  
Management should adopt a results framework that distinguishes more clearly between strategic 
planning and strategic execution.    RBM policy innovation has to be appreciated by both donors 
and recipients as a tool to help organisations succeed through learning and adopting 
programming accordingly, as opposed to being an accountability ―policing and control‖ tool. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Definition of key terminology relevant to the study 
Accountability in development refers to the obligations of development recipients to act 
according to clearly defined responsibilities, roles and performance expectations, often with 
respect to the prudent use of resources.  For public sector managers and policy makers, 
accountability is to taxpayers/citizens, as indicated by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2002a).  
Aid donors/agencies or Western donor /agencies countries include member countries of the 
OECD and other countries like Japan, the Scandinavian countries, and UN bodies and 
multilateral organisations like The World Bank and the IMF that give money in the form of 
grants or loans to developing countries.   
Developing countries are countries (mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin America) that receive 
international development assistance from Western countries.  They rank lowest in the United 
Nations Development Programme‘s Human Development Index Ranking Report (UNDP, 2004 ).  
Development programmes or interventions are instruments used for partner (donor and non-
donor) support aimed to promote development.  Examples could be policy advice, projects, or 
programmes (OECD, 2002a).  
Results are those changes that are attributable to the breadth and depth of influence an 
organisation has through the use of resources.  They are desirable or measurable changes in state 
(outputs, outcomes, impacts, negative or positive) that are derived from a development 
intervention (OECD, 2006b; Shand & OECD, 1994).  
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Results-based Management (RBM) refers to a team effort based on participatory management 
strategy designed to improve programme and management effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability and focuses on achieving defined development results at output, outcomes and 
impact levels.  The approach ensures that financial and human resources are strategically 
deployed to achieve the greatest human development impact (Goldstein, Skoufias, & Fiszbein, 
2008; Menon, Karl, & Wignaraja, 2009).  
Strategic planning comprises an organisation's process of defining its strategy, or direction, and 
making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy. In order to determine the 
direction of the organisation, it is necessary to understand its current position and the possible 
avenues through which it can pursue a particular course of action. Generally, strategic planning 
deals with at least one of three key questions (Armstrong, 1986; Mulcaster, 2008).  
Strategy execution involves visualising the strategy, measuring the strategy, reporting progress, 
making decisions, identifying strategy projects, aligning strategy projects, managing projects, 
communicating strategy, aligning individual roles, and rewarding performance.   
Strategy execution involves a process and the discipline of getting things done (Mulcaster, 
2008; Larry & Ram, 2002). It is a discipline or ―systematic way of exposing reality and acting on 
it.‖  The authors explain that ―the heart of execution lies in three core processes‖: people, 
strategy and operations. Strategy execution therefore encompasses the processes and descriptions 
that managers use to successfully drive business results. Strategy execution is about linking 
strategy to operations for competitive advantage (Mckeown, 2013).  
Strategy is about shaping the future (Mckeown, 2013; Mulcaster, 2008). Strategy is something 
that people do, both as style of thinking, in ―strategic planning‖, and the combination of actions 
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taken in ―strategy execution‖ along with their consequences. Individuals, and groups, can 
increase their ability to think and act strategically, by finding the best route to desirable ends 
with available means.   
Technologies, in this study, refer to ideas, concepts, structures, knowledge, practices and values.   
Transfer of technologies refers to the cross-cultural, cross-border, and cross-organisational 
process whereby information, ideas, and practices move from one point or system to another 
(Clark & Geppert, 2002). (In the context of this study the movement is from Western developers 
to users in developing countries.) 
 
 






1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The fast-changing global environment is forcing countries, companies and individuals to 
improve their competitiveness by acquiring new technical skills and investing in more advanced 
technologies and management skills. However, there are many factors inhibiting the adoption of 
new technologies and management skills, particularly in developing countries.  Moreover, 
without adopting these, these countries will continue lagging in their development efforts.   In an 
effort to improve accountability for the money that developing countries receive from developed 
countries and other organisations, developed countries introduced Result-based Management 
(RBM). RBM systems are government-wide reforms established by western development donor 
countries and multilateral agencies including Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) as a response to a general public sense that development aid to developing 
countries was not working very well (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009; OECD, 2006b). RBM is both a 
management system and a performance reporting system which judges an operation by its 
outcomes or impacts as opposed to inputs or outputs (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009). The effect of 
the approach is to link budget planning with strategic policy planning, thus moving the 
institution from an internal management focus to an outward looking orientation, centred on 
achieving results (Carvalho, 2010).  
 
The government-wide legislation in the OECD countries has driven and guided public sector 
reforms and multilateral organisations that benefit from these governments into conducting their 
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business in a results-oriented manner (OECD, 2006b). The policy requirement has subsequently 
been transferred to their funding beneficiaries, who are mostly non-profit organisations and 
governments in developing countries (OECD, 2006b). RBM specifically requires social 
organisations, governments, and communities supported by donor agencies to focus their work, 
plan strategically, and credibly demonstrate the difference that the organisations are making to 
human development (Menon et al., 2009). It also requires that public project and programme 
deliverables be measurable, observable, relevant, and verifiable, and is intended to enhance a 
culture of accountability, learning, and achieving results (Menon et al., 2009; OECD, 2006b). 
More specifically, donor agencies want to see more evidence that funded activities are producing 
longer-term human development benefits.   
 
While RBM has been widely acclaimed and endorsed by development aid donors as a good 
management approach to the efficiency and effectiveness of non-profit sector programmes, 
literature (Nigel Holden, Cooper, & Carr, 1998; Dorota & Jankowicz, 2002)  on transfer of 
management knowledge cautions that the process of transfer is complex.  Further more, 
knowledge (like RBM) cannot be easily transferred across national, cultural, and institutional 
boundaries and implemented un- problematically within organisations without modifications 
(DFID, 2001b).   
 
This study was motivated by the conviction that, while RBM seems conceptually appealing to 
end-user not-for-profit and developer donors alike, issues of development effectiveness and 
efficiency will remain a receding target, unless transfer problems are identified and addressed.  
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Theories on transfer of knowledge were not tested during the study, but they served as helpful 
frameworks for understanding the process of RBM transfer.   
 
1.2  RBM AS A TOOL FOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
According to the World Bank (2008a), one of the major challenges facing both developing 
countries and donor countries is the question of measuring and qualifying achievements of 
development interventions in terms of human development.  In spite of the billions of 
development dollars spent by donor agencies over the decades in developing countries in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, economic and social growth expected from recipient 
countries has remained unrealised and elusive (Hulme, 2007; The World Bank, 2008b).  
 
It has been noted that the majority of developing countries have maintained their largely poor 
status, and others have slid deeper into poverty, raising questions about the effectiveness of 
development programmes and projects in changing people‘s lives.  Internal and external 
customers of development assistance programmes are asking for better use of aid resources and 
evidence of the difference the resources are making in the lives of targeted beneficiaries (Menon 
et al., 2009; OECD, 2006b). They want to understand what is being achieved in relation to what 
is being spent. 
 
There is a general sense that aid is not working very well, and that the prevailing ―aid fatigue‖ 
(that is, the public‘s perception that aid programmes are failing to produce the desired 
development results) has resulted in declining budgets over the years. The effectiveness of the 
development agencies that have been carrying out economic growth through the Poverty 
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Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSP) and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiatives, have been rightly criticised for an implementation process that is very slow; and for 
paying too little attention to the final impact of their interventions (DFID, 2001; Menon et al., 
2009). 
 
While there was some progress in reducing income poverty, there was too little improvement in 
the performance of most of the non-income poverty indicators.  This suggests that it is unlikely 
that the non-income Millennium Development Goal targets will be met by the end of 2015.  
Outcome indicators for growth, regional cooperation and integration, basic infrastructure, and 
governance showed satisfactory progress (Cummings & Worley, 2001).  
 
According to government reports accessed by the Menon et al. (2009), there is growing public 
concern for national debt reduction as evidenced by the declining confidence in political 
leadership coupled with the globalisation of the economy through free trade and, consequently, 
increased competitiveness in the open market; these have all been important factors increasing 
pressure from the donor tax-paying public for demonstrating efficient and effective use of public 
resources.  This new development has led to an increase in the number of evaluations to assess 
the effectiveness and impact of programmes in various organisational settings: in developing 
countries, including non-profit and for-profit organisations; local and government agencies; 
universities; and foundations (Nelson, 2012; OECD, 2002a; World Bank, 2010). 
 
One core development concern has been the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) pledged by world leaders, whose overarching goal is to cut world poverty by half by 
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2015, through improved organisational effectiveness or operational results (World Bank, 2005). 
According to the World Bank (2005) and UNDP (2004), achieving the MDGs (a commitment by 
the international community to an expanded vision of development, to one that vigorously 
promotes human development as the key to sustaining social and economic progress in all 
countries) by 2015, will require more focus on development outcomes (results) and less on 
inputs to effectively improve human development.  
 
There has been emphasis on improving performance and ensuring that government activities 
achieve desired results and need to be supported by performance management systems (OECD, 
2006b).  Performance management, also referred to as results-based management (RBM), can be 
defined as a broad management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way 
government agencies operate, with improving performance (achieving better results) as the 
central orientation. Performance measurement is concerned more narrowly with the production 
or supply of performance information, and is focused on technical aspects of clarifying 
objectives, developing indicators, and collecting and analysing data on results. Performance 
management encompasses performance measurement, but is broader. It is equally concerned 
with generating management demand for performance information – that is, with its uses in 
programme, policy, and budget decision-making processes and with establishing organisational 
procedures, mechanisms and incentives that actively encourage its use (OECD, 2006b). In an 
effective performance management system, achieving results and continuous improvement based 
on performance information is central to the management process. 
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The 1990s saw a shift in the thinking and practice of development cooperation from aid flows 
being determined by national strategic considerations to a focus on the promotion of sustainable 
human development (Clinton, 2012). This shift also resulted in a steady decline in official 
development assistance and increasing pressure from the public in donor countries to 
demonstrate effectiveness of aid (UNDP, 2007). In response, some bilateral organisations (led by 
the United States Agency for International Development  (USAID), and the public sector in 
some donor countries (such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand) began to adopt a results-
based management approach that was widely used in the private sector.  To reverse the declining 
resource base, assure predictability of programme funding and demonstrate performance focus to 
the donors, UNDP also adopted results-based management (AfDB, 2013). 
 
By promoting RBM, donors want to see more evidence that publicly funded organisational 
activities are producing longer-term benefits leading to the achievement of MDGs, and that they 
can describe and track these results (Menon et al., 2009; OECD, 2002b).  RBM systems demand 
that development aid beneficiaries, like UN-Habitat, define clear and measurable goals, monitor 
and assess progress towards the achievement of these goals, use performance information to 
achieve better results and integrate lessons learnt, while reporting on performance (Menon et al., 
2009).  
 
The quest to better management for development results has led to the uniform adoption and use 
of RBM by multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN), The World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), who receive their major contributions from OECD 
governments (OECD, 2006b).  More recently, the Paris Declaration identified the five principles 
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of country ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability 
as the core of the global development agenda (The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 
the Accra Agenda for Action, 2005/2008: 3-8).  This push towards results management has 
gained momentum and there is now a broad consensus regarding the importance of achieving 
measurable results (Ravishankar et al., 2009; Afdb, 2013).  
 
Some aspects of RBM are, however, not dramatically new to the world of programme and 
project management.  More than anything, RBM represents a shift of emphasis or paradigm in 
public sector management, beyond a traditional concern with operational aspects of programme 
and project management to an emphasis on longer-term human development results, which are 
outcomes and impacts (Morris, 2006). Positive changes in the lives of targeted people and 
communities is therefore expected (Carvalho, 2010). Thus, by specifically looking at what was 
achieved as compared to what was intended, aid-donors can be provided with a lens to examine 
whether they are on track to achieving development effectiveness. 
 
In recent years, donor agencies have wanted to see organisational effectiveness hand in hand 
with improved development effectiveness for the results process to get fully aligned, which, at 
the moment, does not appear to be closely linked (Carvalho, 2010; OECD, 2006b). According to 
the RBM approach, improved management effectiveness and accountability requires involving 
key stakeholders in defining realistic expected results; assessing risk; monitoring progress 
toward the achievement of expected results; integrating lessons learnt into management 
decisions; and reporting on performance.  It integrates the management of strategies, resources, 
activities, and information about performance (Menon et al., 2009).  




The ―results revolution‖ therefore came to the development sector in part as a result of ―aid 
fatigue‖ (OECD, 2006b). By 2000, there was growing pressure for institutional reform and a 
rethinking of the traditional way of doing business (OECD, 2003). Evidently, if aid was to be 
effective, it was not going to be business as usual for the state and non-state actors in 
development.  The results revolution was also fuelled by the development of powerful tools 
based on systematic analysis of logical cause and effect.  Logical frameworks (logframes) were 
quickly accepted as valuable tools for improving planning, implementation, measuring and 
reporting results (Kusek & Rist, 2004).   
 
The emergence of evidence-based policy making, evidence-based management and evidence-
based decision making has gained prominence when accountability is required for monies given 
out for development projects.  It involves generating management demand for performance 
information – for use in programme, policy, and budget decision-making processes, and for the 
establishment of organisational procedures, mechanisms and incentives that actively encourage 
the use of data (DFID, 2001). In an effective performance management system, achieving results 
and continuous improvement based on performance information is central to the management 
process (Menon et al., 2009). Strengthening the organisational performance management 
function, therefore, serves two key purposes: 
(a) Management improvement, which involves using performance information generated 
through performance measurement for management learning and decision-making processes to 
effect adjustments that improve programmes and projects based on feedback about results being 
achieved, and resource allocation; and 
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(b) Performance reporting ‗accountability‘ ensuring that organisations use performance 
information for accountability for results and managing for results. 
 
Some of the governments that committed themselves to RBM are the United States of America 
(USA) through the 1993 United States Government Performance and Results Act; the United 
Kingdom (UK) through the 1995 White Paper on Better Accountability for the Tax Payers‘ 
Money; and Australia‘s Accruals-based Outcome and Output Budgeting.  In Canada, the Office 
of the Auditor General and the Treasury Board Secretariat are the primary promoters of results 
reforms across federal government.  Five bilateral organisations (USAID; the Department for 
International Development (DFID); AUSAID; the Danish International Development Agency –
DANIDA; and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) and two multilateral 
organisations (the UNDP and The World Bank) are leading in RBM experience (OECD, 2006b).  
 
RBM has therefore been generally accepted  as a coherent framework for strategic planning and 
management based on learning and accountability (OECD, 2006b). Firstly it is a management 
system and, secondly, a performance measurement and reporting system. It reflects the way in 
which an organisation applies processes and resources to achieve interventions targeted at 
commonly agreed results. RBM is a participatory and team-based approach to programme 
planning, monitoring and evaluation and focuses on achieving defined and measurable results 
and impact (UNDP, 2009).  RBM requires that all stakeholders are involved in the design and the 
management of interventions.  This involves participatory identification of unmet needs, defining 
of desired changes or results; and establishment and participation in performance measurement. 
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It is designed to improve programme delivery and strengthen management effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability (AWID, 2013). 
 
Governments require their international development agencies to demonstrate the purpose and 
value of all public funded activities. This has resulted in the introduction of RBM to bilateral 
organisations and recipients of their funding. With UN-Habitat (end-users) of bilateral funding, 
the introduction of RBM from Western countries (developers) was done to demonstrate results 
and value for money. However, the transfer of RBM from these Western developers to UN-
Habitat was not negotiated. The RBM policy management innovation was made available or 
disseminated to the organisations through policy documents. Sustained funding to development 
programmes has since been pegged on how well recipients of such donor funds adopt and 
implement these blueprints from investors.  
 
RBM suffers from what  Rogers Everett (1995) calls ―pro-innovation bias‖. The transfer model 
that was used assumed that potential end-users like UN-Habitat would be interested in RBM as a 
new and appropriate technology and would willingly accept it and use it without any capacity or 
contextual problems. The developers of RBM policy management innovation also assumed that, 
since it was conceptually appealing, it would self-sell. Thus implications for end-users did not 
seem to have been taken into consideration in the transfer model.  
 
While RBM was expected to transfer successfully to end-users, further effort on the part of most 
developers has not been there. For instance, little, if anything, has been done by the RBM policy 
management innovation developers (Western donors) to educate the end-users (UN-Habitat or 
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UNDP) or to develop their capacity to design, to adopt, or adapt the new technology to context. 
Learning or any form of capacity development for designing, using and sustaining the system at 
UN-Habitat was not provided.  
 
Development literature (OECD/DAC, 1999; World Bank, 2004; UNDP, 2001) cautions that, 
while some see merit in the RBM approach and view it as a navigating aid to assist organisations 
to achieve their intended results, many organisations that are now required to use the approach 
for project designs and progress reports, see RBM as an imposition motivated mostly by 
investor‘s accountability concerns. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2003) also warns 
that attempts to just transplant mechanisms such ase RBM developed in OECD countries into 
very different institutional environments found in developing countries without contextualising 
them to different conditions, have rarely had a significant impact. 
 
The transfer of RBM policy management innovation has been described as the new way of 
managing for development results by end users at UN-Habitat.  To understand the phenomenon 
of transfer, the study was aligned to the literature on transfer and diffusion of technologies (Hall 
& Hord, 1987; Rogers Everett, 1995); transfer of management knowledge to developing 
countries; and private and public sector literature (OECD, 2006b) on RBM.   
 
Rose (1993) asserts that many propositions that are true across space are not true across time. To 
say that a programme that works in one place could not work in another confuses a truth about 
the present with uncertainty about the future. He asserts that the fact that country Y does not 
have the programme in effect today indicates that there may be difficulties in its immediate 
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transference from country X (Rose, 1993). But this does not mean that a programme cannot be 
introduced there in the future. The farther ahead one looks, the greater the degree of uncertainty, 
and thus, the greater the possibility of applying lessons from elsewhere. 
 
At a given moment, it is easy to document obstacles to adopting a policy management innovation 
based on experience elsewhere. A historicist argues against lesson-drawing on the assumption 
that present obstacles remain in place; the future is assumed to be determined by past events. In 
the short run, the political inertia of public agencies, employees, budgets, and laws makes 
programmes and policies "sticky" and difficult to alter. But every obstacle to change is sooner or 
later vulnerable to challenge (Rose, 1993). With time programmes become easier to transfer 
without any alteration in their intrinsic characteristics, as changes in policy environments remove 
obstacles. 
 
While transfer theories were not tested during the study, they serve as a helpful framework for 
understanding the process.  Transfer of RBM knowledge in this study includes not just the 
acceptance and appropriation of the new technical knowledge, but also new ways of thinking and 
understanding new discourses and, more deeply, the values, beliefs and assumptions upon which 
new practices were found. 
 
Transfer theories emphasised factors that promote or undermine the transfer process from one 
point to another.  They, for instance, emphasise that local values and cultures and management 
learning must always be taken into account for successful transfer of management knowledge 
(Lang & Steger, 2002; Mahoney & Chi, 2001). (Peng, 2001).  




The correspondence in most available RBM literature by development donor agencies and 
multilateral organisations (Goldstein et al., 2008; OECD, 2006b) points to the fact that for RBM 
to be successfully transferred, the following six design and implementation aspects must be 
incorporated: 
a) Expected results must be clearly defined and measurable; 
b) Underlying assumptions and risks must be identified and monitored over time;  
c) Performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge 
performance must be selected;  
d) Performance monitoring systems must be developed to regularly collect performance information 
on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual results vis-à-vis the 
targeted results);  
e) In managing for development results, systems must integrate formative evaluations to 
performance measurement to provide complementary performance information not readily 
available from performance monitoring systems; and 
f) Performance information is used not only for internal management accountability, learning and 
decision-making processes, but also for external performance reporting to stakeholders and 
partners. 
 
According to OECD (2006b), the first three phases or processes generally relate to a results-
oriented planning approach, sometimes referred to as strategic planning.  The first five together 
are usually included in the concept of performance measurement.  All six phases combined are 
essential to an effective RBM system - that is, integrating complementary information from both 
evaluations and performance measurement systems and ensuring use of this information are 
viewed as critical aspects of RBM.   




Bamberger and Kirk (2009), Loffler & Bovaird (2009), OECD (2006b), further indicate that, for 
RBM systems to be successfully transferred, they must be supported by a corporate culture 
characterised by the following good governance values: 
 Accountability: Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving 
results within the spheres of control; 
 Empowerment: Managers with delegated authority to the management level are held 
accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustment 
and to shift resources to better performing activities; 
 Transparency: Disclosure, reformed policies, procedures, roles and responsibilities to 
support the RBM system and an organisational culture (values, attitudes, behaviour of 
personnel) that supports the effective implementation of the RBM system; 
 Results Focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services; 
 Participation: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement 
and management processes, and shared interest and understanding of development 
objectives; and 
 A developed support mechanism to help managers implement performance measurement 
and a management process that provides appropriate training and technical assistance 
needs to be established.  
 
1.3  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Billions of dollars are spent each year on development programmes like those of the UN-Habitat, 
in an effort to alleviate poverty and accelerate economic growth in developing countries (World 
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Bank, 2002), yet poverty does not seem to reduce.  Most development donor agencies see 
successful transfer of RBM systems to development programmes as a plausible solution to 
problems of development inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and poor accountability to stakeholders 
(CIDA, 2010).  The key question is how well the RBM systems are transferred to developing 
countries‘ developmental programmes and more so in a development organisation like UN-
Habitat, and whether RBM has contributed to improvements in managing for development 
results and accountability, including its acceptability.  Although there is a lot of literature on 
RBM in development work, a literature search indicated limited scholarly evidence of either 
successes or failures of the approach, especially in developing countries.  
 
While RBM might be a useful performance management tool for the public and social sector 
organisations and in OECD countries, little is empirically known about its transfer (adoption) 
process to developental management sector of developing countries, its practicality, or its 
promises (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009; OECD, 2006b). Current management research literature 
cautions that the process of transfer of management knowledge is complex, and knowledge 
cannot be easily transferred across national, cultural, and institutional boundaries and 
implemented unproblematically within organisations without modifications (Holden, 1998; Nigel 
Holden et al., 1998). Current approaches to knowledge transfer are, however, based on a belief 
that there is a one best way in which certain aspects can be done, a belief that one world-wide 
approach to doing business is the key to both efficiency and effectiveness and that this can be 
transferred easily (Rogers Everett, 1995). 
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Transfer and adoption of western management concepts, structures, and instruments often face 
cultural barriers and problems of misfit, which can be characterised as technical and institutional 
inconsistencies. The other challenge is failure to consider the level of development and the 
economic structure of the recipient countries. For the transfer of management knowledge to be 
successful, enabler local values and cultures must also be taken into account (Dobosz & 
Jankowicz, 2002).  The best way of doing things can be inappropriate due to fundamental 
differences between the values of different cultures, but if these can be taken into account and  
localised (Clark & Geppert, 2002), technology or policy transfer  can be achieved.  In 
comparison, in western countries, change takes place within a relatively stable framework of 
social and economic institutions, and managers of business organisations therefore operate 
within relatively known parameters (Clark & Soulsby, 2007; Clark & Soulsby, 2005), which is 
not the case within developing countries.  The main questions to be answered are: What are the 
parameters that are prerequisites for RBM policy and management innovation transfer?  What 
competencies and capacity are required to transfer and adopt a performance management tool 
like RBM in a development organisation in the public sector?  Do recipient organisations or end 
users have the required competencies? 
 
1.4  PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to look at the factors that determine the success or failure in the 
process of policy management innovation transfer using the RBM systems from developers in 
western countries to end-users in developing countries in the development management field. 
 
Specifically, the objectives of the study were to:  
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(i) Analyse the existing literature on the theoretical foundation (adoption of innovation 
transfer of management knowledge, and organizational culture) and how RBM has 
been used in measuring the performance of projects by different recipients supported 
by donors in the development management field, 
(ii) Capture the experience, lessons learned and complexities of transferring and adopting 
policy management innovation from the developers in western countries to end users, 
UN-Habitat case for the development management field. 
(iii) Identify the complexities and peculiarities associated with the transfer, especially in the 
context of development not-for-profit organisation, and 
(iv) Provide recommendations for future technological innovation transfer between developed 
and developing countries that might enable the adoption of the new innovation in 
future in the development management field. 
Specific research questions were formulated to pursue these objectives. 
 
1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were framed from the objectives of the study:  
(i) Objective 1: Analyse the existing literature on the theoretical foundation (adoption of 
innovation transfer of management knowledge, and organizational culture) and how 
RBM has been used in planning and measuring the performance of projects by 
different recipients supported by donors in the development management field. 
 What insights and knowledge exist in the literature on transfer of new policy 
management innovation like RBM in the development management field say? 
 How has managing for development results been transferred to UN-Habitat at the 
headquarters and the three regional offices? 
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 How has RBM been applied to different components of development programmes at 
UN-Habitat?  
Objective 2: Capture the experience, lessons learned and complexities of transferring and 
adopting the policy management innovation from the developers in western countries to end 
users, UN-Habitat a case for the development management field. 
 What lessons were learned by UN-Habitat and UNDP from the transfer of RBM in 
the development management field? 
 What potential lies in existing cultures of the UN-Habitat and UNDP for effective 
transfer of managing for development results? 
 How has RBM transfer been received and accepted at UN-Habitat and UNDP as the 
receiving organisations?   
 
Objective 3:  Identify the complexities and peculiarities associated with the transfer, especially in 
a context of a development not-for-profit organisation in the development management field. 
 What lessons have been learned at UN-Habitat and UNDP in managing for the 
development result‘s transfer process? 
 
Objective 4: Provide recommendations for future technological transfer between the developed 
and developing countries that would enable the adoption of the new innovation in the 
development management field. 
 What are the best ways of technological transfer for development purposes between 
the developed and developing (Donor and receiving) partners in the development 
management field? 
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 What is an effective RBM policy innovation transfer theory of change?  
 
 
1.6  SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
The study was set out to understand the adoption and transfer of a technology (RBM) that was 
directing the way the world was  conducting development management in the non-government 
sector (donor perspective). This is because the non-government sector has away in which it 
influences technological transfer which sometimes also endup in the public sector.  However, 
this study does not focus on public administration/public management perspective at all...  The 
theoretical model for drivers of successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) was 
developed, and gained insights that were absent in the theory of policy innovation technology 
transfer in the development management field, including on-site in-depth insight from field sites, 
which are often neglected in the policy innovation transfer process. This research study helped 
develop a theory of change for RBM policy innovation (Figure 8.1) in the development 
management field which was missing before. It further sought evidence-based insights gained on 
the peculiarities, practicality and problems associated with developmental technological transfer. 
It also adds to the general body of knowledge on the transfer of management knowledge, but 
more specifically in the development management organisation context. The information forms a 
database for future comparison and theory building. The new information could inform the way 
programmes in the development management field are designed and delivered, and this could, in 
the long run, have a positive effect on development progress for millions of poor people in the 
world targeted in such development programmes.  
 
The study therefore extends frontiers of knowledge by documenting model requirements 
prerequisite for effective transfer and adoption of policy management innovation (RBM) from 
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western developers to end-user developing country programmes in the development management 
field.  First, it seeks to understand the transfer of policy management innovation (RBM) that is 
directing the way in which the world is conducting social development business.  Secondly, it is 
unique in that it examines the fit and consistency of the technology in a non-traditional not-for-
profit organisation—a development-based international programme.   
 
Any evidence-based insights gained on the peculiarities, practicality and problems associated 
with the transfer will in some way add to the general information available on transfer of 
management knowledge, but more specifically in a development organisation.  The new 
information could inform the way human settlement development programmes are designed and 
delivered, and this could in the long run positively affect development progress for millions of 
the poor in the world targeted by such programmes.   
 
For any new transfer of management policy innovation like RBM requires knowledge and 
insights on its adoption. Research data holds a promise by providing knowledge that creates a 
deeper understanding of the peculiarities and complexities associated with such transfer.   
 
More importantly, it is hoped that the new knowledge will provide aid-donor agencies, 
multilateral organisations, private foundations and public sector organisations in developing 
countries with more realistic expectations of what RBM can do, and what it cannot do for 
development programmes.  Such insights in an applied field can result in significant changes in 
the way development programmes are delivered and managed, hence contributing to better 
livelihoods for targeted communities. 




The study is an important first step to understanding complexities involved in the transfer of 
management knowledge (RBM) from developer countries to end users in the social sectors of 
developing countries.   It is hoped that the greater the knowledge about the RBM transfer 
process, the more the development practice and theories will be improved, and ultimately the 
greater the advancement in human development.  The study will also contribute significantly to 
add value to the body of knowledge on RBM policy innovation transfer.  
 
Lastly, lessons learned about critical factors for successful RBM transfer to a human settlement-
based end-user organisation might improve programme design, institutional context, and the 
implementation process, and generate some practical guidance for similar organisations seeking 
to operationalize RBM policy innovation. 
 
1.7  ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
The study has been divided into eight chapters.  Chapter 1 which is the introduction sets out to 
provide the background to the study and the rational of RBM, as well as the potential 
contribution of the study to the body of knowledge on development management.  Chapter 2 
presents literature reviewed on adoption of innovation models, theories on management 
knowledge transfer, organisation culture,  all providing the theoretical foundation to the research. 
The chapter also presents literature on RBM and supports the realisation of the objectives in 
analysing the existing literature on the use of how RBM policy innovation in development 
management in the non-government sector and by the different donor recipients in planning and 
measuring performance of projects. The literature review integrates sources from development 
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agencies with more academic writings thereby futher broadening understanding of the principles 
of RBM in the context of development aid from both these viewpoints to inform better 
development management. The chapter also presents a theoretical model for successful RBM 
policy innovation transfer. The methodology is presented in Chapter 3. The chapter describes 
how the study was conducted and what the study involved.  The chapter defines the strategies 
employed in extending the frontiers of knowledge in the transfer of RBM policy innovation.  
Chapter 4 describes the study context in detail. Events cannot be fully understood outside of their 
context. Hence, the processes of RBM transfer to the UN-Habitat Programme could not be 
sufficiently understood independent of its wider context. The context describes the site, 
background history of the wider organisation, the vision and mission, mandate and geographical 
focus, governance structure, and important evolutionary changes in the recent past. The 
description of the context is not limited to the present, however, but straddles across changes in 
the last 10 years, and traces the effects of those changes in the existing UN-Habitat physical and 
material culture.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 capture the findings, experiences and document lessons learned, including 
the enablers and potential in UN-Habitat‘s and UNDP‘s existing culture for effective transfer of 
managing for development results and how RBM transfer was received and accepted at UN-
Habitat and UNDP. The chapters also capture the experience and complexities of transferring 
and adopting the RBM policy innovation from the developers in western countries to end users; 
UN-Habitat and UNDP.  Chapter 5 looks at the good practices and enables for the transfer of 
RBM policy in the UN-Habitatat, including the ideology, political support and empowerment.  
Chapter 6 similarly examines  the barriers in the transfer of RBM at the UN-habitat while 
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Chapter 7 puts the preceiding chapters into context before presenting  the steps of successful 
transfer of RBM.  
 
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations, and proposes 
components for an effective and ideal RBM system. It also presents a theory of change for RBM 
as a further contribution to the academic and practical world. Finally relevant lessons for the 
successful transfer of RBM technology is offered in this chapter.  




LITERATURE REVIEW FOR RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 presents literature on RBM policy innovation adoption, diffusion of innovation 
models, concern-based adaptation model, explores the transfer of management knowledge, 
organization culture and human factors and Results-based Management (RBM).  It presents the 
different contexts under which RBM has been applied and the challenges faced in implementing 
it.  The chapter is divided into three parts: part one (sections 2.2 – 2.7) provides a theoretical 
foundation; It presents a framework for RBM policy innovation adoption, diffusion of innovation 
models, concern-based adaptation model, explores the transfer of management knowledge, 
organization culture and human factors. Part two (sections 2.8) contains the context of RBM 
technology transfer.  This culminates in a theoretical model for successful RBM policy 
innovation transfer (section 2.9) presented in part three. Part three introduces and describes the 
literature pertaining to RBM policy management innovation (section 2.9). 
 
2.2  Adoption of Innovation 
Rogers (2003) defined adoption as the decision to make full use of an innovation as the best 
course of action available.  Rogers (2003) in his view claimed that if an innovation is perceived 
to be advantageous; is compatible with existing norms, beliefs, and past experiences; has a 
relatively low level of complexity; can be experimented with; and use of the innovation has 
observable results, including being able to see others using the innovation, then there will be an 
increased likelihood of adoption. 




Rogers (1995) views an innovation as an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption.  However, Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) and Mackenzie 
Owen and Van Halm (1989) argue that it is the adoption rather than the newness that is the 
essence of innovation.  In Rogers‘ view, adoption is one of several stages in what he calls the 
innovation-development process.  Of particular interest to this study are the events surrounding 
the transfer and adoption of RBM policy innovation.  The following sections outline two 
adoption and implementation models that informed the study. 
 
Many inconsistencies have been identified in transfer of management knowledge from Western 
countries and questions are being asked on the one hand whether these concepts really fit with 
the Eastern environment and, on the other hand, whether different Western ―imports‖ with 
diverse origins are really consistent with one another.  The different modes of adoption, 
especially those including a higher amount of power and pressure on actors, can create some 
severe problems if the local patterns of interaction are not taken into account (Nigel Holden et 
al., 1998). 
 
Tiene (2004) and Hawkins (2002) both argued that to increase adoption of technology in 
developing countries, a focus must be placed on meeting the needs and addressing the limitations 
of the end user by demonstrating the advantages to adopting a given technology innovation. 
Tiene (2004) found that efforts to increase the adoption of technology in less developed countries 
often fail to improve innitiative efforts. Tiene noted that ―one critical mistake is to be overly 
ambitious and overly optimistic about what technology can accomplish‖. 
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According to Dirksen & Ament (1996) innovations that have a clear, unambiguous advantage in 
either effectiveness or cost-effectiveness are more easily adopted and implemented (Marshall 
1990; Meyer, Johnson, and Ethington 1997; and Rogers 1995). If potential users see no relative 
advantage in the innovation, they generally will not consider it further; in other words, relative 
advantage is a sine qua non for adoption (Rogers, 1995). 
 
Denis et al. (2002); Fitzgerald et al. (2002) and Grimshaw et al. (2004) argue that relative 
advantage alone does not guarantee widespread adoption. Even so-called evidence-based 
innovations undergo a lengthy period of negotiation among potential adopters, in which their 
meaning is discussed, contested, and reframed. Such discourse can increase or decrease the 
innovation‘s perceived relative advantage (Ferlie et al. 2001). 
 
Innovations that are compatible with the intended adopters‘ values, norms, and perceived needs 
are more readily adopted (Aubert & Hamel 2001; Denis et al. 2002; Ferlie et al. 2001; Foy et al. 
2002; and Rogers 1995). Compatibility with organizational or professional norms, values, and 
ways of working is an additional determinant of successful assimilation (Denis et al. 2002; 
Fennell & Warnecke 1988; and Ferlie et al. 2001). 
 
Innovations that are perceived by key players as simple to use are more easily adopted (Denis et 
al. 2002; Grilli and Lomas 1994; Marshall 1990; Meyer and Goes 1988; Meyer, Johnson, and 
Ethington 1997; and Rogers 1995). Perceived complexity can be reduced by practical experience 
and demonstration (Plsek, 2003). Plsek (2003) and Rogers (1995) further assert that if the 
innovation can be broken down into more manageable parts and adopted incrementally, it will be 
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more easily adopted. Innovations in an organizational setting that has few response barriers that 
must be overcome are more easily assimilated (Rogers, 1995). Interventions to reduce the 
number and extent of such response barriers improve the chances of successful adoption. 
 
It is easier to adopt and assimilate innovations with which the intended users can experiment on a 
limited basis (Grilli and Lomas, 1994; Plsek, 2003; Rogers, 1995; and Yetton, Sharma & 
Southon 1999). Such experimentation can be encouraged by providing ―trialability space‖ 
(Øvretveit et al. 2002; Plsek 2003 and Rogers 1995). 
 
When the benefits of an innovation are visible to intended adopters, it will be adopted more 
easily (Denis et al. 2002; Grilli and Lomas 1994; Meyer and Goes 1988; and Øvretveit et al. 
2002). Initiatives to make more visible the benefits of an innovation (e.g., through 
demonstrations) increase the likelihood of their assimilation. 
 
According to Meyer, Johnson & Ethington (1997) and Rogers (1995) potential adopters can 
adapt, refine, or otherwise modify the innovation to suit their own needs, it will be adopted more 
easily. Reinvention is especially important to those innovations that arise spontaneously as ―good 
ideas in practice‖ and spread through informal, decentralized, horizontal social networks 
(Rogers, 1995). 
 
The adoption of an innovation by individuals in an organization is more likely if key individuals 
in their social networks are willing to support the innovation (Backer & Rogers 1998; Markham 
1998; Meyer & Goes 1988; and Schon 1963). The different champion roles for organizational 
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innovations include (1) the organizational maverick, who gives the innovators autonomy from 
the organization‘s rules, procedures, and systems so they can establish creative solutions to 
existing problems; (2) the transformational leader, who harnesses support from other members of 
the organization; (3) the organizational buffer, who creates a loose monitoring system to ensure 
that innovators properly use the organization‘s resources while still allowing them to act 
creatively; and (4) the network facilitator, who develops cross-functional coalitions within the 
organization (Shane, 1995).  
 
Pettigrew and McKee (1992) argue that receptive context for change incorporates a number of 
organizational features that have been independently associated with its ability to embrace new 
ideas and face the prospect of change. An organization with such a receptive context will be 
better able to assimilate innovations. In addition to an absorptive capacity for new knowledge, 
the components of receptive context include strong leadership, clear strategic vision, good 
managerial relations, visionary staff in pivotal positions, a climate conducive to experimentation 
and risk taking, and effective data capture systems (Anderson & West, 1998; Barnsley, Lemieux-
Charles, & McKinney 1998; Dopson et al. 2002; Gosling, Westbrook, & Braithwaite 2003; 
Newton et al. 2003; Nystrom, Ramamurthy & Wilson 2002; Pettigrew & McKee 1992; and Van 
de Ven et al. 1999). Leadership may be especially helpful in encouraging organizational 
members to break out of the convergent thinking and routines that are the norm in large, well-
established organizations (Van de Ven et al., 1999). 




2.3  Diffusion of Innovation Model 
Studies of the diffusion model of innovation have revealed patterns in the process of adopting 
innovations.  According to Rogers (1995), adopters of innovation fall into five categories ranked 
by the speed at which they adopt the innovations.  He classifies the 2.5% of the population who 
are first to adopt as innovators.  Early adopters are the next 13.5%.  The early majority 
constitutes the following 34% of the population, while the late majority makes up the rest 34%.  
The last 16.5% of the population to adopt are called the laggards.   
 
Figure 2.1: The diffusion of innovations according to Rogers 
Source:Rogers (1995) 
With successive groups of staff adopting the new technology (shown in blue), its 
acceptance/market share (yellow) will eventually reach the saturation level. In mathematics, the 
yellow curve is known as the logistic function. The curve is broken into sections of adopters. 
 
These categories represent ideal types designed to facilitate empirical studies.  Each of these 
types is thought to possess distinctive characteristics and values. For example, innovators‘ chief 
characteristic is venturesomeness.  Each category of adapters has different kinds of social 
networks, with innovators being described as ―cosmopolite‖ while laggards are ―localite‖. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
 
Several other variables are used to characterise adopters.  Rogers (1995) and Dobosz and 
Jankowicz (2002) identify five steps in the innovation-decision process: (a) obtaining knowledge 
about the innovation; (b) persuasion regarding the need for the innovation; (c) a decision support 
to reject or to adopt the innovation; (d) implementation; and (e) confirmation of the adoption 
decision based on further information about the innovation.  Such further information may result 
in a reversal of the adoption decision.  As indicated earlier, the innovation-decision process is not 
easily packaged in a linear stage model as suggested by Rogers (1995).  In supporting the use of 
stages, he states that research strongly supports the presence of knowledge and decision stages 
but less strongly the presence of a persuasive stage. 
 
Of particular interest in this study is the diffusion of innovations in situations where the adoption 
unit is a programme (UN-Habitat) in an organisation as opposed to an individual.  To facilitate 
the study of innovation in organisations, Rogers (1995) and Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) 
present a model that identifies innovation in organisations as a process.  This process view is 
contrasted with the view of adoption as an event, which was characteristic of earlier ―classical‖ 
diffusion research.  Rogers‘ model divides the process into two broad phases called initiation and 
implementation, thus the decision to adopt acts as the boundary between the two phases.  The 
first phase has two stages (agenda setting and matching) while the latter has three stages 
(redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing).  Routinising is the final stage of the 
process.  At this stage the innovation becomes part of the regular activities of the organisation.  
However, the innovation may fail to gain a following and ultimately be discontinued. The 
successful adoption (or failure) of Results-Based Management may be viewed from the 
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perspective of innovation diffusion, especially because such a perspective provides a broad 
framework with which to analyse the process and level of adoption by UN-Habitat. 
 
2.4  Concern-based adoption model 
Loucks-Horsley & Stiegelbauer (1991) and Hall & Hord (1987), (2001) emphasised the 
importance of the implementation process and points out that it may take several years to 
complete.  This analysis centres on the adopter and indicates that adopters‘ innovation-related 
concerns change as their competency in using the innovation changes.  During the initial stages 
of using an innovation, according to Hall and Hord (2001), these concerns are centred on the 
capabilities of the adopter to use the innovation and on the role he or she plays with respect to 
the innovation.  In addition, adopters are concerned about the rewards of using the innovation.  
As their knowledge of innovation increases, adapters become more concerned about how to use 
the innovation.  Finally, after they have developed some confidence from routine use of the 
innovation, their concerns shift to focus more on the impact of the innovation and on ways to 
improve or replace the innovation.  Hall and Hord (2001) presented these ideas in the context of 
their Concerns-Based Adoption Model (CBAM). 
 
The model, which was developed as a conceptual framework for guiding the process of adoption 
of innovations, principally in educational settings, is centred on the role of change facilitator who 
acts as a link between a resource system and the user system.  This model views adoption as a 
process rather than an event.  The change facilitator‘s role in the process is to assist others in 
ways relevant to their concerns so that they become more effective and skilled in using new 
programmes and procedures (Hall & Hord, 2001). 




According to Hall & Hord (2001), the change facilitator intervenes to help clients who constitute 
the user system (which includes both users and non-users of the innovation). He or she has 
access to a resource system that may include experts, libraries, administrators and colleagues in 
other institutions. Ultimately, it is intended that users will develop the ability to make use of the 
resource system without the intervention of the facilitator. In order to assist the change facilitator 
understand the users and hence decide how to apply the available resources, Hall and colleagues 
developed three independent diagnostic tools that are based on the concepts of stages of concern, 
levels of use, and innovation configuration. 
Stages of Concern 
 
The CBAM includes the following seven stages of concern: 
Stage 0 Awareness: little concern or involvement with innovation 
 
Stage 1 Information: Awareness of innovation, interest in learning more. 
 
Stage 2 Personal: Uncertainties about demands of the innovation, one‘s adequacy to 
meet those demands, and one‘s role in the innovation. 
 
Stage 3 Management: Concerns about tasks and processes of using the innovation, 
such as time demands, efficiency, organizing, managing and scheduling. 
 
Stage 4 Consequences: Concerns about impact of innovation on students regarding 
relevance, performance, competencies, and changes needed to increase 
outcomes. 
 
Stage 5 Collaboration: Concerns about coordination and cooperation with others in 
using innovation. 
 
Stage 6 Refocusing: Concerns about more universal benefits of innovation and 
possibilities of improving or replacing the innovation. 
 
From observation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hall and Hord (2001) noted differences in 
how innovations are used.  They subsequently identified eight levels of use.  These concerned 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
observable behaviour, unlike stages of concern, which are inferred from information supplied by 
the subjects.  Though no direct correspondence between stages of concern and levels of use is 
claimed, they are thought to be related.   
 
In addition to levels of use and stages of concern, Hall and Hord (2001) developed a way to 
describe an innovation using the concept of innovation configuration.  After many studies 
involving the use of curriculum innovations, they noted that, though several people may be using 
the same instructional module, the operational form of these modules differed between faculties 
and campuses.  This led to the development of innovation configurations as a means to define 
and describe innovations in use.  The three stages of concern, levels of use, and innovation 
configurations are regarded by Hall and colleagues as tools that the change facilitator uses to 
increase his or her understanding of users and hence improve the effectiveness of their 
facilitative interventions. 
 
This study uses both the Diffusion of Innovation Model and the CBAM model to understand and 
obtain insights about the complex process (successes and barriers) of adopting the RBM by UN-
Habitat, with a focus on considerations made during implementation and perceptions of users 
and stakeholders.  It is hoped that the greater knowledge about the implementation process will 
help other social programmes in similar contexts.  Both positive and negative outcomes are 
possible when an organisation chooses to adopt a particular innovation. Rogers states that this 
area needs further research because of the biased positive attitude that is associated with 
innovation. Rogers lists three categories for consequences: desirable vs undesirable, direct vs 
indirect, and anticipated vs unanticipated. 




2.5  TRANSFER OF MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE 
Many inconsistencies have been identified in the transfer of management knowledge from 
Western to other contexts, and unanswered questions exist, on the one hand, whether these 
concepts really fit with non-Western environments and, on the other hand, whether different 
Western ―imports‖ from diverse origins are really consistent with one another. The different 
modes of adoption, especially those including a higher amount of power and pressure on actors, 
can create problems if the local patterns of interaction are not taken into account (Holden et al., 
1998; Puffer et al., 1996). 
 
Knowledge transfer refers to the cross-cultural, cross-border and cross-organizational processes 
where by information ideas and practices move between two different business systems. 
Knowledge transfer does not just include the appropriation of new technical knowledge, but also 
new ways of thinking and understanding new discourses, and more deeply, the values, beliefs 
and assumptions upon which new practices are found (Lang & Steger, 2002).  
 
Knowledge transfer as discussed in the literature is seen as a one-dimensional process taking 
place when a concept travels from one location to another (Jankowicz, 2000). As Jankowicz 
(2000) pointed out, knowledge itself is not an object, or indeed a process, that has existence in a 
particular location. Knowledge transfer makes use of bi-directional processes, including 
discussions and exchange by both parties involved. He argues that it makes sense to consider this 
phenomenon in terms of knowledge creation rather than transfer, and to speak, as some have, of 
the resulting knowledge transfer as diffusion, which denotes an abstract process.  




Management systems should be context sensitive. No single system will be appropriate for every 
organisation.  This is because organisations differ greatly in the scope of activities they perform 
within different settings.   Different solutions for performance measurement problems exist in 
different agencies.  Evidence suggests that customised management systems are critical for 
success (Casey, 2007).  Experience in OECD countries suggests that selecting an appropriate 
approach for implementing management systems is also very important.  Basic approaches to 
implementing performance management must be selected according to the needs and situations 
of each country (OECD, 2006a). 
 
The concepts of ‗lesson drawing‘ (Rose, 1993) and ‗policy transfer‘ (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 
2000) have become increasingly influential ways of studying public policy, especially in the UK. 
They form an important part of the theoretical basis of the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) Future Governance Programme, a major initiative costing around £3.5m and 
encompassing 30 projects (ESRC, 2000). The programme aims to draw lessons from policy 
initiatives and practices in different jurisdictions by looking at the potential for innovation by 
cross-national learning; examines how policies work when they are adopted as the result of 
international treaties and obligations; and identifies processes and mechanisms of policy learning 
and transfer and how they work. Individual projects explore a range of issues and are not all 
similarly committed to ‗lesson drawing‘ and ‗policy transfer‘. However, most use the terms 
‗lessons‘, ‗learning‘, ‗transfer‘, ‗transferring‘ in their titles and refer to these concepts in their 
project summaries (ESRC, 2000).  
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Lang and Steger (2002), like Geppert and Merkens (1999), Good Practices: Institutional 
Development (2005) observed that, in reviewing literature on management transfer in developing 
countries, it becomes obvious that authors of empirical studies as well as of normative writing, 
explicitly or implicitly, start from a strong and common basic assumption: That more or less 
well-tested institutions, structures, concepts, instruments, and practices need to be transferred 
from the west to ensure a successful transformational process. This critical assumption is hardly 
challenged and does not ask for degrees of adaptation or for modification that take into account, 
for example, the different cultural backgrounds of the various developing countries. 
 
It is assumed that developing nations have to acquire western procedures, and practices and 
managers and, by the same token, are believed to have little choice but to copy and adopt 
imported market economy practices wholesale as ―best practice‖ in order to survive (Geppert & 
Merkens, 1999; Eric, 2012). Geppert & Merkens (1999) and Eric (2012) argued that the 
implication is that knowledge transfer and learning constitute a one-way process, with the 
Western sources acting as the ―senders‖ and ―teachers‖ and the East as the ―recipients‖ and 
―learners.‖ But Czarniawska-Joerges (1994) cautions that western management principles might 
not constitute reliable foundations for theorising knowledge transfer and management in 
transforming societies. 
 
Situations of transfer of management knowledge have sometimes led to marginal modifications 
of the concepts and to the re-combination of old and new, for example, the inclusion of cultural 
factors that are considered responsible for the blockade of the well-experienced, practices 
(Weick, 2001). In other cases, the receiving countries and actors are simply blamed for not 
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having understood the ―greatness‖ of the concepts transferred or how they should work (Gilbert, 
1998). 
 
According to Lang and Steger (2002), management knowledge transfer is grounded in the 
cultural bias of Western modernity. According to this approach, management transfer can be 
understood as a process of re-institutionalisation whereby management concepts, structures, and 
instruments as institutionalised practices are transferred, not because of their higher efficiency, 
but because of the legitimacy they provide and their perceived and expected success. 
Management transfer is seen as a means of supporting the process of adaptation to Western 
―normality‖. 
 
Peng (2001) argues that Western structures and practice are considered a universal, superior 
norm, which should be followed by the reforming societies and organisations, a position that is 
questionable. Lang and Steger (2002) noted that similar patterns and problems of transfer have 
been observed in management knowledge transfer between developed nations. And many times, 
failure serves as a reminder that one has to take into account the different cultures while 
transferring structures and concepts. 
 
For the transfer of knowledge to be successful, local values and culture must be taken into 
account (Dorota & Jankowicz, 2002). They suggest that ―one best way‖ is inappropriate due to 
fundamental differences between the values of different cultures, but that, if these can be taken 
into account, localised ―best ways‖ can be achieved. Sadly, this traditional practice of know-how 
transfer from West to East is often justified and legitimised. 
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2.5.1  Management Learning 
Management learning refers to those internal organisational processes of knowledge organisation 
whereby managers in the organisation concerned assimilate new values, ideas, systems, and 
techniques and thereby, in their changed practices, produce new organisational patterns and 
processes (Clark & Geppert, 2002).  
 
Rose (1993) and Lang and Steger (2002) stressed that there comes a time in a programme's life 
when dissatisfaction disrupts routine. Dissatisfaction can be signalled in many ways. Instead of 
offering support for a program, beneficiaries and their pressure groups can demand more or 
different services (Rose, 1993). The media can publicise complaints; political opponents are 
always ready to stir up discontent; and public opinion polls can register an increase in 
dissatisfaction.  He further states that dissatisfaction stimulates policymakers to search for a 
solution, that is, actions that will reduce the gap between what is expected from a programme 
and what government is doing. The voices of the society represent the environment in which the 
organisation operates and often demand societal transformation. 
 
According to Clark and Geppert (2000), the environment of organisations in transforming 
societies is, to a very high degree, complex, dynamic, and uncertain, including in many cases a 
threat to survival. Changing political government systems increase the complexity and dynamism 
of the environment, and that leaves both organisation and managers in a state of uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Clark & Soulsby, 1999).  
 
There has been a great expectation concerning the introduction and implementation of Western 
institutions and structures on the part of state and regional governments, the European Union, 
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The World Bank, and others. Unfortunately, most organisations in developing countries are 
highly dependent on resources provided by these institutions (Norgaard, 2000). These 
organisations have learned how to incorporate expected structures at the surface and how to 
develop and carry out ceremonial and symbolic activities signifying conformity to funder‘s 
ideologies. These patterns of action may be useful (if not necessary) for survival under changing 
environmental and funding conditions.  
 
The extent, intensity, and speed of the adoption process will depend on the situation of the 
country and the forms and ownership structures of the enterprises. These adoption processes are 
often supported by the state providing additional resources and developing certain professional 
standards. The practice of transformation shows a strong presence of active attempts to influence 
and manipulate actors, often trying to change the rules of the game or to develop new rules and 
laws in their favour (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997). 
 
The transfer and adoption of Western management concepts can lead to East-West inconsistency 
problems, as the Western concepts and instruments may not fit the local national and 
organisational culture (Clark & Geppert, 2002). Inconsistency can also come about as different 
Western concepts, structures, and instruments may not be consistent with one another with 
respect to their different origins. And lastly, Western management concepts can lead to process 
inconsistency problems as the mode of introduction of Western concepts structures and 
instruments may not fit into local hierarchy structures and values. Most often, inconsistency 
problems have been described as cultural issues, which could be solved with cultural sensitivity, 
training and learning (Edwards & Lawrence, 2000). Problems of adoption could also be 
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considered to be conflicts between different institutional pressures and the need to organise 
efficiently and maintain the process of production (Holden, 1997). 
 
According to Dörrenbächeret al. (2000), transfer of management knowledge can be assumed to 
lead to a learning process at the management level and, furthermore, to hybridisation, that is, a 
development of ―new‖ (mixed, adapted) structures, institutions, and practices (Breu, 2000). Poate 
(1997) concludes that current research about management knowledge transfer to developing 
countries reveals serious shortcomings, and transfer of knowledge can no longer be considered a 
simple adoption of well-proved ―best practices‖, but rather as a dynamic process of learning, re-
interpreting, evaluating, and remodelling and recombining with existing concepts, structures, and 
instruments to create new practices—a process he thinks is highly influenced by the situative 
power relations between the actors, as well as by their continuing cultural backgrounds. 
 
 
2.5.2  Organisation learning and resistance to change 
Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) argue that learning is both institutional and individual, and the 
ensuing corporate changes are seen as the prerequisite for the success and survival of 
organisations irrespective of their size and sector. The challenge for most organisations is to 
recognise and react to perceived environmental challenges or enact changes and responses. 
Change is the outcome of learning. 
 
According to Huber (1991) and Tippins & Sohi (2003) organizational learning represents a firm's 
efforts to harness the intellectual and social capital of individuals in order to realize the firm's 
potential for innovation. It has been broadly agreed that organizational learning consists of four 
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components: knowledge acquisition, knowledge distribution, shared interpretation, and 
development of organizational memory have adopted Huber's conceptualization of 
organizational learning and demonstrated that the four learning components are positively related 
to innovation (Jiménez-Jiménez & Sanz-Valle, 2011). Specifically, knowledge acquisition 
identified acquires internally and externally-generated knowledge that is critical to a firm's 
operations. Knowledge acquisition plays a pivotal role in renewing the firm's knowledge base 
and skills that are necessary to initiate innovations. 
 
Senge (1990); Senge et al., (1994) and Tushman & Nadler (1986) have asserted relationships 
between leadership and organizational learning. Traditional leadership has been characterized as 
highly individualistic and a systematic and as making the learning of organizational teams 
difficult; however, transformational leadership is focused on active promotion of employees‘ 
participation in collective decisions and activities (Adair, 1990; Bass, 1991). Transformational 
leaders should be able to build teams and provide them with direction, energy, and support for 
processes of change and organizational learning (Blackler & McDonald, 2000; McDonough, 
2000; Nadler & Tushman, 1990). 
 
More specifically, transformational leadership fuels organizational learning by promoting 
intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and self-confidence among organization 
members (Coad & Berry, 1998). A capability for transformational leadership has been even 
described as one of the most important means of developing learning organizations (Maani & 
Benton, 1999; Slater & Narver, 1995; Snell, 2001). 
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2.6  ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
An organisation needs to change its culture in order to adopt the RBM.  The reason is that each 
organisation over time has developed its own culture which does not change easily, since it took 
time to develop.  According to Schein (2000), culture is ―how things are done around here‖. The 
culture of an organisation is its unique configuration of customary and traditional ways of 
thinking and of doing things that is shared to a greater or lesser degree by all its members, and 
that new members must learn and at least partially accept in order to be accepted into the 
organisation.  It includes values and beliefs that inform practice and behaviour; rules that guide 
people‘s choices; and how they behave.   
 
Organisational culture is the collective programming that distinguishes the members of one 
group or category of people from another.  Culture in a sense covers a wide range of behaviour; 
it incorporates attitudes, customs and habits of managerial behaviour; the objectives of the 
concern; ways of doing business; beliefs; and the less conscious conventions and taboos  
(Minkov, 1991; Schein, 2000).  It is a set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of 
people, and meanings are passed on to new group members.  Culture is not only deep, but also 
wide and complex.  It is dynamic and fluid and never static.  Some aspects of the culture are 
visible and tangible and others are intangible and unconscious. 
 
Every organisation, regardless of its size and complexity, has a political structure and culture that 
greatly impacts its behaviour.  Cultural issues are not clean but are intricately wired to political, 
social, historical and, especially, personal contexts (Senge, 1990; Kotter, 1997).  Organisational 
culture and structure are, indeed, often the major reason why organisations experience 
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difficulties, or become dysfunctional.  Introducing RBM to any organisation will thus involve 
teaching the organisation to change and understand the measurability thereof.  
 
According to Schein (2000), to say something cultural is to say: 
 It must be shared by a significant number of people or members of a social group, 
 
 It is shared in behavior enacted,  
 
 It is physically possessed, 
 
 Or internally thought,  
 
 It has the potential of being passed to a new group, and  
 
 It exists with some permanency. 
 
Culture is not values hoped for, but values lived. A distinction has to be drawn between the 
beliefs and values espoused and those that the employees actually use on a day-to-day basis to 
guide their work and activities (Hofstede, 1991; 1997). Formal documentation (such as publicity 
material and annual reports and accounts) and speeches present a particular view of culture. This 
espoused culture refers to a desired state vision of the organization, that is, what the organization 
should be. In any organization, culture in practice is its actual culture as experienced by 
employees (Senge, 1990). 
 
According to Senge (1990), culture drives an organisation and its actions.  It is somewhat like the 
operating system of the organisation.  It reflects a group‘s effort to cope and learn.  
Organisational culture can be summed up as the total sum of assumptions, beliefs, practices, and 
values its staff share, and it is expressed through what is done, how it is done, and who is doing 
it.  Values are generally connected with moral and ethical codes and determine what a person, or 
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people, think ought to be done.  For instance, do members act openly, honestly, and with 
integrity if they embrace these values?  Beliefs, on the other hand, concerns what people believe 
is true or not true—the theories in use or basic assumptions that influence thinking and action. 
 
Failure in any change process can therefore be avoided by maximising profitability and cultural 
congruence. Changes that embrace or acknowledge aspects of prevailing culture while 
incorporating newly adopted knowledge are often better than revolutionary change.  For a new 
culture to take root, the existing culture has to be fully analysed for compatibility (Schein, 2000). 
 
Within an organisational culture, staff learning is through the positive and negative feedback 
they receive about their actions, repeating what gains positive feedback and giving up behaviour 
that gets negative feedback.  The relationship between learning and culture is interdependent 
(Schein, 2000).  Culture will be influenced by the rate and content of what an organisation 
learns.  The influence of politics and culture are important inhibitors of learning.  Any 
organisational politics will often counteract and neutralise positive learning.  Negative culture 
can retard learning, inadvertently paralyse some individuals, promote and protect competency 
traps, and hence undermine any superior change that an organisation might want to institute 
(Kotter, 1997).  Resistance is, indeed, culturally-based.  But while cultural change is a long-term 
and complicated process, behaviour that protects and preserves the negative culture must be 
monitored and managed for greater performance to be realised (Senge, 1990; Kotter, 1997). 
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The way things are handled by management—new norms, values, working procedure—reveal 
important underlying assumptions which are engrained in culture.  For example, informal 
messages are sent by the way situations are handled.   
 
2.7  THE ROLE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN POLICY MANAGEMENT 
INNOVATION TRANSFER 
A results-based culture must permeate all levels of the organisation and be consistent throughout 
each type of activity (OECD, 2002a). Key is the development of results-focused objectives 
("Managing for Outcomes: Output Plans and Guidance for Departments," 2002) within the 
organisation and fostering a culture of measurement and learning   While experience suggests 
that appropriate leadership providing appropriate signals and incentives can successfully change 
this culture, any reform processes in the organisation have to be  consistent with these leadership 
signals (OECD, 2002a). 
 
There is strong evidence to suggest that senior-level leadership is necessary for successful 
implementation (OECD, 2006a). It is critical that senior management, from top to middle 
managers, fully support and actively participate in the implementation of results-based 
management (UNDP, 2009; UNEG, 2009).  Their level of commitment sets the tone for the 
entire organisation (Clinton, 2012). 
 
Stakeholder Participation and ownership: 
In all cases, governments attribute successful implementation to full participation of staff at all 
levels (McKenzie, 2010; OECD, 2001).  A sense of ownership and commitment is developed by 
involving managers and staff in the process of developing the strategic plans and performance 
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measures (McKenzie, 2010), and people are less likely to criticise something they have 
developed themselves and are more motivated to work together to accomplish common 
objectives (USGAO, 1995). 
 
Among leaders of results-based management, training is listed as an essential ingredient for 
reform (OECD, 2001; USGAO, 1995).  A major hurdle in implementing results-based 
management is the relative lack of experience and expertise (Hatry, 1997a, 1997b; UNIFEM, 
2008). Successful implementation is dependent on managers and staff having the necessary 
knowledge, skills, and abilities to develop and use the performance measurement system (Casey, 
2007).  Training in the development and use of performance measures builds the skills needed 
for results-based management in organisations that have historically been preoccupied with 
inputs (Qizilbash, 2006)  Training not only assists in the acquisition of skills, but also in 
changing the organisational culture (Jackson & Philip, 2005).  
 
Employees need to know why performance measurement is being undertaken, what their role is 
in the new system, and how performance information fits into the decision-making process 
(McKenzie, 2010; OECD, 2001). They need to know that the performance measurement system 
will provide essential information to improve management within the public sector and that it 
will help monitor progress made towards the achievement of expected results.  A lack of clear 
expectations about possible uses for performance data presents perhaps the most difficult 
challenge (Binnendijk, 2001).  In many cases, the sorts of measures that might effectively guide 
internal decision-making may provide data that managers would not want made public for 
resource allocation decisions (IEG, 2011; UNDP, 2009).  In order to overcome the above 
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scenarios, the donors came up with ways in which the though appropriate to transfer innovations 
hence the introduction of Results Based Mangement (RBM).  
 
2.8  RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT (RBM) 
Governments and organizations all over the world are grappling with internal and external 
demands and pressures for improvements and reforms in public sector management. They are 
facing a variety of unique accountability challenges towards their stakeholders as they try to 
answer the ―so what‖ question in regards to the human development results and impacts of their 
actions (Kusek & Rist, 2004; World Bank, 2004). 
 
Whereas many international donor organisations like the United Nations Evaluation Group 
(UNEG), the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the OECD, the United Nations Development 
Programme have written about RBM (MUNDIAL, 2011; UNEG, 2005a; IEG, 2011a), there is 
little scholarly ‗academic‘ literature on RBM.   However, some leading scholars have tried to 
study the outcome of using RBM, especially in measuring the impact of donor funds on the 
livelihood of the beneficiaries of grants and loans (Madhekeni, 2012).  
 
The concept of RBM is believed to have begun with Peter Drucker as Management by 
Objectives (MBO) and Program Performance Budgeting System (PPBS) in the 1960s and 
evolved into the use of a logical framework for the public sector in the 1970s (Rassapan, 2005: 
2). Management by results (MBR) is a process in which employers and employees agree on what 
they have to achieve while working for the organisation. An employee‘s performance is related 
to the extent to which objectives are met. At the start of the performance management cycle the 
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employee and the supervisors agree on what should be achieved (Odiorne, 1965). The term 
"management by objectives" was first popularised by (Drucker, 1954). While performance-based 
budgeting is the practice of developing budgets based on the relationship between programme 
funding levels and expected results from that programme, the performance-based budgeting 
process is a tool that programme administrators can use to manage more cost-efficient and 
effective budgeting (Young, 2003). And a logical framework is a means to define (or present) a 
logic as a signature in a higher-order type theory in such a way that provability of a formula in 
the original logic reduces to a type of inhabitation problem in the framework type theory (Jacobs, 
2001: 598). To describe a logical framework, one must provide the following: 
 A characterisation of the class of object-logics to be represented; 
 An appropriate meta-language; 
 A characterisation of the mechanism by which object-logics are represented (Young, 
2003). 
This is summarised by: ‗Framework = Language + Representation‘ 
 
According to Hulme (2007), results-based management is a  
…strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate with 
improving performance as the central orientation where the key component is the process of 
objectively measuring how well an agency is meeting its stated goals or objectives. 
 
RBM is a sub-field of a wider and more theorised body of work, were management seeks to 
understand how the public sector could be made more effective (Minogue, Polidano, & Hulme, 
1998) as cited by Hulme (2007). With RBM, human development posits that human beings are 
both the ends as well as the means of development, which contradicts many economists and 
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policymakers who want to rely purely on per capita economic growth, and emphasises the 
multidimensionality of human wellbeing (Qizilbash, 2006).  
 
Based on the knowledge of RBM, governments and organisations all over the world are 
grappling with internal and external demands and pressures for improvement and reform in 
public sector management.  They are facing a variety of unique challenges of accountability 
towards their stakeholders as they try to answer the ―so what?‖ question regarding human 
development results and impacts of their actions (MUNDIAL, 2011; UNEG, 2005a; IEG 2011a).  
 
Donor agencies broadly agree on the definition, purposes, and key features of RBM systems as 
follows:  
Results based management provides a coherent framework for strategic planning and 
management based on learning and accountability in a decentralized environment. It is first a 
management system and second, a performance reporting system (World Bank, 2004) in 
Binnendijk, 2001, and in Nelson, 2010. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that introducing a results-oriented approach aims at improving 
management effectiveness and accountability by defining realistic expected results, monitoring 
progress toward the achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into 
management decisions and reporting on performance (Committee, 2002; Menon et al., 2009).  
As the pressure to do more with less is mounting, governments and NGOs are facing increasing 
calls for reform from internal and external stakeholders, for example to deliver tangible results in 
a fair, accountable, equitable, efficient, and timely manner (Löffler & Bovaird, 2009).With 
diminishing resources, these organisations are experiencing budgetary constraints which force 
them to make difficult choices and trade-offs in deciding on the best use of limited resources.  
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There is recognition of the need to build and sustain results-based management systems to 
demonstrate performance. 
 
2.8.1 RBM Approaches, models and how they differ in context and implementation 
RBM is a management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way organisations 
operate, with improving performance in terms of results as the central orientation (OECD, 2002). 
RBM provides the management framework and tools for strategic planning, risk management, 
performance monitoring, and evaluation. Its primary purpose is to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness through organisational learning and, secondly, to fulfil accountability obligations 
through performance reporting (Menon et al., 2009). Key to its success is the involvement of 
stakeholders throughout the management lifecycle in defining realistic expected results, 
assessing risk, monitoring progress, reporting on performance and integrating the lessons learned 
into management decisions. 
 
RBM is significantly different from its precursor, MBO, which suffered from a confusion of 
terminology. Take for example the term ―objective‖ which has the following synonyms: aim, 
goal, intent, purpose and target, not to mention the use of the phrases general and specific 
objectives. The roles and relationships among these terms within the MBO approach was never 
really clear (Menon et al., 2009), with the exception of the hierarchy of objectives that was 
popularized through the use of the Logical Framework Analysis, i.e., inputs, outputs, purpose 
and goal (OECD, 2001). While one can argue the semantic nuances between a well-written 
objective and a well-written result statement, the significant differences lie in how RBM terms 
are defined in relationship to one another. 




RBM terminology borrows heavily from systems theory and reflects the central role of causality, 
while taking into account the temporal dimension. The following selection of key RBM terms as 
defined by the OECD (2001) clearly illustrates these concepts: 
Inputs include financial, human, and material resources used for the development 
intervention. 
Activity refers to actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, 
technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilised to produce specific 
outputs. A related term to activities is development intervention. 
Outputs are the products, capital goods and services which result from a development 
intervention.  
Outcomes are the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an 
intervention‘s outputs. 
Impacts are positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by 
a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. 
 
Successful implementation of RBM is dependent on the organisation‘s ability to create a 
management culture that is focused on results. It requires more than the adoption of new 
administrative and operational systems (Dobosz & Jankowicz, 2002). An emphasis on outcomes 
first and foremost requires a results-oriented management culture that will support and encourage 
the use of the new management approaches. 
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Performance-Based Budgeting: Historically, Performance-based Budgeting (PBB) is described 
as linking performance levels directly to the budgeting process and allocating resources among 
competing programmes based on cost-effectiveness measures (DFID, 2001).  It was believed that 
integrating performance information into budgetary decision-making and management practices 
would create incentives for improvement. According to Young (2003), performance 
measurement in and of itself is not a strong incentive for improvement unless it is connected to 
budgetary decision-making. Many refer to the PBB approach as ―managing by results‖ which 
leads to the misconception that PBB is synonymous with RBM (Young, 2003).  
 
Continuous Evaluation: The essence of evaluation is to determine the relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact and sustainability of activities in the light of their objectives as systematically 
and objectively as possible. Continuous evaluation implies having different formative 
evaluations. One of the popular misconceptions is that RBM and continuous evaluation, also 
known as performance measurement, are synonymous. It is true that the continuous process of 
collecting and analysing data to compare current performance with what was expected is an 
important component of the RBM approach. However, RBM is a much broader management 
strategy that incorporates aspects of strategic planning, risk management, monitoring, evaluation 
and even auditing. This popular misconception has led to some people to believe that RBM is 
designed to increase compliance and control in decentralised management environments (OECD, 
2008).  
 
Performance Reporting: This is a detailed statement that measures the results of some activity in 
terms of its success within a specific time frame. Performance reporting is not the main purpose 
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of RBM, just a secondary by-product of good RBM. In government, performance reporting 
requirements are sometimes the only point of leverage that central agencies have over ministries 
and departments (Wener, 2006). 
 
Compliance and Controls: Compliance and control entail the use of a performance 
measurement system as instrument by which senior management ensures compliance and 
exercise control over front-line managers under the guise of accountability (Werner, 2013).  
With Government services becoming increasingly decentralised with privatisation, organisations 
have resorted to outsourcing and alternative service delivery (UNDP, 2004). The often advanced 
argument is that there must be increased accountability with delegated decision-making 
authority, not just for the stewardship of funds, but also for the achievement of results. When this 
rationale is applied to the individual, we observe a number of distortions in how RBM is 
implemented. In many cases, individual performance appraisals or incentives are linked to the 
achievement of short- and medium-term outcomes through the performance measurement 
system. This becomes problematic because the performance measurement system becomes the 
instrument by which senior management ensures compliance and exercises control over front-
line managers under the guise of accountability.  
 
2.8.2 RBM in the Context of Managing for Development Results 
In the Accra Agenda for Action, Managing for Development Results (MfDR) (Menon et al., 
2009) and (Rogers, 2008) commitments provide that: 
(a) Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation and 
assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, disaggregating 
data by sex, region and socioeconomic status;  
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(b) Developing countries and donors will work to develop cost-effective results management 
instruments to assess the impact of development policies and adjust them as necessary;  
(c) Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems; they will support 
and invest in strengthening national statistical capacity and information systems, 
including those for managing aid; and  
(d) All partners will strengthen incentives to improve aid effectiveness by systematically 
reviewing and addressing legal or administrative impediments to implementing 
international commitments on aid effectiveness. Donors will pay more attention to 
delegating sufficient authority to country offices and to changing organizational and staff 
incentives to promote behaviour in line with aid effectiveness principles.  
 
In RBM, as in MfDR, ‗results‘ are understood to go beyond management (systems, scorecards, 
metrics, reporting) and should be dynamic and transformative (Menon et al., 2009) so that results 
inform decision-making and lead to continuous improvement and the achievement of envisaged 
changes in outcomes. 
 
The effect of the RBM approach is to link strategic policy planning and budget planning to goal 
achievement, thus moving the institution from internal management focus to an outward looking 
orientation, centred on achieving results (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009; Loffler & Bovaird, 2009). 
Private sector and public sector literature review highlighted several factors promoting 
implementation conditions of RBM.  
 
2.8.3 RBM in Strategy Planning 
Results-Based Programme Planning ensures that the sum of interventions is sufficient to achieve 
the expected result (UNICEF, 2003). RBM has been one of the most used tools by organisations 
in the planning phase for their strategic frameworks, programmes and projects (OECD, 2001). A 
number of tools are used in the planning phase; these include: results matrix, monitoring and 
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evaluation plan, and risk mitigation strategy (UNEG, 2005a). It is during the planning phase that 
all the initiatives or activities, programme logic and contextual factors of programme ―theory of 
change‖ elements that are required to effect a desired development change are defined (UNDP, 
2009). 
 
A theory of change is a strategy for change. It explains all the major elements that need to be in 
place in order that developmental change may occur.  The key elements in the theory of change 
are stated by Rogers (2008) is not about what the organisation must do, but what all partners and 
non-partners must do to make real change happen. It is not about projects, but all the different 
types of interventions necessary for change to happen. The Act Knowledge and Aspen Institute 
Roundtable on Community Change (2003) suggested that the theory of change is about  
…building coherent logical models so as to be explicit about: What change is desired; what needs 
to take place for the desired changes to occur? What risks there are to that change ever coming 
into being and how they can be mitigated?; Why is the  system of monitoring necessary to capture 
relevant data on whether  change is emerging as planned; and, How and when relevant 
stakeholders will be able to decide if the initiative was a success or not? 
 
A successful project, programme or policy needs both a strong design and strong implementation 
(Rogers, 2008). One of these two components on its own is not sufficient to ensure success. A 
well-crafted theory of change can help on both accounts, by clearly articulating where the 
initiative intends to go and, secondly, by matching monitoring data against the theory so as to tell 
whether the initiative is going in the right direction or not.  It can, therefore, be concluded that, to 
use RBM, the organisation should adopt it right from the planning stage and answer the 
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following five questions when thinking through the logic of a programme, or its theory of 
change: (Mulcaster, 2008; UNDG, 2011).  
 
What are the concern or concerns of most affected citizens and other stakeholders? To sort out 
this issue, we need questions such as:  Is there a problem? How do we define the problem? What 
are the extent and the causes of the problem? 
 What is the outcome or solution sought? In other words, what would success look like? 
Can success be defined? How can it be measured? When will success be achieved? What 
definitions of success are most relevant? Can we articulate casual model/theory of change 
for how to state success? 
 What are known or likely risks which will stop the programme being successfully 
implemented? Have key risks that threaten success at each stage of the theory of change 
been identified? Are there mitigating ways to address these risks in case they are 
identified? Is the performance measurement system sufficiently nimble and sensitive for 
picking up data that show the effort is going off track? Can key assumptions be tested and 
measured with information readily available to determine what is, or is not, working? 
 Can new programme logic and knowledge gained from implementing programme 
interventions be fed back regularly as necessary into the programme to revise the design 
and implementation plan?  
 
One example where information gained from strategy execution is regularly fed into strategy 
planning to inform existing and new programme logic is at where the Government of Uganda 
has committed itself to effective public service delivery in support of its poverty-reduction 
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priorities. The recognition of service delivery effectiveness as an imperative of national 
development management is strong evidence of commitment to results, which has also been 
evident in several of the public management priorities and activities in Uganda (Mulcaster, 
2008). 
 
2.8.4  RBM in strategy execution (monitoring) 
Monitoring is an important task in the life of a programme or project and is a continuous process 
of regular systematic assessment based on participation, reflection, feedback, data collection, 
analysis of actual performance and regular reporting. Monitoring tells us where we are in relation 
to where we want to be; it helps us remain on track by gathering data and evidence, identifying 
issues and analysing documents and reports (Menon et al., 2009; O'Sullivan, 2004). Monitoring 
is for accountability purposes in order to communicate results to stakeholders and adjust the 




People more often easily confuse RBM and Monitoring. RBM is a Management strategy or 
approach by which an organisation ensures that its processes, products and services contribute to 
the achievement of clearly stated results (UNDP, 2009). RBM goes beyond output monitoring of 
the past to stress outcome monitoring (World Bank, 2003a).  Outcome monitoring refers to 
tracking the outputs and measures their contributions to outcomes by assessing the change from 
baseline conditions (Obadan, 2005). Obadan (2005) and DBSA (2000) suggested that the results 
matrix, the monitoring and evaluation plan, provide the most important monitoring tools by 
outlining expected results, indicators, baselines and targets against which to  monitor ‘change‘. 
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The results matrix helps to stay focused on the expected achievements of the programme or 
project. The results matrix can be used in a number of ways. First, it serves as the centrepiece of 
a programme or project proposal, summarising in a nutshell what the programme or project 
hopes to achieve. Second, the results matrix serves as the reference point for management during 
team meetings. It can act as a guide for reporting on progress and helps in making management 
decisions based on performance information. Third, the results matrix is an aid for monitoring 
and evaluation, providing parameters for what results to measure and to account for with useful 
targets, baselines and sources of information (Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Menon et al., 2009). The 
monitoring and evaluation plan gives precise information on methods, frequency and 
responsibilities with regard to expected results and indicators (Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Menon et 
al., 2009). Monitoring thus provides the opportunity to:  
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 Review assumptions made during the planning process to ensure they still hold true; 
 Track progress in the achievement of results; 
 Decide whether the original strategies are still appropriate and should be continued or 
modified; and 
 Make necessary adjustments to resources, both human and/or financial. An important 
element of monitoring effectively is ensuring that data systems are developed and collect 
information on a regular basis. Data may come from a combination of national systems 
and the programme or project specifically. Baseline data is normally collected at the 
beginning of a programme to show where the programmer project stands before the 
intervention. 
 
Furthermore, in line with the above DBSA (2000) contentions, the point here is that performance 
measurement, including establishing baseline values and setting targets, has become increasingly 
important in Africa because of stagnant and negative economic growth rates; concerns related to 
governance; and doubts about the efficacy of development assistance (DBSA, 2000).  
 
Monitoring supports learning from experience, expands the existing knowledge base and helps to 
make programmes even more effective. Monitoring and evaluation of organisations, projects and 
programmes plays an essential role in this process. RBM has a number of advantages and 
benefits, because it gives an organisation insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of its 
activities, projects and programmes. An organisation can use these results to adjust its activities 
(Kusek & Rist, 2004). 
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2.8.5  RBM in strategy execution (evaluation) 
While monitoring essentially is a management function and internal to the implementation of a 
programme or project, evaluation is independent and usually external, RBM needs external 
validation of results reported in order to be credible. However, according to Kusek and Rist 
(2004), monitoring and evaluation should begin with a ‗readiness assessment‘. The United 
Nations Evaluation Group (2009) has defined an evaluation as ‖An assessment, as systematic 
and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, program, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, 
operational area, institutional performance‖. It focuses on expected and achieved 
accomplishments, examining the results chain, processes, and contextual factors of causality in 
order to understand achievements or the lack thereof. It aims at determining the relevance, 
impact, effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions and contributions of the 
organisations to development results. An evaluation should provide evidence-based information 
that is credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, 
recommendations and lessons into the decision-making processes of the organisations of the UN 
system and its members (Pawson, 2001; Nutley, Davies & Walter, 2003; UNEG, 2005b). 
 
Evaluations have three key functions 
(1) Utilisation, as an input to provide decision makers with knowledge and evidence about 
performance and good practices; 
(2) Accountability to donors, funders, political authorities, stakeholders and the general public; 
and 
(3) Contribution to institutional policymaking, development effectiveness and organisational 
effectiveness (UNEG, 2009; OECD, 2001).  
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Over time, the accountability function has expanded from donors and government primarily to 
other stakeholders and beneficiaries of development interventions. This means that evaluations 
should be useful to all parties, not only the hiring organisation. Evaluations should also help to 
improve development effectiveness and provide critical inputs for managing for results (Nutley, 
Davies & Walter, 2003; McKenzie, 2010). 
 
The usefulness of evaluations, therefore, depends largely on the extent to which the information 
they provide is aligned with the questions asked by their potential users. For most organisations, 
those users include operational staff, management, governments or private sector clients, and the 
development community. Hence the organisation, in its evaluation, should examine the relevance 
of evaluation for programme and project operations, institutional strategies, knowledge 
generation, and accountability for results (IEG, 2012). 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide 
an objective basis for assessing the results of organisations‘ work, and to provide accountability 
in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves organisation work by identifying and 
disseminating the lessons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn from 
evaluation findings, all fed back to the strategy planning process, thus improving interventions 
(IEG, 2012). Thus evaluation utilisation and use of performance measurement information 
completes results-based management or the performance management cycle.  
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2.8.6 RBM in strategy execution (utilization of evaluations) 
Integrating complementary information from both evaluation and performance measurement 
systems and ensuring management's use of this information are viewed as critical aspects of 
results-based management (OECD, 2000). In most organisations, there is a modest feedback loop 
between evaluation production and programme and project operations and learning. There are 
notable examples of the influence of evaluation on development practice, including project 
assessment, decisions to design future programmes; raising the profile of certain types of 
interventions; informing policy dialogue and institutional strategies; and building local RBM 
capabilities (Walter, 2003). Such examples indicate that evaluation, overall, is regarded as a 
valuable tool to increase development effectiveness through better evidence. But in some 
instances, even when evaluations have been relevant and of good quality, they appear to have 
had limited use and influence (IEG, 2012; UNDP, 2009), for varying reasons: poor timeliness, 
failure to engage programme and project teams and decision makers, or lack of dissemination.  
 
Countries have adopted the use of evidence from evaluations to justify their high levels of 
expenditure on education, health and social welfare over other national public sectors (Nutley, 
Davies & Walter, 2003). Evaluation must satisfy a need. ―What is involved is a complex mixture 
of institutional preconditions, political culture, exposure to intellectual traditions, as well as 
sectoral concerns dominating the political discussion‖ (Davies & Walter, 2003). 
 
With increasing demand for accountability for results by bilateral organisations, stakeholders, 
government oversight institutions, political oversight, citizens and donors (Ravishankaret al., 
2009), there are signs of improvement, such as dedicated support for results dissemination as 
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well as closer collaboration with operations and clients in the design of on-going evaluations by 
organisations.  Lack of demand is rooted in the absence of a strong evaluation culture (Schacter, 
2000), which stems from the fact that performance measurement has been viewed as fault 
finding and identification of non-performance and/or non-achievement of planned results as 
opposed to being viewed as a tool for performance improvements and learning. 
 
According to Kusek and Rist (2004), a credible answer to the ―so what‖ question is that results-
based management seeks to address the accountability concerns of stakeholders, to give public 
sector managers information on progress towards achieving the stated targets and goals, and to 
provide substantial evidence as the basis for any necessary mid-course corrections in policies, 
programs or projects. 
 
2.8.7  Challenges to implementing RBM policy innovation as a tool for strategy planning 
and strategy execution 
In implementing RBM, resistance and momentum in the implementation are critical aspects that 
need to be anticipated. Readiness assessment and timing is an important factor to consider during 
implementation of RBM (World Bank, 2004). Morris, (2006) and Roger (2008) also cautions 
that there are risks associated with taking both too long or too little time to implement results-
based management.  A too hurried implementation will only exacerbate fears, but there also are 
risks associated with a slow implementation process.  It is important, therefore, to keep the 
momentum going at a balanced pace (Kusek & Risk, 2004). 
 
Ensuring that performance indicators and measurement practices are linked to strategic 
objectives or expected results is important to successful performance management (OECD, 
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2002a).  In this way, performance measurement is integrated within strategic planning (UNDP, 
2009). Therefore knowledge about strategy planning and execution is increased, and the strategy 
is more likely to be realised (UNDG, 2009).  Managers also need to take a corporate-level view 
and not make the mistake of aggregating functions or lines of business (UNDG, 2009). 
 
There is a cost associated with implementation, and organisations do not necessarily have the 
capacity to adopt a new system (Rogers, 2008). If organisations are expected to design and use 
performance measurement systems, those requesting the information need to recognise that these 
organisations need the resources to do so (World Bank, 2008b, 2009).  Experience in the US 
suggests that commitment of resources—including the time of top-level management devoted to 
designing and implementing feasible performance measurement systems—is a key indication of 
top leadership support.  Such support minimises the risk (Rogers, 2008; World Bank, 2010). 
 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) suggest that performance 
management be located at the programme level and that this will assist in ensuring buy-in from 
line managers (IFAD, 2009; UNEG, 2005b).  However, according to experience in the 
Australian Public Service Western Australia ("Managing for Outcomes: Output Plans and 
Guidance for Departments," 2002), central monitoring and evaluation units within organisations 
should take responsibility for the process.  It is argued that these units can provide the necessary 
technical and analytical expertise needed for successful implementation (UNEG, 2005b).  If 
performance monitoring is to be part of an overall initiative, in particular a shift from a 
traditional direct type of control to a more flexible, strategic, and distant type of control, then the 
need for firm central leadership seems clear (Mayne, 2007a). 




Conducting pilot projects presents a good opportunity for organisations to test new systems 
(AWID, 2013). Pilot projects have facilitated implementation by easing the organisations into 
reforms.  They represent an opportunity to work out problems with some or all of the 
components of the new system while it is being used on a small scale. 
 
One of the biggest risk factors that threaten successful implementation of results-based 
management is over-complexity (Casey, 2007).  Over-complexity of a performance measurement 
system will lead to implementation problems and will simply frustrate stakeholders.  The easier 
it is to use and apply, the more likely it is that stakeholders will adopt and embrace the new 
approach.  One way to keep it simple is to limit the number of indicators.  Multiple cases have 
suggested that indicators should be kept down in number; three indicators which are solid 
measures of outcomes are better than 10 which do not measure anything relevant (AWID, 2009, 
2013).   
 
Using the logic chart has proved to be very helpful in the development and identification of 
expected results, indicators, and risks (OECD, 2006a). It facilitates the task of conceptualising 
projects/programmes in terms of inputs, outputs, and outcomes.  It also helps verify the logical 
consequences of the cause-and-effect linkages and, hence, the level of attribution.  This is a 
useful tool particularly for stakeholders who are not familiar with results-based management, 
because it illustrates how RBM works (UNDP, 2004).  A further advantage that proponents still 
claim for the logframe is that the identification of risks helps to structure the uncontrollable 
factors separating outcomes from output (Ravallion, 2009). 




Morris (2006) believes that RBM focuses attention on achieving outcomes; establishes goals and 
objectives; permits managers to identify and take action to correct weaknesses; and supports a 
development agenda that is shifting towards greater accountability for aid lending. But 
implementing RBM requires a combination of institutional capacity and political will. For 
performance information to be useful, it must be valid and reliable.  The information will simply 
not be accepted or used if it is biased or inaccurate (Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010).  Even 
a perceived possibility that the information could be falsified can impair the usefulness of the 
system (IFAD, 2009; UNEG, 2005b).  To ensure that the information is credible, there needs to 
be some form of independent checking or auditing.  The means of verification must be 
communicated.  It has been found that simply describing the chosen method within annual 
reports provides assurance to readers that the information is credible (Mayne, 2007a). 
 
It is difficult to judge whether results are improving if one has no reference point against which 
to compare.  In this sense, baselines and targets are critical for defining accountability.  In the 
absence of specific and measurable standards of performance against which measured 
performance can be compared, there is no basis for accountability (UNDG, 2009).  
Benchmarking against similar programmes is another method used for setting targets.  Evidence 
from the private sector suggests that benchmarking against competitors is a useful practice 
(Hulme, 2007; Hulme, 2007) also notes that indicators and targets should be set in the context of 
what is understood to be best practices through reference to the experience of other agencies 
undertaking the same or similar tasks. 
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The use and hence credibility of performance information is essential for effective 
implementation of development interventions.  The performance information collected has to be 
useful (OECD, 2002a; UNEG, 2009). It has to illustrate that it is worth the cost incurred to 
collect the data.  As data usage increases and produces real benefits, individuals will gain more 
confidence in the data (World Bank, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
Managers will be less likely to commit to achieving results if they do not have the flexibility 
needed to manage their programmes efficiently and effectively (OECD, 2006a).  The idea of 
having fewer rules and controls is an attractive incentive in support of results-based management 
(OECD, 2006a). The use of other types of incentives needs to be carefully considered.  For 
example, pay for performance has been used in some jurisdictions (OECD, 2006a), but not 
always with positive results (OECD, 2002a).  Incentives can be counterproductive when the 
perception is that good performance is rewarded and poor performance is penalised with budget 
cuts and staff reductions, rather than seen as an opportunity to learn.   
 
Information regarding progress towards achieving objectives should be reported and 
communicated to all stakeholders.  As stated earlier, results-based management should be 
implemented using a participatory approach.  Stakeholders involved in the process will want to 
be kept informed of the progress.  This vital flow of information should be maintained (Gore, 
1999). Managers and staff need performance information frequently in order to make 
adjustments to programmes and to later assess the effectiveness of those adjustments.  The most 
successful organisations have kept in constant communication with their staff at all levels 
(Meier, 1998). 




Development literature (OECD, 2006a; UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2008b) cautions that, while 
some see merit in the RBM approach and view it as a navigating aid to assist organisations 
achieve their intended results, many organisations that are now required to use the approach for 
project designs and progress reports find RBM an imposition motivated mostly by investor‘s 
concerns about accountability.  The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (ODI, 2003) also 
warns that attempts to transplant mechanisms like RBM developed in OECD countries into the 
very different institutional environments found in developing countries have rarely had a 
significant impact due to a myriad of factors such as organisational setup and human factors 
including results and information culture. 
 
2.8.8 Concluding remarks on RBM in planning, monitoring and evaluation 
As all management systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation become more results based, 
it is expected that the process of implementation will lead to greater learning, adjustment and 
decision-making. This continual process of feedback and adjustment seeks to make programmes 
and projects more responsive to the environment within which they operate. Organisations need 
to ensure that they have adequate mechanisms for flexibility, revision, adjustment and learning 
(UNDP, 2009). 
 
RBM emphasises efficiency and effectiveness and business systems and processes inform on 
what, how, when and where. When business processes are aligned to programmes, they 
strengthen the likelihood that results will be achieved and facilitate improved staff performance 
(World Bank, 2008b). Considerable progress has been made with several established standard 
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operating procedures and business processes, including delegation of authority and 
corresponding accountability frameworks. RBM stresses learning to inform decision-making, 
planning and improvement.  
 
With the major emphasis on evidence and visible change, the RBM is a powerful instrument that 
can be used to improve the way in which organisations and governments achieve results. Just as 
governments need financial, human resource and accountability systems, governments also need 
good performance feedback systems (Hauge, 2001). As described by Khan (2001), results-based 
management is an exercise to assess the performance of an institution or a programme or a 
project, on the basis of impacts and benefits that it is expected to produce. Unlike the traditional 
monitoring and evaluation, which simply measure and report on the status of results, the RBM 
measures and reports results to produce better results. In other words, it is a proactive tool to 
improve decision making and drive interventions and actions towards clearly defined goals 
(Kahn, 2001). 
 
The International Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET, 2007:3) suggests that 
there are growing pressures in developing countries, particularly in Africa, to improve the 
performance of their public sectors. One strategy to address this need is to design and construct 
results-based management systems. These strategies track the results produced, or not produced, 
by governments and other entities. Kusek and Rist (2004) suggest that what gets measured gets 
managed. The power of measuring results is that, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
If you do not measure results, you cannot tell success from failure;  
If you cannot see success, you cannot learn from it and you cannot reward it, you are probably 
rewarding failure;  
If you cannot recognize failure, you cannot correct it;  
If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support (World Bank, 2010). 
 
2.9  RBM POLICY INNOVATION GOOD PRACTICES CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
This section presents the RBM policy innovation conceptual framework and factors ‗enablers‘ 
model for successful RBM transfer. The transfer of technologies framework captured the 
processes for the transfer of RBM policy innovation from developers to end-users at UN-Habitat. 
To understand the phenomenon of transfer, the study was aligned to literature on the transfer and 
diffusion of technologies (Hall & Hord, 1987; Mackenzie Owen & Van Halm, 1989; Rogers, 
1995); transfer of management knowledge to developing countries; and private and public sector 
literature (OECD, 2001) on results-based management. Transfer of RBM policy innovation in 
this study includes not just the acceptance and appropriation of the new technical knowledge, but 
also new ways of thinking and understanding new discourses and, more deeply, the values, 
beliefs, and assumptions on which new practices are found. 
 
Transfer theories emphasise factors that promote or undermine the transfer process from one 
point to another. They, for instance, emphasise that local values and cultures and management 
learning must always be taken into account for successful transfer of management knowledge 
(Hofstedeet al., 1997; Lang & Steger, 2002; Peng, 2000).  
 
A convergence in most available RBM literature by development donor agencies and multilateral 
organisations (OECD, 2001; World Bank, 2004; UN, 2001) points to the fact that for RBM 
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policy innovation to successfully transfer, the following six design and implementation aspects 
must be incorporated into the intervention theory of change: 
(a) Expected results must be clearly defined and must be measurable; 
(b) Assumptions and risks must be identified and monitored over time;  
(c) Performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge 
performance must be selected;  
(d) Performance monitoring systems must be developed to regularly collect performance 
information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual 
results vis-à-vis the targeted results);  
(e) The RBM system must integrate formative evaluations to provide complementary 
performance information not readily available from performance monitoring systems; 
and that 
(f) Performance information is used not only for internal management accountability, 
learning and decision making processes, but also for external performance reporting to 
stakeholders and partners (OECD, 2001). 
 
According to OECD/DAC (2002), the first three phases or processes generally relate to a results-
oriented planning approach, sometimes referred to as strategic planning. The first five together 
are usually included in the concept of performance measurement. All six phases combined are 
essential to an effective RBM policy innovation system. That is integrating complementary 
information from both evaluations and performance measurement systems and ensuring use of 
this information are viewed as critical aspects of RBM. The six steps are diagrammatically 
represented below. 
 




 1. Identifying clear and measurable objectives 
  
2. Selecting indicators 
  
3. Setting explicit targets 
    
4. Developing performance monitoring systems 
  
5. Reviewing, analysing and reporting actual 
 
6. Using evaluation findings to generate lessons and increase the 
understanding of strengths, weaknesses and comparative advantages 
 
7. Using performance information for internal management accountability, 
learning, resource allocation decisions including human resources 
management, and reporting to stakeholders and partners 
 
Figure 2.2: Holistic RBM Policy Innovation 
Source:  (Adopted from OECD: 2001) 
 
RBM Policy Innovation Enablers and Barriers Model 
Transfer theories emphasized factors that promote or undermine the transfer process from one 
point to another. They, for instance, emphasize that local values and cultures and management 
learning must always be taken into account for successful transfer of management knowledge 
(Hofstede, 1997; Lang & Steger, 2002; Peng, 2000). According to Hall and Hord (2001), during 
the initial stages of using an innovation, these concerns are centred on the capabilities of the 
adopter to use the innovation and on the role he or she plays with respect to the innovation. This 
analysis centres on the adopter and indicates that adopters‘ innovation-related concerns change 
as their competencies in using the innovation changes.  In addition, adopters are concerned about 
the rewards of using the innovation. Successful implementation is also dependent on managers 
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performance measurement system (Casey, 2007). It is critical that senior management, from top 
to middle managers, fully support and actively participate in the implementation of results-based 
management (UNDP, 2009; UNEG, 2009). Their level of commitment sets the tone for the entire 
organisation (Clinton, 2012). By involving managers and staff in the process of developing the 
strategic plans and performance measures, a sense of ownership and commitment is developed 
(McKenzie, 2010). Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) argue that learning is both institutional and 
individual, and ensuing corporate changes are seen as the prerequisite for the success and 
survival of organisations irrespective of their size and sector. Results-based management should 
be implemented using a participatory approach.  Stakeholders involved in the process will want 
to be kept informed of the progress.  This vital flow of information should be maintained (Gore, 
1999). 
 
Therefore for RBM policy innovation system to transfer successfully, it must be supported by a 
corporate culture characterised by the listed enablers, (a- β) below, and avoiding their absence 
‗barriers‘: This is further demonstrated in Figure 2.3 that shows enablers that contribute to 
successful adoption of RBM policy innovation in implementing organisations. Inappropriate 
realisation and implementation of any of these enablers result in this variable/enabler becoming a 
barrier to successful RBM adoption. Therefore, when any of the variables below are realised, it 
becomes an enabler to successful RBM policy transfer, and when inappropriately realised, they 
become barriers to RBM transfer (Source: Researcher original work).  The RBM enablers 
therefore are: 
(a) Ideological commonalities between the RBM‘s components and principles, and 
organisations‘ Espoused values and governance practices 
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(b) Donor Pressure  
(c) Emerging political support from senior leadership including resource allocation for 
RBM implementation 
(d) Existence of good communication channels  
(e) Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services 
(f) Lessons of experience from pilot programmes  
(g) Governance values  
(h) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity  
(i) Empowerment and accountability: Institutional mechanism for holding managers 
accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control and managers with 
delegated authority to the management level are held accountable for results, and 
empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustment and to shift resources to 
better performing activities 
(j) Participatory and team-based management: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects 
of performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and 
understanding of development objectives 
(k) Learning organisation  
(l) The reward system 
(m) β 
(n) Six RBM policy innovation adoption steps 
 (Source: Researcher‘s original work) 
 
The enablers can thus be summarised as:  
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Successful RBM innovation adoption enables =  f (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, I, j, k, l, m)  
Where:  
 Successful RBM policy innovation adoption = dependent variable 
 Independent variables ‗enablers/drivers‘ are: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, I, j, k, l, β 
o β = other variables that might have been omitted from the enablers model 
and hence resulting in under identification of the model. 
 The six RBM policy innovation adoption steps 
 
Thus RBM poicy innovation adoption = f (Six RBM policy innovation adoption steps) + f(a, b, c, 
d, e, f, g, h, i,  j, k, l, m, β) 
 





































1. Clearly defining expected 
results in a measurable manner 
2. Identifying and monitoring 
risks over time 
3. Identifying or selecting 
performance indicators that will 
be used to measure progress 
towards results and to judge 
performance 
 
Performance Monitoring & 
Reporting 
4. Developing performance 
monitoring systems to regularly 
collect performance information 
on actual results, review, analyse 
and report performance 
Evaluation & use of 
Performance Information 
5. Integrating formative 
evaluations to provide 
complementary 
performance not readily 
available from performance 
monitoring systems 
 
6. Use of performance 
information for learning, 
management improvement, 
‗decision-making 
processes‘, and internal 
management accountability 
 
(a) Donor Pressure 
(b) Ideological Commonalities between the 
RBM Components and Principles, and the 
organization‘s Espoused Values and 
Governance Practices 
© Results focus: A focus on targeted client 
satisfaction with goods and services;  
(m) β 
(d) Empowerment and 
accountability 
(e) Reward system   




(g) Existence of good communication channels 
(h) Lessons learned from pilot programmes 
(i) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity  
(j) Participatory and team-based management 
(k) Governance values 



































Figure 2.3: RBM Policy Innovation Adoption Model 
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Figure 2.3 comprises of: strategic planning, performance measurement, evaluations, performance 
information use, enablers and barriers.  
The six stages of RBM policy innovation transfer from Figure 2.3 (discussed in Chapter Seven) 
are therefore presented / expressed as follows:  
 Strategic planning (SP) = Well-defined results, Risk Management, Results focused 
indicators (1, 2 & 3) 
 Performance monitoring and reporting (PMR) = performance monitoring systems (4) 
 Performance measurement (PM) =  
Well-defined results, Risk Management, Results focused indicators & performance 
monitoring systems (1, 2, 3 & 4) 
 Thus PM = f (SP, PMR) 
 Evaluation and use of performance information (EUI) = formative evaluations and 
performance information for learning, management improvement, decision-making 
processes (5 & 6). The use of performance information for management decision-making 
requires that it becomes integrated into key management systems and processes of the 
organization; such as in strategic planning, policy formulation, program or project 
management, financial and budget management, and human resource management. 
 Performance management = f (SP, PM, EUI) 
 Therefore, performance management (PMM) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 
 Thus: PM  = PMM – EUI  
 PMM = f (Learning, performance improvement, accountability) 
 PMM = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) = f (Learning, performance improvement, accountability) 
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 For SP to be effectively executed it has to be supported by enablers (a, b, c, m); PMR 
requires enablers (d, e, f, m) for its successful implementation and performance 
measurement will be successful if enablers (g, h, I, j, k, l, m) are present. 
The three chapters of the research finding are represented in the model (Figure 2.3) by the 
enablers (a, b, c,……,l, m) - are discussed in chapter five, barriers (which are the 
reverse/converse of enablers) are presented in chapter six and chapter seven discusses the six 
stages for RBM policy innovation transfer [PMM = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)].  
 
In the model, performance measurement [(PM) = 1, 2, 3, 4] is concerned more narrowly with the 
production or supply of performance information, and is focused on technical aspects of (1) 
Clearly defining expected results in a measurable manner; (2) Identifying and monitoring risks 
over time; (3) Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure 
progress towards results and to judge performance; and (4) Developing performance monitoring 
systems to regularly collect performance information on actual results, review, analyze and 
report performance. Performance management [(PMM) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) + f (a, b, c,……, l, 
m)] encompasses performance measurement, but is broader. It is equally concerned with 
generating management demand for performance information [(EUI) = 5, 6] - that is, with its 
uses in programme, policy, and budget decision-making processes and with establishing 
organizational procedures, mechanisms and incentives that actively encourage its use. In an 
effective performance management system, achieving results and continuous improvement based 
on performance information is central to the management process. 
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Performance management [(PMM) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)], also referred to as results based 
management, can thus be defined as a broad management strategy aimed at achieving important 
changes in the way government agencies operate, with improving performance (achieving better 
results) as the central orientation. Thus the organisational performance management system 
(Learning, Performance Improvements and Accountability) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) + f (a, b, c, l, m). 
 
The enablers (a, b, c, l, m) in figure 2.3 above illustrate factors for successful adoption of RBM 
policy innovation (presented in Chapter Five). However, (Chapter Six) discusses the absence of 
these factors as as barriers to successful RBM adoption. Chapter Eight thus presnts the RBM 
theory of change derived from the theoretical model (Figure 2.3) and also presented as enablers 
(discussed in Chapter Five), barriers (discussed in Chapter Six) and RBM adoption steps 
(discussed in Chapter Seven). 
 Focusing on results: This involves focusing on identifying beneficiary needs inform of 
expected results. Consulting with and being responsive to project/programme 
beneficiaries or clients concerning their preferences and satisfaction with goods and 
services provided. 
 Empowering managers: Delegating authority to the management level being held 
accountable for results, thus empowering them with flexibility to make corrective 
adjustments and to shift resources from poorer to better performing activities. 
 Holding managers accountable: Instituting new mechanisms for holding agency 
managers and staff accountable for achieving results within their sphere of control. 
 Participation and partnership: Including partners (e.g., from implementing agencies, 
partner country organisations, other donor agencies) that have a shared interest in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
80 
 
achieving a development objective in all aspects of performance measurement and 
management processes. Facilitating putting partners from developing countries ―in the 
driver‘s seat‖, for example by building capacity for performance monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 Leadership of recipient organisations reforming policy and procedure: Officially 
instituting changes in the way the donor agency conducts its business operations by 
issuing new policies and procedural guidelines on results based management.  
 Developing supportive mechanisms by developing in-house expertise and institutional 
capacity: Assisting managers to effectively implement performance measurement and 
management processes, by providing appropriate training and technical assistance; 
establishing new performance information databases; developing guidebooks and best 
practices series. 
 Governance values: Changing organisational culture: Facilitating changes in the agency‘s 
culture – i.e., the values, attitudes, and behaviours of its personnel – required for 
effectively implementing results-based management. For example, instilling a 
commitment to honest and open performance reporting; reorientation away from inputs 
and processes towards results achievement; encouraging a learning culture grounded in 
evaluation (Source: Researcher original work). 
 
Thus the adoption RBM elements with the right enablers in place, namely; strategic planning 
processes, performance monitoring, evaluations and use of performance information creates 
organisations that manage for results. The organisations learn from what they do, apply adoptive 
management principles and will be accountable to all their stakeholders. However, the above 
model of enablers may be ‗under-identified‘ or ‗over-identified‘ and hence enabling factors will 
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need to be adopted in relation to a given context. The application of this model should thus be 
context sensitive and consider other variables that might not have been included in this model. 
 
2.10  SUMMARY 
The chapter analysed the existing literature on how RBM has been used by the different donor 
recipients on planning and measuring performance of projects and what the literature on transfer 
of new policy management innovation like RBM says. This section summarises the relationship 
and types of three relevant literature sources; Results-Based-Management; the transfer of 
knowledge and policy management innovation; and organisational learning and culture. The 
chapter also summarised RBM‘s central role in strategic planning and management based on 
learning, adopting and accountability in a decentralised environment. It is first a management 
system and second, a performance reporting system (World Bank, 1997, in Nelson, 2010) and 
hence a coherent framework for strategy planning and strategy execution. 
 
The literature review revealed that successful transfer of policy management innovation like 
RBM and its implementation is dependent on the organisation‘s ability to create a management 
culture that is focused on results. Jankowicz (1996) said that it requires more than the adoption 
of new administrative and operational systems. Adopting RBM requires an organisation to 
change its culture, and understand the context in terms of barriers and opportunities that support 
it. The literature guided the study in answering the research questions.  
 
Most of the literature cited on RBM is from development organisations, development partners 
and its application in programming.  However, limited literature was available from the 
academic point of view, which looks at the merits and demerits of RBM policy management 
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innovation transfers.  The research methodology will describe the approaches to extending 
frontiers of knowledge on the transfer of RBM policy innovation to UN-Habitat headquarters 
and the three regional offices, and how it was applied to different components of development 
programmes at UN-Habitat. It also describes the approaches to capturing key challenges and 
barriers encountered in the transfer and adoption of RBM 




METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methodology used in the study.  The discussion of the methodology is 
divided into two parts.  The first part describes the underlying research design.  This covers the 
reasons for choosing particular design strategies, how the design minimised some of the 
limitations that have been associated with it, and how field sites were selected.  The second part 
summarises the way data was collected and analysed. 
 
The study started with two data collection methods (document review and observation), and 
proceeded to conducting key informant interviews as the situation warranted.  This, therefore, 
involved spending time doing the initial data analysis while data collection was still in progress 
and this process was aimed at enhancing the validity of study findings through triangulation.  
The researcher analysed the data through interpretation and the constant comparative method, 
and constantly reflected on the meaning of the data (what was heard and observed) and the 
direction in which the research was going; constantly comparing themes and looking for data that 
confirmed the interpretations.  
 
The above process adopted two strategies recommended by Robson (2002), of thinking through 
data collection.  The first strategy was to keep a record using standard forms to summarise data 
collection events from interviews and observations (see Appendices A and B for contact 
summary sheets and document summary forms).  The forms were pre-designed for recording 
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specific details about people, events, and situations and on what else the researcher focused 
attention during the next contact.  The document summary form records brief summaries of 
documents that the researcher examined, noting the type of document, its uses, a summary of its 
contents, and ideas about other documents that had to be obtained and studied.  The completed 
forms revealed missing information and thus indicated where further data collection was needed.  
They also suggested promising directions for subsequent stages of data collection and analysis.  
This form was not a substitute for the researcher‘s field notes.  The contact summary sheet (see 
Appendix A) is brief and primarily focuses on what was learnt and further guided subsequent 
data collection activities, while the field notes are comprehensive and descriptive. 
 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Creswell (2007) and Yin (1994:19), a research design is a ―blueprint‖ of the 
research.  It is the ―action-plan for getting from here to there‖ where ―here‖ is the question to be 
answered and ―there‖ is the conclusions or ―answers‖ to these questions.  Yin (1994) states that  
action plan should guide the researcher in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting 
data.  A research design, he explains, is the logic that links the data to be collected and the 
conclusions to be made to the initial questions of the study.   
 
A cross-sectional case study design was chosen for this study because of the nature of the 
research problem and the questions being asked.  The types of research questions to be answered 
in this study were the deciding factors of the research design (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 1994:13; 
Robson, 2002).  The reason for this was to provide for a deep understanding of (a) how policy 
management innovation with the RBM transfer process occurred in its dynamic social context; 
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(b) why it worked or why it was not working; (c) the study subjects; and (d) the contextual 
conditions believed to be relevant to the phenomenon under study. 
 
3.2.1  Justification for the use of a case study 
A case study design was that a case study strategy is a comprehensive research strategy that 
―investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context were not clearly evident‖ (Creswell, 2007; 
Robson, 2002; Yin, 1994:13).  According to Creswell (2007), case studies are aimed at complex 
relationships between interventions and various factors in social systems without focusing on 
specific relationships between isolated variables.  Cases are conceptualised as examples of a 
broader phenomenon, and the significance of the case can be seen in terms of the light it sheds 
on the phenomenon.  Case studies describe organisations and the behaviour of people as they 
occur and provide a deeper understanding of what is actually going on.  They allow us to learn 
through the experience of other organisations so that we can avoid the uncertainty of working by 
trial and error.  The real business of case studies is particularisation, not generalisation, so the 
first criterion for a case study should be to maximise what one can learn.  Case studies help us to  
get to know it well, not how it is different from others, but what it is and what it does (Creswell, 
2007; Stake, 1995).   
The case study design was suitable for this study because: 
(a) the focus of the study was to answer ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions on the transfer of 
RBM policy innovation;  
(b) the behaviour of those involved in the study could not be manipulated; 
(c) of the need to cover contextual conditions because they were relevant to  the  
phenomenon  under  study;  and 
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(d) The boundaries between the phenomenon and context were not clear.   
 
A case study was, therefore, chosen because the adoption of RBM policy innovation by UN-
Habitat could not be considered without the context; the UN-Habitat physical and material image; 
evolutionary changes at UN-Habitat; and the organisational infrastructure setting. It is in these 
settings that the adoption took place. It would have been impossible for the researcher to gain a 
true picture of the adoption of RBM policy innovation by UN-Habitat without considering the 
context within which it occurred (Yin, 2003; Grinstead, 2009). Merriam (1998) emphasises this 
notion when she argues that innovative programmes and practices are often the focus of 
descriptive case studies.  She stresses that insights gleaned from cases can be unique and can 
reveal information about the phenomenon, knowledge, and understanding we would otherwise 
not have access to, which could be used to influence policy, practice, and future research.  The 
information forms a database for future comparison and theory building. 
 
3.2.2  Field Site Selection 
The UN-Habitat headquarters are located in Nairobi to strategically cope with the increasing 
needs for inter-programme coordination, a global perspective and representational duties. The 
UN-Habitat is primarily concerned with promoting socially and environmentally sustainable 
towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all (UN-Habitat, 2011).  The 
main study field site was thus the coordinating programme office located at the headquarters 
offices at UN-Habitat, Nairobi, Kenya.  However, all three regional offices were purposively 
selected, including that of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) located in Nairobi, 
for comparative purposes and further illumination of the findings from the main field site.  The 
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three sites outside the main field site are distinctly different regarding their mandate.  The 
regional field sites, the Regional (ROAAS) based in Nairobi, Kenya; the Regional Office for Asia 
and the Pacific (ROAP) based in Fukuoka, Japan; and the Regional Office for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ROLAC) based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Each of these offices is in charge of 
several countries and offices were all purposively selected because of implementing the UN-
Habitat programmes. 
 
Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central 
importance to the purpose of the research (Creswell, 2007).  The study, therefore, looked for 
interesting patterns across the great variation of data, and in this way was able to increase the 
scope and range of data exposed, as well as the likelihood that the full array of multiple realities 
was uncovered.  The selection was refined during the piloting of the tools.   
 
3.2.3  Selection of respondents 
The selection of the study respondents was guided by the fact that the selected staff had 
experience working with the organisation and perceptions that gave them special value as data 
sources.  Key informants were people who had been key players in the designing and 
implementing of the organisation‘s programme, including the old and new staff in the 
organisation.  The key informants provided in-depth explanations including providing materials 
that contained information relevant to the study.   
3.2.4 Pretesting of instruments 
Prior to beginning the field work, the instruments to  be used were pretested to establish whether 
they presented a good flow; were able to capture the data required to meet the objectives of the 
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study; and cross check the reliability (Grinstead, 2009). Face validity of the instruments was 
achieved using peers and anything they did not understand was changed. The pilot testing was 
done on a small sample of staff that became part of the study population. Useful comments were 
incorporated into the final tools. 
 
3.2.5  Simplifying the plans to collect data 
Data collection tends to be one of the most expensive and time-consuming items in a research 
study. Consequently, any efforts to reduce costs or time inevitably involve simplifying plans for 
data collection (Grinstead, 2009). This involved three main approaches: 
 Identification of what information was really required for the research and elimination of 
information that was not essential in answering the key research questions driving this 
study. 
 Reviewing data collection instruments to eliminate unnecessary information. Data 
collection instruments tend to grow in length as different people suggest additional items 
that would be ―interesting‖ to include, even though not directly related to the purpose of 
the study. 
 Streamlining the process of data collection to reduce costs and time. These included the 
following: simplifying the study design, e.g. looking for reliable secondary data; reducing 
the sample size; reducing the costs of data collection, input, and analysis (e.g. use of self-
administered questionnaires, using direct observation instead of surveys, using focus 
groups and community fora instead of household surveys). 




3.3  DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Four main methods were used in the data collection, namely interviews, review of secondary 
documents, observations and assessment of UN-Habitat capacities for RBM policy innovation 
using CAPScan tool.  Table 3.1 below summarises the methods used for data collection; who 
was interviewed (UN-Habitat and UNDP) senior staff; the key documents reviewed; and what 
was observed. 
Table 3.1: Data collection techniques 
Research questions Interviews 







How has RBM been transferred 










Strategic plan, annual work plans, 
Quarterly/annual, & financial reports, 
evaluations, field visit reports, minutes 
of project, travel schedules, 
agreements with donors & partners 
and general project communication 
between and among staff.   
 
Staff (behaviour at formal 
settings and field staff ) 
Question 2: 
What potential exists in 
receiving culture for effective 






Corporate strategies and reports.  
Strategic plans, financial reports, 
annual reports, internal 
correspondence and memos from 
management to staff.  Public speeches 
from management, appraisal 
documents, Board of Trustees 
minutes. 
Behaviour at formal and 
informal settings, space and 
surroundings, objects of 
importance, events.  Activities 
and interactions, physical 
settings and participants.   
Rites and rituals of the 
organisation. 
Question 3: 
What barriers, if any, does 
receiving culture present to 







Strategic plans, financial reports, 
annual reports, internal 
correspondence and memos from 
management to staff.  Public speeches 
from management, appraisal 
documents, committee of permanent 
representative minutes. 
Events, behaviour at social 
and formal /informal settings, 
space and surroundings, 
objects of importance 
 
The study involved observing what was going on; interviewing  respondents either face to face 
or by telephone; and examining documents that are part of the context.  Respondents were asked 
why they did the things they did; said the things they said (verbally or in reports); and meanings 
of their various actions and words.  Triangulation or multiple sources of information (review of 
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UN-Habitat document, interviews with staff at headquarters and field sites, observation of the 
unspoken practices, and assessment of capacities for RBM at UN-Habitat) was sought and used 
because no single source of information could provide a comprehensive perspective (Mckenzie, 
2010).   
 
3.3.1  Document Review 
In terms of collecting readily available data, documents were the most unobtrusive and 
immediately available sources, especially those that were particularly relevant, valid, and reliable 
(Grinstead, 2009).  However, note that there was indication of central record keeping of RBM-
related documents or general programme/project management files and reports.  A protocol to 
record information about each document or material and key categories sought in the source of 
information was designed (see Appendix B).  The material was divided into primary 
(information directly from those people being studied) and secondary (second-hand accounts of 
the people or situation) material.  The document reviewed revealed information about the 
programme practices and trends over time in managing for results and the culture of UN-Habitat. 
 
In reviewing the documents, the researcher  aimed to find out whether there were any important 
messages between the lines, by looking for biases, what audience the document was written for, 
and with what objective. Documentary evidence reflected communication among other parties 
attempting to achieve some objective.   The documentary evidence obtained, however, was 
triangulated with information obtained from interviews with staff.  In identifying conditions and 
assumptions when the documents were authored, the researcher conducted interviews with staff; 
corroborated documentary evidence; and interpreted the contents of such evidence.  Document 
analysis was triangulated with information gathered through interviews. The document review 
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also provided what the programme achieved and this was corroborated with practices observed 
and also with what programme staff members said they did. Table 3.2 below outlines the key 
documents that were selected and reviewed to best answer the questions of the study. The table 
also outlines what was reviewed in the documents. Validation and triangulation of document data 
was done through in-depth interviews. 
 




Sample key planning and implementation documents (2008-2013) that explained the adoption 
process of RBM and documents that spoke to how the programme was like previous to the 
adoption of RBM (2007).  Other sample documents were those that showed the organisation‘s 
culture –internal communication for management, policy guidelines, Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), Governing Council, corporate Medium-Term Strategic and 
Institutional Plan (MTSIP) for 2007-2013, strategy papers, biennium strategic plans and 
programmes of work, and annual plans and reports, travel calendar and UN-Habitat 
evaluations, corporate history, procedures, regulations, reward system, strategy, mission, 




By going through the documents, the researcher wanted to better understand what UN-Habitat 
HQ does – the practices, prior to RBM implementation and after, and the organisations‘ 
culture relationship between policy and practice, lived values and espoused values.  In 
addition, the researcher was able to verify some interview data. 
 
When and for 
how long?   
The larger part of the document review was undertaken at the beginning of the study (January 
- June 2013), before any in-depth interviews.  It overlapped with most of the early intense 
observation period.  Document review was continuous until the end of the 5
th
 month when the 
researcher terminated the research to continue analysing and reporting. 
 
3.3.2  Interviews 
Semi-structured, open-ended in-depth interviews were the main basis of the study, as a design 
that does not set limits to the process of unveiling the distinct meanings of words and actions of 
participants.  Interviews were an essential source of case study evidence because case studies are 
about human affairs (Creswell, 2007).  When questions emerged or changed in the course of 
interviewing, the researcher added them to the protocol (Appendix A).  The main reason for 
using open-ended interviews for the study was because they are suitable for probing deeply in 
search of opinions, perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes towards various issues, and serve also 
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as a validity check regarding responses and information that could be obtained from observations 
and documents.  Questions were open ended for general themes and issues and more focused for 
specific issues.  The opportunity to learn about what the researcher could not see and to explore 
alternative explanations of what was seen was the special strength of interviewing in this study 
(Glesne, 1999).   
 
In-depth interviews were conducted in a conversational manner guided by a set of questions in 
the interview protocol.  The human affairs in the programme were reported and interpreted 
through the eyes of specific interviewees, and the purposely-selected, well-informed respondents 
provided important insights into the situation. Table 3.3 outlines the key informants selected for 
in-depth interviews, why they were selected and the timing of interviews, which was important 
in providing timely information for corroboration with that gathered using other data collection 
techniques. 
 








Purposefully-selected senior staff in Nairobi and at the selected field sites, Chairperson 
Committee of Permanent Representatives  
Incumbent Executive Director  
Regional Director, and five staff members—field site 1 
Deputy Executive director 
Senior Programme Officers in charge of strategic planning, quality assurance, 
monitoring and evaluation, and three staff members– Field Site 2 
Former Executive Director  
Senior Programme Officers and three staff members – Field Site 3 
Programme Manager 
Four international staff – service between 3-4 years 




Because they were best placed to answer the research questions, given that they are 
directly involved in the designing and planning of the programme and are directing the 
implementation process and hence the use of RBM.  Others who were interviewed were 
those best placed to talk about RBM and the culture at the organisation. 
 
When? After preliminary observations and some extensive document review 
For how long 
(months/year)? 
Just how many sessions were required depended on the availability and fluency of the 
respondent and the researcher‘s probing skills.  All interviews were conducted in 
between observations and document reviews, but follow-ups on very particular items of 
importance, were undertaken throughout the period of study in a bid to gain more 
understanding, and clarification.   
 
3.3.3  Observations 
Although observation as a data-gathering technique has been criticised as highly subjective and 
unreliable due to the selective nature of human perception, in terms of collecting data, it still has 
an advantage in covering events in real time and in the context of these events (Creswell, 2007; 
Yin, 1994).  Many things that seemed ordinary to people in the organisation explained difficult 
problems and behaviour and gave the researcher important clues about the norms and values that 
are central to shaping behaviour in this arena.  Observation helped the researcher to identify the 
informal rules that people at UN-Habitat and UNDP follow to guide and make decisions 
(Creswell, 2007).   




Planning and mental preparation were important for the researcher to be able to observe well and 
pay attention to norms and values that were central to shaping behaviour.  The specifics to be 
observed were guided by the purpose of the study and the research questions. During the 
research period, the researcher was physically located at the UN-Habitat HQ offices in Nairobi 
and engaged in observation to become familiar with and to understand the dynamics of the 
purposively-selected study participants.  The study did not adopt observation as its primary data 
collection method; rather the researcher followed McKenzie (2009) and Glesne‘s (1999) 
suggestion, that in qualitative research, the experience of learning as an observer often preceded 
interviewing, and this was a basis for informing some issues in the study questions.  
 
Observation helped the researcher to study behaviour in formal and informal settings; space and 
surroundings; objects of importance; and events (Creswell, 2007).  The activities and 
interactions, physical settings and participants, rites and rituals of the organisation were also 
observed. Observing is about sensing and getting an opportunity for a first-hand account of the 
phenomenon as it happens as opposed to relying on other people‘s perspectives and 
interpretations (Merriam, 1998).  Given that nobody can observe everything, the researcher 
focused the observation on behaviour, events, persons, and the physical context (Table 3.4).  He 
observed routine things that may have led to understanding the context.  He observed things like 
dynamics among staff that participants often miss or point out in interviews, and also observed 
with the idea to triangulate emerging findings from interviews and document analysis.  What was 
learnt through the observation provided the researcher with knowledge of context, specific 
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incidents, behaviour, and so on, and these were used as reference points for subsequent 
interviews. 
Table 3.4: Observation Chart 
Question Rationale 
Who was observed? HQ staff—general interactions at formal and informal settings, body 
language. 
What was observed? Normal daily activities, physical setting, conversations, subtle factors, events 
like coffee meetings, seminars in Nairobi, annual planning and review 
meetings, Management meetings, coffee breaks, lunch breaks, cocktails, 




By observing these things the researcher could become familiar with the 
surroundings, participants and the organisational vocabulary.  Most 
importantly, the researcher better understood the context/culture of the UN-
Habitat and this helped in framing meaningful interview questions.  
 
When and for how long 
(months, year/s)? 
Researcher observed more keenly and intensively in the beginning, but 
general observation ran throughout the length of the study period. 
 
3.3.4  RBM Institutional Capacity Scan (CAP-Scan) at UN-Habitat 
a) Introduction: The CAP-Scan is an analytical framework and participatory process. As a 
self-assessment tool, CAP-Scan is conducted on the basis of the five managing for 
development results (MfDR) pillars: Leadership; Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E);   
Accountability and Partnerships; Planning and Budgeting; and Statistical Capacity, by  
determining  the level  of  development  of  its capacities  on  a  scale  of  four major stages: 
Awareness, Experimentation, Transition, and Sustainable Implementation (CAP-Scan Secretariat, 
2009), 
b) Purpose of the Institutional Capacity Scan: The research study involved assessment of UN-
Habitat capacity to work within Results-Based Management (RBM), using the Institutional 
Capacity Scan methodology (CAP-Scan Secretariat, 2009) to identify its strengths and 
weaknesses and improve achievement of results.  
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c) Components of the Institutional Capacity Scan (CAP-Scan):The methodology implemented 
included orientation of staff on RBM concepts and principles, and on key elements of the 
Institutional CAP-Scan Measurement Framework adapted for the following five main RBM 
pillars: Planning and Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), Leadership and 
Accountability, and Information Systems and Statistics (Cap-Scan Secretariat, 2009). 
d) Components of the Cap-Scan as adapted for the purpose of this study: The Planning and 
Budgeting (P&B) pillar incorporates all components necessary to ensure that the institution‘s 
coordination of planning and budgeting process is in line with RBM objectives.  The assessment 
is based on the following elements: (1)  budget consistency with MTSIP priorities; (2)  budget 
preparation based on objectives and results; (3)  sub-programme coordination; (4) presence of a 
results management framework; (5)  supporting funding sources link programming to the budget, 
and 6. participation of cities in the budgeting process.  
 
The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) pillar was key in determining whether the institution‘s 
current M & E systems facilitate or hinder RBM.  This entailed assessing the following 
components: (1) Results-based monitoring is in place; (2) Capacity for monitoring and 
evaluation in the organisation exists; (3) Information system and decision-making support tools 
are utilised; (4) Reporting on results occurs; (5) The use of programme and project monitoring 
and evaluation information for decision-making; (6) A system for measuring client satisfaction in 
place; and 7. an independent evaluation unit exists in UN-Habitat. 
 
The Information Systems and Statistics (IS&S) pillar provides the structure in ensuring that 
sound statistical information systems exist, are used for decision making, and are disseminated 
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throughout the institution.  To do so, the following criteria were assessed: (1) presence of a 
framework for the management of statistical activities; (2) data management and disaggregation 
capacity; (3) data quality assessment; and (4) capacity for analysis and modelling. 
 
The Leadership and Accountability (L&A) pillar includes the key elements which demonstrate 
the institution‘s commitment from the top down to RBM objectives.  It is an important element 
in RBM that could be considered the foundation upon which the other pillars stand for the 
implementation.  To assess the solidity of the pillar, the following elements are considered:   (1) 
integration of RBM; (2) commitment to RBM; (3)  clarity and articulation of development 
assistance and orientation; (4) responsibility, delegation and accountability for senior UN-
Habitat staff;   (5)  management changes; (6)  responsibility and commitment to achieve results; 
(7) UN-Habitat results orientation; and (8)  programme implementation for mainstreaming RBM. 
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Table 3.5: Components Scored by RBM Pillars for the Capacity Assessment 
RBM Pillars 
 1. Planning & 
Budgeting 
2. Monitoring & 
Evaluation 
3. Information Systems 
and Statistical Capacity 





























preparation based on 
objectives and results 




3.2. Data management: 
aggregation and 
disaggregation 
4.2. Clarity and articulation 
of development assistance 
orientations 






3.3. Extent of data 
4.3. Responsibility, 
delegation and 
accountability at the level 
of senior officials of UN-
Habitat 
 
1.4. Sub programmes 
coordination 
2.4. UN-Habitat 
performance geared to 
development results 
3.4. Data quality 
assessment 






2.5 Reporting on 
results 
3.5 Capacity for 
analysis and modelling 
4.5. Responsibility and 
commitment to achieve 
results in UN-Habitat 
1.6 Supporting 
funding sources link 
programming to 
results 
2.6 Use project 
implementation (and 









1.7 Participation of 
cities in budget 
planning  
2.7 Use of project 









term plan (3-5 years) 









2.10 Coordination with 
partners (executing 
agencies) 
Source: (CAP-Scan Secretariat, 2009)  
 
The participants were divided into groups of approximately five people from their own sub-
programmes to participate in the exercise. Participants came from a mix of senior level, 
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technical, and managerial positions. At least one participant from each group was responsible for 
noting down the capacity scores and justification for these. Before the exercise, the Cap-Scan 
tool was designed and tailored to the UN-Habitat context. The main purpose of the adaptation 
phase was to clarify wording issues and ensure that the different criteria of the RBM levels were 
properly captured for the current UN-Habitat change process.   
 
e) Training of Participants and Scope of the Assessment 
All participants received a brief overview on RBM concepts and the Institutional Cap-Scan 
methodology to ensure effective implementation of the group discussion exercise during the 
assessment. The assessment targeted all sub-programmes and managers, including directors.  
 
Seven groups scored their capacity and the extent to which they have put RBM-related practices 
and structures in place based on the Institutional Cap-Scan measurement framework. Each group 
determined where it fell within the following criteria: 
 Lack of knowledge and absence of procedures: There is an absence of knowledge 
regarding the UN RBM approach (every UN agency develops its own strategy for 
implementing RBM);  
 Awareness level: recognizing the need to implement RBM in the institution, with no 
concrete action conducted to date; 
 Exploration stage: taking actions but in the context of limited means to effectively 
implement a given strategy;  
 Transition stage: advancing with the effective use of RBM practices; and 
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 Full implementation or consolidation process of RBM practices:  in other words 
performance oriented projects and policies consolidated for a period longer than three 
years. 
 
The overall institutional score was obtained through averaging the scores of the seven groups, 
rather than through an agreement by all groups on an institutional score. The groups presented 
the results to their colleagues for further validation as they were generated during the self-
assessment. For the definitions of the CAP-Scan stages, (see Appendix E). 
 
3.4  Data Management and Analysis 
Data analysis is inevitably inextricably linked to the method of collection, not least because they 
are derived from the same theoretical concepts and are aimed at meeting the same research 
objectives. Creswell (2007) referred to this as ―Analysis is a matter of giving meaning to first 
impressions as well as final compilations‖.  Analysis means essentially taking something apart.  
In this case, it was necessary to have a reasonable measure of overlap between the case study 
analysis and data gathering so that each informed the other.  The whole process of data analysis 
is what Creswell (2007) referred to as the ―explanation building‖ case study analysis, or what 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) called the constant comparative method of data analysis.  This relates 
to the way new data were constantly compared with old data; the way case analysis went through 
several iterations; and the way emerging themes were constantly compared with theoretical 
propositions.   
 
The strategy (finish-to-start approach) that the study adopted involved thinking about the way to 
present data at the end of the research.  The relative emphasis was to be given to thick 
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description and to analysis and interpretation of constructs and themes, patterns, and a 
comparison of emerging data with existing theories.  This makes the researcher record events at 
an adequate level of detail, including an abundance of quotations.  In this way, the researcher 
was able to anticipate which data were collected and in what depth.   
 
The case study description involved analysing the organisation‘s culture from the perspectives of 
key informants to see how it promoted or undermined the transfer process of RBM; clearly 
describing the analysis of the transfer process of RBM at the UN-Habitat from the theoretical 
concepts described earlier; and looking at the three field sites to further gain some understanding 
of how the transfer was rolling out; and compiling multiple databases prior to collecting the data.  
Handwritten notes were typed, formatted, and made into computer files, hard copy documents 
were scanned and turned into files, resulting in a database.   
 
The researcher, in addition, developed a category label and definition for each type of 
phenomenon that was analysed.  A category is a construct that refers to a certain type of 
phenomenon mentioned in the database; a construct observed from the phenomenon (Yin, 1994).  
Consideration was given to whether the categories could be analysed further into subtypes (e.g., 
very useful, useful, and not useful).  File folders and 3x5 card files that identified issues, field 
sites, and persons were used in the process of sorting out information.  Each category or theme 
was supported by numerous incidents, quotes, and so on.  Categorisation cascades to sub-
categories and assumes many levels.  This level of coding was important; hence, there was a 
need to include details such as when the incident took place or the characteristics of the person 
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interviewed and the comments and thoughts at the time.  In this way, the researcher was able to 
avoid loss of detail that could occur with the passage of time. 
 
The researcher organised field notes into observational notes (what was seen, heard, felt, etc.); 
methodology notes (methods regarding how to collect the data); theoretical notes (hunches, 
hypothesis, critiques of what was done, thinking, seeing); and personal notes (reflections, 
feeling, statements about the research, the people talked to, the doubts, the anxieties, the 
pleasures).   
 
One way in which this analysis was done was through the use of codes to categorise and sort the 
data into look-alike groups.  ―Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study‖ (Creswell, 2007). Codes attempt 
to characterise and make understandable the meaning of the data and answer why data are 
grouped together in a particular way.  These codes were used to sort and organise the volume of 
data collected during the study. 
 
Utilising the research questions, the components and principles of RBM, related literature, and 
the researcher‘s conceptual framework of transfer of technologies/knowledge, a starter list of 
codes which ―forces the analyst to tie research questions or directly to the data‖ (Mayne, 2007) 
were created.  The pilot interviews were coded using this starter list of codes.  The codes were 
then re-examined, and categories that were too broad, too abstract, or just did not work were 
either revised or discarded. 
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Transcription of interviews was on-going throughout the seven-month field process.  Taped 
interviews were transcribed, read, re-read, and coded.  Comments to self-suggesting 
interpretations, links between data, and issues for further checking were written in the margins of 
the transcribed interviews.  These comments were coded.  Document summary forms and contact 
summary sheets were coded.  A separate notebook/memo was kept to record the researcher‘s 
thoughts, feelings, hunches, doubts, insights, and peculiar incidents ―throughout the data 
collection, data reduction, data displays conclusion drawings, conclusion testing and final 
reporting‖ (Robson, 2002), and these memos were coded.   
 
Throughout the process of data analysis, the codes were periodically re-examined to determine 
whether or not they still worked.  Categories of material that were too broad were divided into 
sub-categories.  Codes that did not work were dropped.  The researcher kept notes on RBM, 
transfer of technologies, and adoption and diffusion of innovation literatures as reading material 
specifically to stimulate questions, data gathering, and theoretical sensitivity in the course of the 
data collection and analysis process, and to help explain why the findings support or differ from 
existing literature.  In addition, the researcher kept a diary to help in reflection and to ensure that 
important aspects of the early thinking about the research were not forgotten, an aspect that was 
crucial to the readers‘ understanding of the case.  The self-conscious notes in the diary were 
intended to show readers the development of thinking with all the setbacks and dead ends.  This 
was to ensure that the reasoning remained transparent to self as well as to others.  Diary keeping 
also improved time management and provided ideas for the future direction of the work.   
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The data analysis process consisted of three concurrent flows of activity: (a) data reduction; (b) 
data display; and (c) conclusion drawing/verification.  In data reduction, the researcher selected, 
focused, and simplified raw data.  Data reduction involves making decisions about which data 
chunks provide the initial focus, and data display involves organising and assembling 
information that permits conclusions to be drawn (Mayne, 2007).  The researcher, in the end, 
decided what things meant and noted regularities, patterns, and configurations.  Finally, 
conclusions were tested for plausibility and validity by having key informants read the draft 
report. 
 
Russ-Eft (1999) warns that the methods that a researcher chooses for analysis should be able to 
provide meaningful information to listeners and readers.  The researcher, therefore, used 
interpretational analysis and reflective analysis because it is best suited for case studies.  Even 
though the data were coded into categories that summarised it during the data collection, the 
study still generated a great many pages of observational notes, interview transcripts, and 
documents obtained from the field setting.   
As a final check on category systems, Mckensie (2010) recommends that the inter-ratter 
reliability should be determined.  While the discovery of themes is important in qualitative 
research, the discovery of constructs can be a significant outcome of a case study (Creswell, 
2007).   
 
3.5  QUALITY CONTROL 
Being able to trust research results is especially important to professionals in applied fields in 
which practitioners intervene in people‘s lives (Ravallion, 2009; Merriam, 1998).  Every 
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researcher wants to contribute results that are believable and trustworthy.  Reliability concerns 
the accuracy of the information; whether it matches reality; the extent to which the same research 
findings can be repeated; and, if repeated, whether it can yield the same results.  This poses a 
problem in qualitative studies because human behaviour is dynamic and not static, and reliability 
is based on an assumption that there is a single reality (Mayne, 2007). 
 
However, to ensure reliability, the researcher created trust through being sensitive, maintaining 
confidentiality, being non-judgmental, friendly, and inoffensive when relating to the research 
participants, and that made respondents talk more openly, personally, and deeply about issues.  
To further increase the quality and credibility of data the researcher used three strategies: (a) 
Member checking– confirmation by the respondents that the information the researcher had was 
correct;  (b) Multiple methods, convergence or corroborative evidence (triangulation) to increase 
the reliability and precision of the information gathered; and (c) According to Yin (1994), the 
validity of a study is strengthened if the researcher presents a strong chain of evidence that is 
clear –meaningful links between research questions, raw data, and findings.  Validity was further 
strengthened by the participatory manner in which the researcher collected data at the field sites.  
Data were member-checked during individual reviews, and peers commented on findings as they 
emerged.   
 
Case studies like this one cannot be generalised, so we cannot talk of external validity or 
reliability in the context of replicating the study in another context.  Dooley (2002) suggests, 
however, that relating findings back to the literature also helps to establish external validity, 
which the researcher ensured in the research questions.   
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3.6  REPORTING THE CASE STUDY 
A case study represents a unique case.  In reporting, the researcher compressed and linked data 
together in a narrative that conveyed the meaning derived from studying the phenomenon 
(Merriam, 1998).  Caution was exercised in trying to faithfully report reality as it was heard in 
the voices and interpretations of the informants.  The case report is descriptive and is based on 
experiences lived by UN-Habitat HQ staff in field sites, including experiences of UNDP staff 
based in Nairobi.  The reporting represents the context, participation, and reality of the situation.  
Context was included as an important aspect of the study because practitioners would be 
interested in knowing whether the research setting sufficiently resembles their own situation to 
warrant adopting the same practice. 
 
Starting with a brief overview of findings, each finding is supported by quotes from interviews, 
field notes, and reference to documentary evidence.  A combination of reflective and analytic 
reporting is used.  The researcher drew conclusions because leaving it for others could lead to 
misinterpretation, especially by readers who are not able to make connections implied in the 
study.  However, the case report still leaves room to stimulate the reader to think beyond the 
particular bits of information.  Because cases reflect real life situations, the case report tries to 
represent good and bad practices, failures as well as successes.  There were no attempts to 
change facts to expose how a situation should have been handled. 
 
3.7  CONFIDENTIALITY 
It was not possible completely to protect the identity of the participants in this case study, and 
that could have led to speculation, accusations, and denials, especially regarding contentious 
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data.  However, efforts were made to conceal the identities of respondents, especially regarding 
sensitive evidence.  Participants were informed that they have the right to refuse to answer the 
research questions. 
 
The researcher made every effort to be truly sensitive to the variety of individual and 
institutional interests that were at stake in the kind of information that was presented.  The 
researcher avoided offending questions or issues to ensure that respondent‘s dignity was fully 
protected in the course of the research.  The approval letter for subjects was a written agreement 
concerning the promise of non-violation to them.  All participants were assigned a number and 
these number codes were used throughout the study to protect the identity of the participants.   A 
written consent letter was prepared (See Appendix F). 
 
3.8  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This case study was limited in several ways.  First, by mainly using the qualitative paradigm, 
some aspects may require quantification, which was not the case.  Qualitative data collection 
methods as the primary framework for data gathering and analysing can sometimes be 
subjective. As in Royse (2004), research methods in social work, positions quantitative research 
as ―legitimate‖ research and qualitative research as ―popular‖. Second, ―natural‖ alliance exists 
between practice and qualitative research methods and data, and qualitative markers of validity 
and reliability are as rigorous as those employed in quantitative research. There should be no one 
research methodology assuming the status of ―truth‖— indeed, these approaches are all about a 
challenge to the notion that there is a ―truth‖ to be ―discovered‖ or a ―true path‖ to follow in 
creating, constructing, or uncovering knowledge. Other people‘s views are filtered through the 
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researcher‘s worldview, values, and perspectives, which are coloured by the researcher‘s 
experience in development programmes and the use of RBM policy innovation.   
 
The other limitation is the use of case studies which are usually few but from which conclusions 
are made (Mayne, 2007).  Case studies usually may not be easily replicable, thus the difficulty in 
designing the survey tool. Case studies have been faulted for their lack of rigor in the collection 
and the analysis of empirical material, and that lack of rigor is linked to researcher bias and 
others involved in the case, hence raising the question of ethics, trustworthiness, validity, 
generalisation, and basic data integrity (Yin, 1994).  Deliberate efforts were made to apply 
methods like data triangulation and detailed verifiable processes to avoid such possible errors in 
the current research. 
 
Since the researcher was aware of the limitations, ways to mitigate these were used, like 
addressing the issues related to bias, accuracy, and being as honest as is humanly possible in all 
phases of research (Creswell, 2007).  These are discussed in the report, including the inbuilt 
controls to manage bias, accuracy and validity of data.  
 
3.9  SUMMARY 
Case  study  research  comprises  more  than  simply  conducting  research  on  a  single 
organisation/individual or situation. This approach has the potential to deal with simple 
though complex situations. It enabled the researcher to answer ―how‖ and ―why‖ type questions, 
while taking into consideration how the phenomenon of ‗RBM policy innovation‘ adoption is 
influenced by the context within which it is situated. For research on the transfer and adoption 
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of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat, a case study provided an excellent opportunity to gain 
tremendous insight into a case. It enabled the researcher to gather data from a variety of sources and 
to converge the data to illuminate the case. The research proposition was based on the literature 
found on the topic of RBM policy innovation. 
 
A case study design was chosen for the study because of the nature of the research problem and 
the questions being asked. What the researcher wants to know and the types of research 
questions to be answered in a study are the deciding factor of a research design (Yin, 1994; 
Merriam, 1998).  
 
The qualitative case study design provided tools for the researcher to study complex phenomena 
within the particular contexts. The study‘s purpose and objectives guided writing the research 
questions, developing propositions, determining the ―case‖ under study, binding the case and a 
discussion of data sources and triangulation.  The unit of analysis ―case‖ is defined by Miles and 
Huberman (1994:25) as, ―a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context. This 
research study, the case, in effect, is my unit of analysis. 





RBM AT THE UN-HABITAT 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the context of the study in detail. This helps to place UN-Habitat in the 
wider context of the organisation, where the infrastructure necessary for RBM transfer lies. 
Examining the UN-Habitat context – the role; the site; background history of the wider 
organisation; the vision and mission; mandate and geographical focus; governance structure; and 
important evolutionary changes in the last few years – provides an attempt to explain the 
complexities and peculiarities associated with the transfer of RBM policy innovation, especially 
in a context of a development not-for-profit organisation. Understanding the programme focus 
helps to understand how RBM was applied to different components of development programmes 
at UN-Habitat. Studying the context in terms of geographical focus supports complexities and 
peculiarities associated with transferring RBM policy innovation and how it was received and 
institutionalised between UN-Habitat headquarters and the study‘s field sites.  
 
4.2  UN-HABITAT BACKGROUND HISTORY AND THE CHANGING FACE 
On 1 January 1975, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Habitat and 
Human Settlements Foundation (UNHHSF), the first official UN body dedicated to promoting 
urbanisation in developing countries as an international public good (IPG) to address issues of 
urbanisation by assisting national programmes relating to human settlements through the 
provision of capital and technical assistance, particularly in developing countries (UN-Habitat, 
2011a). 
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On 1 January 2002, the UN-Habitat mandate was strengthened and its status elevated to a fully-
fledged programme in the United Nations system, giving birth to UN-Habitat, the United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme (General Assembly Resolution A/56/206). Key 
recommendations and fine tuning of the agenda were now underway, along with 
new strategies for achieving the urban development and shelter goals and targets for the next 15 
years. 
 
The revitalisation placed UN-Habitat squarely in the middle of the UN‘s development agenda for 
poverty reduction (General Assembly Resolution A/56/206), with a more streamlined and 
effective structure and staff, and a more relevant and focused set of programmes and priorities. It 
is through this structure and mandate that UN-Habitat contributes to the overall objective of the 
United Nations system aimed at addressing ―humankind‘s greatest challenges on the planet - to 
reduce poverty and to promote sustainable development (General Assembly Resolution 
A/56/206). Today, its partners range from governments and local authorities to a wide range of 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups (CSGs) (General 
Assembly Resolution A/56/206). 
 
Starting with an annual budget of $4 million, UN-Habitat had grown into a $100 million annual 
budget organisation by 2012 (UN-Habitat, 2011b). The United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-Habitat) is the United Nations agency for Human Settlements mandated by the 
General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the 
goal of providing adequate shelter for all (General Assembly resolutions, S-25/2).  UN-Habitat 
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helps the urban poor by transforming cities into safer, healthier, greener places with better 
opportunities where everyone can live in dignity (General Assembly resolutions, S-25/2). 
 
UN-Habitat‘s mission is to promote the development of socially and environmentally sustainable 
human settlements and the achievement of adequate shelter for all (General Assembly resolution 
A/56/206, 2002). UN-Habitat‘s vision is to see sustainable urbanisation in cities and regions that 
provides all citizens with adequate shelter, basic services, security, and employment 
opportunities, regardless of age, sex, and social strata (General Assembly resolution A/56/206, 
2002). This vision, derived from the Millennium Development Goals, requires systemic reform 
to improve access to land and housing for all. 
 
The UN-Habitat strategy supports national and local governments and Habitat Agenda partners 
to put in place better land and housing policies. The agency is focusing on three outcomes: 
supporting enabling land and housing reforms; increasing security of tenure; and promoting slum 
improvement and slum prevention policies (General Assembly resolutions, S-25/2). 
 
In order to realise its vision and mission, UN-Habitat made a radical departure from standard 
practices in the UN Secretariat by developing a six-year Strategic Plan, 2008-2013, and adopting 
RBM as its management approach for achieving better development results. The development of 
the strategic framework and work programme documents is pivotal to and sets the foundation for 
implementation of RBM in the agency as they define the programme of work for the concerned 
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biennium. These documents are mandatory and are prepared according to regulations and rules 
articulated in the UN Secretary General‘s bulletin (‗ST/SGB/2000/8‘). 
 
To spearhead the implementation of the strategic plan, UN-Habitat established four change-
management task forces, namely Results-based Management and Knowledge Management 
(RBM & KM); Resource Mobilization and Allocation; Human Resources and Administration; 
and Enhanced Normative and Operational Framework (ENOF).  The RBM & Knowledge 
Management (KM) task force was responsible for implementing RBM-related activities (UN-
Habitat, 2009). Institutionalisation of results-based management in UN-Habitat encompassed 
introducing a results-oriented approach aimed at improving management effectiveness and 
accountability by defining realistic expected results, monitoring progress towards the 
achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and 
reporting on performance.  UN-Habitat introduced RBM at its headquarters and at its three 
regional offices. The regional offices include the Regional Office for Arab and Africa States, the 
Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean; and the Regional Office for Asia and the 
Pacific (UN-Habitat, 2012). 
 
4.3  UN-HABITAT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
The UN-Habitat Secretariat is the executive organ of UN-Habitat in charge of coordinating the 
programme (Governing Council Resolution, 32/162). It designs, implements, manages and 
monitors UN-Habitat‘s urban initiatives and human settlements development projects, and 
provides the Governing Council with strategic recommendations and direction. It is also 
mandated to carry out research activities and to facilitate the exchange of information, 
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knowledge and best practices on questions of urbanisation such as global trends, effective 
approaches and new technologies (Governing Council Resolution, 32/162). 
 
The UN-Habitat Secretariat headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya services the Governing Council and 
acts as the focal point for all human settlement matters within the United Nations system. Under 
the direction of the Executive Director (Figure 4.1), it is entrusted with the responsibilities set 
out in both Resolution 32/162 and in paragraph 228 of the Habitat Agenda. 
The UN-Habitat Secretariat is structured according to: 
 offices that carry out management and support tasks, 
 thematic organisational units, or branches, that handle a specific urban theme, and 
 regional offices that deliver the UN-Habitat work programme at regional and country levels. 
Thus (Figure 4.1) presents the UN-Habitat Secretariat organisation structure, headed by the Executive 
Director. 



















Figure 4.1: UN-Habitat Organogram 
Source: UN-Habitat, 2010-2013 Programme of Work and Budget 
 
The work of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UH-Habitat) is guided through 
the General Assembly by three main policy bodies of the United Nations, namely the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC); the Governing Council of UN-Habitat; and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (CPR) (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206). The 
governance structure is headed by the Chair selected from permanent member countries with a 
rotational tenure of two years, with the agency‘s Executive Director participating as an ex-officio 
member of the Committee. The members ‗Ambassadors‘ are appointed by respective member 
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countries to represent their governments and regions. Members serve for a period of two years 
(General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206). 
 
The Office of Programme Management coordinates financial management and control, resource 
management and administration, business processes, and quality assurance functions comprising 
results-based management and programme planning, monitoring and reporting. It is responsible 
for financial management and control; human resource management and administration; business 
guidelines and processes; and administrative services for HQ, regional and field offices, among 
other areas (Governing Council Resolution, 32/162). 
 
According to the United Nation Charter, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) are 
responsible for guiding the development of the programme‘s long-range plans; approving the 
annual programme of work and budget; monitoring progress towards the agency‘s objectives; 
ensuring financial integrity and accountability; providing oversight of investments and the 
disposal of major assets; approving personnel policies affecting the organisation staff; defending 
the organisation‘s image; the legal implications of activities; and the performance of the 
Committee as a whole and that of its individual members (General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/56/206). 
 
The day-to-day management of the organisation is vested with the Executive Director, who is as-
sisted by a Senior Management Team comprising the Deputy Executive Director, the Division 
Directors, and Chief of Staff. UN-Habitat‘s professional staff were selected through a highly 
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competitive international search; the agency had a worldwide staff of 500 from 40 nationalities 
by the year 2005 (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206). 
. 
In addition to the diversity of their funding base, UN-Habitat benefits greatly from a diversity of 
staff. Staff are based in 23 countries throughout the tropics and work in collaboration with others 
in many more regions. According to categorisation in an internal report by the Cultural Change 
Committee (2009), UN-Habitat‘s staff members at the Headquarters and regional offices 
comprise 40 female and 30 male support staff, and 60 female and 70 male professional staff. 
More than half of the senior professional talent is drawn from the South and from the very 
countries in which UN-Habitat works and the aim is to achieve an impact on slum dwellers. Staff 
membership is composed of more than 30 different nationalities, and UN-Habitat enjoys a well-
balanced profile of experience, and educational and professional backgrounds ranging from pre-
graduates who were just starting out to staff with more than 20 years of experience in the 
international urbanisation and economics (UN-Habitat, 2012). 
 
4.4  UN-HABITAT GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS 
UN-Habitat has three main regional offices, as well as liaison and information offices in New 
York, Brussels, Geneva, Moscow, Beijing, Chennai (India), Amman and Budapest. The Regional 
and Technical Cooperation Division oversees the work of the: 
a) Regional Office for Africa and the Arab States (ROAAS) based in Nairobi, Kenya 
b) Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) based in Fukuoka, Japan, 
c) Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) based in the Brazilian 
city of Rio de Janeiro. 
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Currently, 34 countries across Africa and the Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) participate in 
the programme (UN-Habitat, 2011b). 
 
Participating countries in Africa include: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, and 
the Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Benin, Lesotho, Rwanda, Botswana, Togo and Namibia (UN-Habitat, 2012).  The participating 
Caribbean countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti, St. Lucia, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago, while those from the pacific region are Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
the Solomon Islands. 
4.5  UN-HABITAT’S MATERIAL CULTURE 
The UN-Habitat headquarters in Nairobi is a symbol of good taste, opulence, and status. It is 
located in a lush and plush neighbourhood of Gigiri and, in the words of one director, ―Nairobi 
is a beautiful and great location for all of us—you can‘t be in a better location.‖  
 
A drive up a stunning terrain of well-manicured grounds and lush assortments of flower gardens 
brings you to the UN‘s sprawling office complex. Tarmac driveways and brick-paved pathways 
direct employees and visitors around the complex grounds, where well-tended indigenous and 
exotic trees are a natural habitat to monkeys and rare birds. An uncommon display of rare palm 
trees accents the entrance to the main buildings. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
On one side of the complex, a cascading car park displays staff members‘ red-numbered UN car 
number plates that are part of the benefit package for professional staff at UN-Habitat and other 
UN bodies housed at the complex, as well as buses that transport national staff to and from their 
residences. The red UN plates are an official government symbol for United Nations status, like 
UN-Habitat. As with all other aspects of UN-Habitat work, the trademark suggests attention to 
detail. 
 
The office complex at UN-Habitat, which consists of what they call the north and south office 
blocks, holds approximately 150 employees (UN-Habitat, 2011b), creating what one would call 
an ―urban park.‖ Offices in each block face each other in a rectangle-like design, forming a 
spectacular quad in the middle, a design that seems to have been created with collaborative work 
in mind. 
 
All UN-Habitat staff members, both professional and support staff, occupy individualised, 
soundproof, windowed offices, complete with nameplates on the doors. Modern facilities include 
laptop computers and modern computer furniture, book-shelves, telephones, printers, with 
informal seating and carpeting as extras for senior management. This office arrangement allows 
for personal décor, total privacy, and independence at work. In the words of one Program 
Officer, ―The system trusts you will do a commendable job without constant supervision.‖  
Behaviour around the offices is quiet and controlled. The pin-drop silence around the campus 
gives it an ambience of high professionalism. 
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Under the lower offices, a medium-sized modern library and documentation centre keeps and 
preserves many of UN-Habitat‘s publications and wider important but related literature. Urban 
management books and journals, development books, and many best-seller management books 
are among the many resources found in the library.  
 
The office complex includes approximately 100 avant-garde offices, at least 10 meeting rooms 
complete with ultra-modern facilities, and a state-of-the-art amphitheatre lecture room that can 
accommodate 100 people. All of this remains available to teams, staff, and partner organisations. 
One of the largest and seemingly most useful facilities is the 500 plus capacity, stained glass-
ornamented conference room managed by the United Nations Office in Nairobi, which is 
complete with speakerphones, effect lighting, and a 10 by 10 foot remote-controlled screen that 
is used for most large meetings, including annual Planning and Review meetings.  
 
But that is not all—other conveniences around the office complex include coffee shops located in 
each office block, a commercial printing press, and a private banking facility. Cold and hot 
drinking water dispensers are conveniently placed in office blocks and conference rooms. 
Contemporary toilets complete with Eastern showers and shower/bathrooms are located in 
convenient areas of the buildings.  
 
Highly polished terracotta floors lined with potted plants bring the outside inside. Gallery-size 
pictures that depict UN-Habitat‘s work, agency logos, and mission statements decorate the 
hallways and define its long-term vision in terms of who they are, what they do, how they do it, 
why they do it, whom they want to serve, and where they want to be. 




Modern communication satellite dishes managed by the United Nations Office in Nairobi 
facilitate direct world dials and high-speed internet connections, linking UN-Habitat to the rest of 
the world. Uniformed guards, cleaners, and grounds men keep the complex safe, clean, and well-
manicured. A polite, pleasant and courteous staff is present to serve the public.  
 
However, the three field sites visited did not have an equal measure of outward glamour and 
elegance like the headquarter office in Nairobi. The field offices each had one meeting room 
with modern facilities that could accommodate 50 people and is available to teams and partner 
organisations. This meeting room is used for most large meetings, including annual planning and 
review meetings. Field offices are smaller and in most cases are shared with other international 
organisations like the United Environmental Programme (UNEP) field offices and the UNDP. 
The surroundings lack the spruced-up look, the attention to detail, and the environmental 
sensitivity of the Nairobi headquarter complex. Other conveniences around the field offices 
include cold and hot drinking water dispensers which are conveniently placed in offices and 
conference rooms. 
 
None of the three field sites visited had a library or documentation centre that keeps and 
preserves UN-Habitat publications and other important literature, but the researcher found these 
kept in lockable cabins located in the offices of technical staff. Most of the reference material 
like urban management books and journals, development books, and many best-seller 
management books are only accessible through the UN-Habitat HQ E-Library.  
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Other conveniences found at field site offices include kitchens where staff made coffee, 
computers and printers. Banking facilities are located in the central business districts. 
 
In most respects, an air of professionalism was evident in the Africa and Arab States regional 
office in Nairobi, Kenya and in the Asia Pacific office in Fukuoka, Japan, while the Latin 
America and the Caribbean office based in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro seems to reflect 
some difference. For instance, beyond things appearing oddly casual inside most offices, the 
behaviour was also somewhat casual compared to the Nairobi HQs; the researcher on one 
occasion observed young staff members freely enjoying football on television in the Boardroom 
during working hours, behaviour that was in total contrast to the seriousness and professionalism 
displayed at the UN-Habitat HQ in Nairobi. 
 
4.6  UN-HABITAT’S MATCH WITH THE PHYSICAL IMAGE 
To match its physical image, UN-Habitat solicits internationally for the best professionals in the 
field of urbanisation who are either posted to headquarters in Nairobi or to field sites. To retain 
them, they ―pay better than most‖ in similar organisations, take care of their family‘s health, 
housing, schooling, home leaves, and, until two years ago, provided the security of renewable 
two-year tenure contracts. As an incentive to accept work in field sites, the international 
professionals are paid a field maintenance allowance. What is more, one requires no appointment 
to see middle-level managers or senior management; UN-Habitat maintains an open door policy 
at both the headquarters and in field sites. The informality is extended to the way people address 
each other. For instance, while nearly all the professional staff and senior managers at 
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headquarters are PhD holders, academic titles (Dr or Prof.) are hardly ever used, as everyone is 
on a first name basis. 
 
Everything at UN-Habitat appears to be done with two things in mind: excellence and superior 
image. The Committee of Permanent Representatives, which is the governing body, creates and 
protects UN-Habitat‘s image (General Assembly Resolution, S-25/2), and is ultimately 
responsible for its integrity, delivery of development results, and the promotion of good 
governance values, at the headquarters and in field sites. 
 
UN-Habitat describes itself in its publications as world renowned for its urbanisation 
contribution in the fields of slum upgrading. Starting with its highly accomplished Committee of 
Permanent Representatives members, its professional staff are equally widely published in top 
peer-reviewed journals. The professional staffs at field sites publish in top peer-reviewed 
journals in collaboration with their counterparts at UN-Habitat HQ (UN-Habitat, 2011b).  
 
According to its own publications, UN-Habitat has distinguished itself as world-class in 
urbanisation for over 20 years (UN-Habitat, 2011b). International peer-reviewed journals publish 
UN-Habitat contributions to the world‘s slum problems. In return, investors, mostly 
governments, foundations, and international development agencies, invest an average of $100 
million annually in support of UN-Habitat‘s work. One newly recruited staff member at 
headquarters, overwhelmed by his brief experience in the organisation, summarised what most 
other staff said of UN-Habitat:  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
124 
 
It is a great place, friendly, warm people, beautiful environment, good salary packages, 
and professionally very exciting and challenging.  
 
Although staff at headquarters enjoyed their working environment, some staff at field offices felt 
it was better to be stationed away from headquarters. One staff member at the UN-Habitat field 
site visited had this to say:  
I prefer working here compared to headquarters with bosses all over the place-, everywhere you 
pass you find a Director. In addition, field offices are not busy compared to working at the 
headquarters. I could not get time to study while I was based at HQ, and I thank God now I have 
the time to study while working at the same time. 
 
4.7  PROGRAMME FOCUS 
Seven major thematic areas that correspond directly to its Mission Goals define UN-Habitat‘s 
operational structure (Dialogues at the UN Economic and Social Council, 2008:224-227). These 
include Urban Legislation; Land and Governance; Urban Planning and Design; Urban Economy; 
Urban Basic Services; Housing and Slum Upgrading; Risk Reduction and Rehabilitation; and 
Research and Capacity Development (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1, 2013) 
. 
 
The Urban Legislation, Land and Governance (Governing Council Resolutions 20/6, 2012) 
focus area supports improving access to land; adopting enabling legislation, and putting in place 
effective decentralised governance that foster equitable sustainable urban development, including 
urban safety at city, regional and national authority levels (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1, 
2013). 
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The Urban Planning and Design focus area supports improving policies, plans and designs 
for more compact, better integrated and connected cities that foster equitable sustainable urban 
development and are resilient to climate change, at city, regional and national levels (Governing 
Council Resolutions 24/1, 2013). 
The Urban Economy programme focuses on improving urban strategies and policies supportive 
of city-wide economic development, creation of decent jobs, and enhanced municipal financing 
(Governing Council Resolutions 24/1). 
The Urban Basic Services focus area supports increasing equitable access to urban basic 
services and improving the standard of living of the urban poor (UN-Habitat, 2013a:12). 
The Housing and Slum Upgrading focus area supports increasing access to adequate housing 
and improving the standard of living in existing slums and communities at the local and national 
levels (UN-Habitat, 2013a:14). 
The Risk Reduction and Rehabilitation focus area supports increasing the resilience of cities to 
the impact of natural and human-made crises in an equitable manner, and undertakes 
rehabilitation in ways that advance sustainable urban development (UN-Habitat, 2013a:16). 
The Research and Capacity Development focus area of UN-Habitat is responsible for the 
preparation of the Global Report on Human Settlements (GRHS), a UN General Assembly 
mandated report published every two years that provides one of the most authoritative reviews of 
urban trends, conditions and policies (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1). 
 
4.8  RECENT EVOLUTIONARY CHANGES AT UN-HABITAT 
UN-Habitat, like many development organisations, has evolved through several changes from 
2001 to 2013. Prior to the evolutionary changes, power and accountability were concentrated at 
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headquarters and the approval bureaucracy slowed down implementation of activities; there was 
a general lack of accountability for resources and results and this affected the UN-Habitat donor 
base who eventually demanded RBM adoption; UN-Habitat operated in only 20 countries and 
there was a growing demand for more urbanisation initiatives; the Integrated Monitoring and 
Documentation Information System (IMDIS), the UN-Habitat performance measurement system 
only monitored and reported at output level. The performance measurement system did not 
address the ―so what‖ questions in which donors and other stakeholders were interested. 
Programme stakeholders are interested in seeing development changes and not outputs. The 
evaluation unit was more involved with conducting meta-analysis of performance reports instead 
of evaluating the effectiveness of programmes and strategies and there was a limited results 
culture at UN-Habitat. Capacity for RBM was also limited in the organisation. UN-Habitat 
practised resource-based budgeting as opposed to results-based budgeting. It was thus important 
for UN-Habitat to go through evolutionary changes (UN-Habitat, 2010). 
In the words of the Executive Director, 
It was important for UN-Habitat to go through these evolutionary changes to meet the 
urbanisation and human settlement challenges of today. The UN-Habitat of ten years ago cannot 
stand today‘s demands; we can no longer afford to do business as usual.  The organisation has to 
expand geographically and its programs, we had to become efficient and cost sensitive and 
improve the way we manage and deliver our programs.  
 
a) Decentralisation: In the new structure, power and accountability were decentralised from the 
headquarters to the regions. This meant that Regional Directors had power and responsibility 
with regard to planning, monitoring and budgeting and were answerable to the Director Projects 
instead of Office of Management, as they had previously done. This move was meant to, among 
other things, ease some historic management tensions that were said to have existed between 
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headquarter and the regions. In the seemingly exaggerated words of one Programme Officer,       
―There have been many ‗bloody battles‘ between the regions and headquarters.‖ 
Yet, the autonomy of the regions seemed threatening to some at headquarters, who saw the 
regions as having ―too much power‖ (UN-Habitat, 2011b). 
 
Although RBM is appreciated by all at UN-Habitat, there are organisational cultures which 
hinder the acceptance of RBM. These cultures are about governance, the reward system and 
internal capacity that may be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in 
failure to open up and management‘s failure to read between the lines to discover what causes 
the staff to close up. The conflict between local and international staff and the issue of academic 
qualifications are some of the barriers.  These personal perceptions of the organisation; the 
informal power structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, 
and risk-taking behaviour resulted in ‗blood wars‘ among staff; and the relationship between 
managers and employees. The transfer process did not enjoy formal backing of top leadership, 
nor did it enjoy full peer support (UN-Habitat, 2010). 
 
In all the discussions that took place during this study at all levels of the organisation, there was 
one overarching issue that was raised: the lack of transparency, responsiveness and 
accountability in the making and implementation of organisational policy and, above all, in the 
allocation and use of UN-Habitat resources, both human and financial, between headquarters and 
regions.  The way different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and 
working procedures for the whole organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions. 
This has led to the inefficient use of limited resources, the diminished ability to achieve both 
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work programmes and the Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) results and 
the lowering of staff morale, especially at regional offices.  The principal recommendation in this 
regard was to decentralise resource allocation and management of limited resources (UN-
Habitat, 2011). 
 
b) Cost saving measures: Projects and housed partners have been charged for services provided 
through UN-Habitat and for office space as part of cost recovery measures and in keeping with 
the RBM principle of ―doing more with less‖. The fundamental rationale for using team-based 
approaches in management also, among other things, concerned cost-effectiveness. Significant 
improvement in productivity was expected with the use of teams at UN-Habitat. They 
compensated for some of the effects of down-sizing. These teams include the RBM and 
knowledge management team spearheading institutionalisation of RBM policy innovation; the 
Resource Mobilisation and Allocation; the Enhanced Normative and Operational Framework 
(ENOF); and the Human Resources and Administration teams (UN-Habitat, 2011b).  
 
c) Expansion: By 2011, UN-Habitat expansion had reached Spain (UN-Habitat Annual Report, 
2012); a new office was established in Barcelona, Spain, which also happened to be the home 
town of the new Executive Director (UN-Habitat, 2010). 
 
d) Results-based reforms: Following a 2005 Office of Investigations and Oversight Services 
(OIOS) evaluation of UN-Habitat‘s organisational effectiveness, which found that UN-Habitat 
focused on activities, and money spent on ―delivery‖ was used to measure performance at the 
organisation; learning was limited and the measurement effort was to satisfy the organisation‘s 
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accountability function and data were not used for performance improvements, the Governing 
Council called on the UN-Habitat Executive Director to develop a six-year Medium-Term 
Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) for the period 2008 to 2013.  The MTSIP was approved 
in April 2007 (GC Resolution 21/2), which further directed the Executive Director to refine this 
new strategy, make it more results-based and ensure that the traditional work programme and 
budget became fully aligned to it.   
 
In June 2007, the Executive Director established four inter-divisional Task Forces to initiate the 
implementation of the MTSIP.  The Task Forces were developed around specific objectives 
designed to address identified institutional constraints inhibiting achievement of MTSIP results: 
(i) the Enhanced Normative and Operational Framework; (ii) Results-based Management and 
Knowledge Management; (iii) Resource Mobilization and Allocation; and (iv) Human Resources 
Management and Administration (UN-Habitat, 2008). 
 
An action plan was developed to provide guidance to the Task Forces during MTSIP 
implementation, and particularly with regard to the refinement process.  It included critical 
information regarding priorities; verifiable indicators and targets; linkages and dependencies; 
phasing and sequencing; and preliminary cost estimates.  Twelve ―quick-wins‖ which included 
Strengthening the Programme Review Committee (PRC); a Resource Mobilisation Unit 
established by March 2008;  delegation of authority at division and regional level;  a Branding 
and fund-raising strategy launched at the World Urban Forum 4; proposals for intra-divisional 
restructuring by June 2008; improved engagement of UN-Habitat staff by Quarter 1 of 2008; a 
participatory work programme and budget preparation; institutionalisation of performance 
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monitoring, evaluation and reporting; the launch of the RBM project and several more ―must-
does‖ were developed to further promote strategic and institutional reforms during the first two 
years of the Action Plan (UN-Habitat, 2008). 
 
By June 2009, the strategic dimension of the refinement process was largely completed with the 
formulation of results frameworks, SMART results and corresponding performance indicators, 
and policy papers for each of the four new MTSIP focus areas. The Executive Director had this 
to say; 
Staff are empowered to achieve planned results, institution aligned to deliver MTSIP Results, 
RBM principles are applied, and financial resources are used to achieve MTSIP results.  
While several actions aimed at addressing institutional issues were undertaken during the first 
two years of the Action Plan, critical reforms identified by the Office of Investigations and 
Oversight Services (OIOS) and in later assessments remained incomplete.  The MTSIP Roadmap 
was conceived for picking up where the Action Plan left off, but with the specific purpose of 
pursuing institutional reforms necessary to deliver newly refined SMART results.  According to 
one UN-Habitat document, ―The MTSIP was built from, and contributes to the evolution of 
regional strategies, which were in turn defined by global priorities and targets for socially and 
environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of adequate 
shelter for all‖ (UN-Habitat, 2011b).  
 
4.8.1  RBM policy Innovation at UN-Habitat 
Results-based Management (RBM) was not entirely new to UN-Habitat, but it was not 
implemented in a systematic and consistent manner before 2008.  As an agency of the UN 
Secretariat, UN-Habitat started implementing results-based budgeting (RBB), for the biennium 
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2000-2001.  This included an integrated planning, management and measurement cycle guided 
by the Regulations and Rules Governing Program Planning, the Program Aspects of the Budget, 
the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2000/8, General 
Assembly resolution 55/231).  The General Assembly (GA) requested that RBB be implemented 
‗gradually and incrementally‘.   
 
UN-Habitat adopted RBM as the management approach in response to recommendations from 
the General Assembly (A/55/231; A/61/805); the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; and the 
Accra Agenda for Action for enhancing the practice of RBM by development partners. Like 
other agencies of the UN Secretariat, UN-Habitat had been implementing results-based 
budgeting along the lines prescribed in the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme 
Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the 
Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/200/8). The focus was largely on selecting activities and 
costing them as ―budgeting and programming aspects‖, without paying due attention to results, 
and the essential changes in culture, administrative, financial and human resource systems that 
are critical RBM elements. 
 
UN-Habitat adopted RBM as the management approach for achieving institutional and 
development results in the Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) following its 
approval by the Governing Council (GC) in April 2007.  An MTSIP Action Plan developed in 
2007 to guide implementation of the MTSIP outlined four objectives, each with ‗quick wins‘ and 
‗must dos‘ to be implemented during the kick start phase (2008) and two subsequent 
implementation phases, namely the roll-out phase (2009-2010) and up-scaling phase (2011-
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2013).  The Action Plan articulated the deliverables for the period 2008-2009 and an MTSIP 
Roadmap that picked up from where the Action Plan left off outlined the deliverables for the 
remaining years, 2010-2013, and aligned the delivery periods to the biennial planning cycles 
including excellence in management, a hybrid management structure for a results-based 
organisation, and commitment by UN-Habitat leadership to institutional reform (ST/SGB/2000/8, 
General Assembly resolution 55/231; UN-Habitat, 2011b).   
 
Achieving excellence in management expected accomplishments largely meant that senior 
managers provide excellence in leadership (GC/23/2, 2010).  The job of reform and creating the 
institutional conditions that promote a results-based culture falls to excellence in management. 
Important institutional actions that underlie the push towards true organisational reform driven 
by excellence in management include:  
 Alignment of MTSIP with work programme and budget;  
 Identification of capacity building requirements for RBM transfer;  
 Integrating RBM into staff performance appraisal; and 
 Strengthening the capacity of the evaluation unit and systematically incorporating results 
into reporting systems, and strengthening the monitoring and evaluation framework for 
learning, accountability and reporting (UN-Habitat, 2011b). 
 
The existing task force structure that was created as part of the MTSIP action plan with a specific 
mandate to ensure the implementation of quick-wins and a range of must-dos ran its course as 
most of them were achieved, including refinement of the MTSIP (UN-Habitat, 2011b).  In 
aligning the institution for delivering MTSIP results, RBM was introduced to support 
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implementation of the MTSIP as an enterprise that ensures high-level transparency and 
accountability in the management of human and financial resources; enhancing results-based 
planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation; and reporting (OECD, 2003). In undertaking 
the necessary institutional reforms defined in the roadmap to deliver the refined MTSIP 
appointed a ―champion‖ Senior Programme Officer in charge of RBM to provide stronger, more 
strategic and accountable leadership of the reform process. The changes and reforms at UN-
habitat include: decentralisation; expansion to new regions; cost saving measures; and results-
based reforms. However, the Senior Programme Officer in charge of RBM had this to say: 
UN-Habitat is moving in the right direction; my only concern is that the organization is 
implementing multiple changes or too many reforms in a short period of time. This might lead to 
transformation fatigue which may contribute to limited transformation.  
These changes were geared towards making UN-Habitat a result-oriented organisation that learns 
from its intervention-providing management with evidence on which to base decision making 
and at the same time be accountable to its stakeholders, especially donors. The changes were 
meant to focus the organisational thinking on results and not just on outputs. The adoption of 
RBM was also expected to increase organisational efficiency and the donor base, in addition to 
building staff capacity to manage for results and to also be accountable for resources and results 
(UN-Habitat, 2011b).  
 
4.8.2  Consequence of introducing RBM at UN-Habitat 
These multiple changes in structure and management  affected the UN-Habitat RBM transfer 
process in one critical way: the newly mandated Office of Management meant  having less direct 
management involvement with those who worked under it (UN-Habitat Organisation Structure, 
Unit Roles and Responsibilities, 2011), with the office now focusing more on strategic issues.  
The Office of Management (OM) provides administrative and programme support, and is 
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structured in two units: Finance, Quality Assurance, Information and Support (FQAIS), and 
Resources Management (RM). Through these two units, the Office of Management coordinates 
and controls the agency‘s finances, resources, and administration, as well as its business 
processes, quality assurance, monitoring, and reporting. The OM embedded staff in all 
organisational units who were directly supervised by those units and not by the Office of 
Management (UN-Habitat, 2011b). 
 
The OM also works closely with the United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON) on issues of 
financial management and control, human resource management and administration, business 
guidelines and processes, and project and administrative services for regional and field offices. 
The overall objective of the programme support component is to strengthen organisational 
accountability, financial resources, and systems management for the effective delivery of 
services. 
 
The OM ensures the efficient and transparent allocation of the human and financial resources of 
the organisation and other assets to meet its operational priorities. It also promotes transparent 
financial management, effective reporting, and strong financial accountability and governance, in 
compliance with the UN‘s financial and administrative rules and regulations (ST/SGB/200/8; 
UN-Habitat, 2013a). 
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The Project Office ensures the overall coordination of the UN-Habitat project portfolio. Its 
objectives are to strengthen project development and management processes and to ensure 
efficient and effective implementation of UN-Habitat projects. The Project Office oversees the 
whole project management cycle, from project strategy, resources, formulation, and approval to 
implementation and monitoring. In order to guarantee operational efficiency and to optimise 
workflow, the regional offices managed by regional directors and the thematic organisational 
units (branches) are decentralised thematic areas and are supported by the Office of Management 
with policies and guidelines (UN-Habitat, 2011b).  
 
Staff who were previously appraised by the Office of Management leaders were going to be 
evaluated ―by their primary supervisors and colleagues [to] whom they were responsible for 
deliverables under particular projects‖ (UN-Habitat, 2013b). Planning and budgeting was 
decentralised; this included decision making about the four thematic areas. The complexity, 
dynamism, and uncertainty in the organisation‘s internal environment definitely posed a threat to 
different aspects of the transfer and survival of the RBM system.  
 
4.9  SUMMARY 
UN-Habitat is a highly complex, dynamic, image-conscious, political, and unpredictable 
organisation. UN-Habitat seems to have many established habits, but at the same time is able to 
continually reflect, self-assess, and align itself with the external environment.  
 
UN-Habitat‘s physical and material culture describes the potential that lies in the existing culture 
in UN-Habitat and the UNDP for effective transfer of RBM policy innovation. The description 
of the context was, not limited to the period during which data were collected for the study, 
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however, but straddled across changes from the time of the organisation‘s founding, and traced 
the effects of those changes to the existing UN-Habitat culture. 
 
The formal components of UN-Habitat represent that part that can be seen and informal 
components are those that lie beneath, unseen, unknown and undetected, yet clearly recognisable 
as organisational elements. These consist of personal perceptions of the organisation; the 
informal power structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, 
and risk-taking behaviour; and the relationship between managers and employees. The way 
different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures 
for the whole organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions. The study‘s wider 
context was not meant to serve merely as a descriptive background to the case study; it also 
represented, on its own, an analysis of the organisation‘s receiving culture.  





GOOD PRACTICES/ ENABLERS FOR TRANSFER OF RBM POLICY 
INNOVATION IN UN-HABITAT 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
RBM is a management strategy aimed at improving the way organisations operate by improving 
performance in terms of results as the core objective.  It provides a management framework and 
tools for strategic planning, risk management, performance monitoring and evaluation, with the 
primary objective of improving efficiency and effectiveness through organisational learning and 
fulfilment of accountability obligations through performance reporting. 
 
This chapter presents the findings and analysis of the enabler ‗drivers‘ for RBM policy 
innovation transfer developed and presented in Figure 2.3: A theoretical model for successful 
RBM Policy innovation transfer. The theoretical model presents the enabler ‗drivers‘ that 
support successful transfer of different steps of the holistic RBM policy innovation discussed in 
this chapter. In terms of expert human capital it looks at inter-relationships with regard to 
communication channels and ideological commonalities as well as institutional capacity.  Other 
enablers that were studied were UN-Habitat as a learning organisation and donor pressure.  
Expert human capital with good communication channels with ideal ideological commonalities 
as well as on-going learning at UN-Habitat and pressure from donors will enable the transfer of 
RBM policy in UN-Habitat. For RBM policy innovation transfer to succeed, the following are 
requisite enablers:  
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(a) Ideological commonalities between RBM components and principles, and an 
organisation‘s espoused values and governance practices 
(b) Donor pressure  
(c) Emerging political support from senior leadership, including resource allocation for RBM 
implementation 
(d) Existence of good communication channels  
(e) Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services 
(f) Lessons of experience from pilot programmes  
(g) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity  
(h) Empowerment and accountability: Institutional mechanism for holding managers 
accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control, and managers with 
delegated authority to the management level held accountable for results and empowered 
with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources to better 
performing activities 
(i) Participatory and team-based management: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of 
performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and 
understanding of development objectives 
(j) Learning organisation  
 
5.2  ENABLERS FOR RBM POLICY TRANSFER 
In exploring the potential for transfer, it is worth noting that the fact that UN-Habitat was able to 
retain some of the best human settlement experts in the world and to attract a constant flow of 
funds (more than $150 million annually) from diverse world agencies and governments (UN-
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Habitat, 2011b). This testifies to the fact that the organisation was creating recognisable public 
goods and services that were of value to stakeholders. Correspondingly, it was also clear from 
evidence that most employees considered UN-Habitat a great place to work at in many ways, and 
that, for most, it was ―a better place to work‖ than where they previously worked. Professionally, 
people were described as ―good to work with‖, and most urban experts enjoyed a high ―degree of 
freedom‖ and ―greater liberty‖ than in their previous employment. One urban expert summarised 
the perceptions of most when he said: 
At UN-Habitat you have greater freedom to apply knowledge than in most places, and people are 
particularly motivated by the work they do. There is tremendous latitude—and irrespective of 
your field in human settlements management, there is room for you at UN-Habitat, and you get to 
move beyond the box. Generally people do not want to leave UN-Habitat. 
 
Some factors, practices and characteristics at UN-Habitat that held substantial potential for the 
RBM transfer process included:  
5.2.1 Ideological Commonalities between the RBM Components and Principles, and UN-
Habitat’s Espoused Values and Governance Practices 
Many components of RBM policy innovation were not entirely new to UN-Habitat, and the 
potential for transfer lay in the fact that, ideologically, RBM says nothing radically different 
from the UN-Habitat aspiration to manage the transformation of human settlements effectively 
and efficiently and for lives to escape poverty. RBM is likewise vested in efficiency and 
effectiveness of the transformation of the status and conditions of poor urban dwellers. It was 
evident from the many changes instituted at UN-Habitat that improved efficiency and 
effectiveness was of as much concern as it was for RBM (UN-Habitat, 2011b). 
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The UN-Habitat inclinations towards ―doing more with less‖, as evidenced by cost cutting 
measures and the creation of teams, and their ―focus on results‖, as stipulated by planning and 
reporting guidelines from the office of programmes and Budgets at the UN headquarters in New 
York (ST/SGB/200/8), did not contradict RBM policy innovation but rather affirmed it. Obvious 
examples of the UN-Habitat concern for efficiency could be seen in decisions to outsource 
transport services for support staff, photocopying; sharing of office space and information 
technologies with other UN agencies located at the UN complex in Nairobi, Kenya; cutting down 
on functions that did not add value; and in the reduction of staff contracts to results-based 
contracts, all of which were cost-saving measures intended to enhance efficiency (UN-Habitat, 
2013a). 
 
5.2.2  Donor Pressure as tool for successful RBM transfer 
RBM policy innovation transfer at UN-Habitat experienced a high degree of power and pressure 
from donors (transfer developers). The potential for RBM policy innovation transfer lay with 
UN-Habitat‘s compliance with the requirements instituted by development partners, especially 
the Department of Foreign International Development (DFID), one of its major donors, regarding 
the use of the tool for managing and tracking performance. 
 
DFID was urging UN-Habitat to focus its work; plan strategically; and credibly demonstrate the 
difference that it was making in the lives of the targeted populations (UN-Habitat, 2011b). DFID 
and other development donors also required that UN-Habitat‘s project and programme 
deliverables be measurable, observable, relevant, and verifiable, and wanted to see more 
evidence that funded activities were producing longer-term benefits.  




More and more donors investing in UN-Habitat had roundly said that publications were good, 
―but they were not enough‖, as the Executive Director put it. RBM assisted in better describing 
and tracking of the results of programmes; assessing progress towards the achievement of goals; 
integrating lessons learned; and reporting performance (UN-Habitat, 2011b). The demand for 
results ran across the three field study sites; however, in Fukuoka, CIDA, the leading donor, had 
pressurised for the institutionalisation of RBM in the planning and reporting of its programmes 
and projects. 
 
5.2.3  Emerging Political Support from Senior Leadership 
RBM literature suggests that senior management is central in successful transfer. Without the 
support of senior management, there is no impetus for change. It is critical that they participate 
and actively support both the creation and implementation of the approach. Moreover, their 
involvement must be clear, consistent, and visible, and they must help overcome resistance. The 
literature also suggests that the leadership role should be shared, in cascading downwards for 
depth and sustainability (UN-Habitat, 2011a). 
 
A review of documents and interviews revealed that the prevailing thought at senior management 
level at UN-Habitat (Deputy Executive Director‘s office) showed a shift towards a results focus, 
although it was not necessarily referred to as RBM (UN-Habitat, 2012). Guidelines from the 
Deputy Executive Director‘s office to programme officers and section heads asked for more 
explicit development results and performance measures that would be easily tracked for progress 
(UN-Habitat, 2011). They asked for reports that were analytical and that indicated why plans 
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succeeded or why they failed, as well as reasons for variance in planned outputs. In the words of 
a member of CPR: ―Getting funds is not an employee‘s key deliverable; the money aspect is their 
added value. People must deliver on development results.‖ 
 
In formal meetings and in documents, the Executive Director reminded programme officers and 
Section Heads of the need for performance measurement and the possibility of adopting some 
aspects of RBM. Guidelines from the senior leadership team were meant to guide global 
programming, and hence the three field study sites were expected to oblige. Top management 
support was yet another potential for successful RBM policy innovation transfer. 
 
Argyris (1999) indicated that leaders transmit the culture of an organisation. Leadership does set 
the trends in the organisation and what they reward gets done or reinforced. The actions of 
management, therefore, have symbolic meanings, and they send messages to the rest of the 
organisation. A performance measurement specialist at UNDP had this to say:  
Leadership support for results-based management reforms has played an important role in this 
organization. Strong advocacy from senior managers has supported institutionalized results-based 
management systems broadly and effectively within the agency. Leaders have been sending 
strong messages of support for results based management to their staff by giving speeches, 
sending out agency-wide notices, participating in results-based management-oriented workshops, 
providing adequate budgetary support, etc. 
One UN-Habitat section head was reported as a manager who managed with tough empathy, 
‗that is, caring intensely about employees and the work they do, yet tough on the bottom line‘, 
and was said to pay attention to subordinate‘s concerns. Staff said the leader focused on building 
emotional bonds while building relationships and healing rifts. This was confirmed by many 
programme officers at UN-Habitat HQ and, in the words of one of them, ―We get together—
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chat—celebrate birthdays go out for dinners and dancing— X really tries to keep us together and 
motivated.‖ 
 
5.2.4 Existence of Good Communication Channels as tool for successful RBM transfer 
Johnsonet al. (1997) noted that communication is a key element in any transfer process, and the 
use and acceptance of technology will not happen without proper communication strategies. 
RBM is an iterative tool that depends on good communication and feedback loops. Intended 
learning will not occur if knowledge is not communicated in a timely manner. UN-Habitat‘s 
potential for RBM transfer lay in its various communication channels, which would support the 
diffusion to its global partners, field sites, national, and regional offices. Moreover, there were 
journals, newsletters, and web-field sites, communities of practice, books, and education and 
training programmes. Other existing institutionalised communication channels included bi-
annual planning and review meetings, CPR meetings, annual reports, and quarterly reports. 
Further, UN-Habitat had invested heavily in information technology, which connected it not to 
its global offices only, but also to other stakeholders and partners (UN-Habitat, 2012). 
 
These well-established channels of communication offered huge potential for a successful RBM 
transfer. For instance, with communication, it was easy to clarify RBM concepts and plans 
globally; to clarify why performance was being measured; what performance information fitted 
decision-making; what kinds of data were expected from the field; and so on, and it would be 
easy to receive timely feedback. UN-Habitat‘s good communication network, if used efficiently, 
has great potential for assisting RBM policy innovation transfer. Fundamentally, all three field 
sites were connected to the Nairobi-Kenya HQ office and had dependable means of 
communication to allow successful RBM policy innovation transfer. 




5.2.5  A results focus as a tool for successful transfer of RBM 
Many components of RBM, especially the strategic and budget planning process, were not new 
to UN-Habitat. For example, engaging partners to increase chances of results; identifying and 
clarifying the specific development problems UN-Habitat sought to affect; developing 
hypotheses about how to address the problems; defining results that reflect the hypotheses; 
organising teams to manage for results; articulating alternative approaches; developing activities 
that achieve the intended results; determining how well to access progress; and obtaining the 
approval to fund the plan, were already in practice, albeit not as systematically as required by an 
RBM system. The Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme 
Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation 
(ST/SGB/200/8) which govern UN-Habitat‘s planning processes states that stakeholders must 
always be engaged in all the organisation‘s strategic planning to increase chances of achieving 
results by jointly identifying and clarifying the development problems; agreeing on results to be 
achieved; developing a hypothesis about how to address problems; and articulating alternative 
approaches. 
 
Likewise, in implementing the planned activities, UN-Habitat conducted most activities with 
partner institutions (governments, UN agencies, international organisations, local non-
governmental bodies, and local governments at municipalities), and they constantly engaged 
partners for results, including joint monitoring and tracking output quality and timeliness. 
 
RBM policy innovation transfer at UN-Habitat, in this case, would just be a combination of old 
and new and a shift of emphasis to outputs and outcomes in the results chain, as opposed to their 
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previous emphasis on activities and outputs. The use of the results frameworks, for instance to 
display programme logic, had been in use at UN-Habitat. What RBM was offering was an 
improvement of the framework to a Performance Management Framework (PMF) whose 
strength lay in its ability to graphically represent not only the cause-and-effect relationships 
between activities, reach, and developmental results, but also more details at output, outcome, 
and impact levels including establishing a robust intervention theory of change. Extra details in 
PMF included systematically identifying performance indicators; means of verifying the 
indicators, sources and frequency of data collection; responsibilities and accountabilities for data 
collection; and, finally, risks and assumptions involved in realising the results. 
 
5.2.6 Lessons of Experience from Pilot Programmes as tool for successful RBM transfer 
Literature suggests that conducting pilot projects presents a good opportunity for organisations to 
test new management systems. Pilot projects present an opportunity to identify and to work out 
some problems and to try out some of the RBM components. It further suggests that pilot 
projects must emulate the scenario of full implementation; must last long enough to test most of 
the new systems, including data collection; and must involve a representative group of 
participants (Creswell, 2007; Robson, 2002). 
 
The Africa regional office had more than three years of RBM experience, and the UN-Habitat 
HQ had about four years of piloting. This combined experience and lessons learned presented an 
incredible window of opportunity for easier RBM policy innovation transfer to the rest of UN-
Habitat.  
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5.2.7  Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity as tool for 
successful RBM transfer 
a) In-house RBM expert  
The potential for RBM policy innovation transfer was high at UN-Habitat, with the enthusiasm 
and interest of a recognised in-house expert and champion in the section head for strategic 
planning and quality assurance. RBM literature indicates that implementing the approach can be 
very challenging, especially to those who have no in-house expertise. An in-house technical 
expert provides guidance, mentors, and facilitates regarding every aspect of development and use 
of performance measurement systems, including collection of data and analysis.  The fact that 
one UN-Habitat section head had respect and recognition as an RBM resource from top 
leadership proved very important for the transfer. In the words of the Executive Director: 
The ground was prepared to receive RBM . . . . We linked the Medium-Term Institutional 
Strategic Plan to RBM, which we did successfully. This was done even before I joined the 
organization,. . . the UN-Habitat HQ section head is an expert and is helping us. 
The one other section head at UN-Habitat is also of great assistance, having used RBM for many 
years while working with UNDP, was involved in a task force that developed guidelines for UN-
Habitat‘s performance measurement. There were a few other program officers who were 
interested in RBM and performance measurement system; this was a huge potential for successful 
RBM transfer. 
 
With regard to the field sites, those in Kenya, though somewhat interested in RBM, did not have 
in-house experts or champions. However, the Fukuoko office seemed to have benefited from a 
training programme provided by one of its main donors and a section head of RBM from UN-
Habitat HQ. 
 
The existence of in-house expertise to support implementation of RBM policy innovation proved 
critical in the adoption of the RBM policy innovation technology. Mentoring for RBM by one 
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UN-Habitat section head in particular had set the climate and seriousness for RBM by 
communicating enthusiasm, confidence, and optimism, which seemed to inspire staff to manage 
for results. One programme officer had the following to say of one of the section heads: ―X is 
easy-going and supportive, but he does not joke when it comes to delivering of results: you either 
show results or you quit.‖ 
 
b)  Internal institutional capacity as tool for successful RBM transfer 
For successful transfer of RBM policy innovation, organisations need to have adequate capacity 
in RBM. The study assessed RBM capacity at UN-Habitat using CAP-Scan (see section 3.3.4), 
and considered the four RBM pillars, namely planning, monitoring and evaluation, and use of 
performance information which were reviewed; and assessing adoption and application of the 
RBM tool in the organisation.  In order to understand the level of RBM policy innovation 
adoption and application within the institution, each pillar was assessed and given a score 
ranging between 0 and 4.  The closer the number was to 4, the higher the RBM level of adoption 
and application. With an average score of 2.2 on a 4-point scale, UN-Habitat has clearly been 
implementing results-oriented approaches for quite some time. There is a need to follow a 
consistent institution-wide approach so as to increase its effectiveness and improve performance. 
Figures 5.1 to 5.5 present an overview of the ranking of UN-Habitat adoption and application of 
RBM in the four pillars.  The findings indicated that UN-Habitat as an institution has the 
knowledge and methodology that is required for RBM successful transfer.  It is observable that 
most pieces of the puzzle are on the table, except for the one related to the role and commitment 
of top managers, which at this moment remains the missing piece.  




Figure 5.1: Results RBM capacity in UN-Habitat 
 
Based on the results presented in Figure 5.1, UN-Habitat is in the transition phase of its RBM 
capacity and implementation of RBM-related strategies, with an average score of 2.2 on a 4-
point scale, as detailed in Figure 5.1 above. All pillars, except for the one focusing on 
Monitoring and Evaluation, are in the transition phase. UN-Habitat scored the least in the 
―monitoring and evaluation‖ RBM pillar with an average capacity score of 1.9, which places it in 
the exploration phase. 




Figure 5.2: UN-Habitat Score in Planning and Budgeting 
 
Planning and Budgeting scored 2.0, as seen in Figure 5.2. The budgeting process must consider 
the results established by UN-Habitat in the Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan 
(MTSIP). One of the major challenges to implement joint results or Programme-Based 
Budgeting (RBB) is to link planning with the budget. A programme-based budget is a strong 
support in advancing the transfer of RBM policy innovation. The advantage of the programme 
classification is that it allows monitoring and evaluation of strategic programmes in the MTSIP. 
This facilitates the achievement of expected results. It is easier to analyse results if both 
instruments have the same programme structure. 
It is clear that a programme consists of organised and integrated activities, services, processes 
and/or projects that implement the strategies designed to achieve the objectives and goals of an 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
150 
 
organisation. In the RBM system, the entire budget should be programme-structured, including 
current spending (wages and salaries).  
 
Figure 5.3: UN-Habitat score in Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) scored 1.9, demonstrating that this is still at the infancy 
stage and appears to be the weakest pillar compared with the other pillars that were studied. 
Monitoring and evaluation is at the core of RBM, since it focuses on the decision-making 
process. Its adoption requires training, practice, and leadership. Training includes how to use 
information to implement evidence-based decision making; practice is necessary to avoid 
making decisions that are not evidence based, and leadership is required because, if evidence-
based decision making is not demonstrated by the heads of the institution and the heads of 
sections, it will not be part of decision making. The respondent‘s average for this pillar was 1.9, 
with a standard deviation of 65%. The lowest scoring  M&E pillar reported  0.7 for the 
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information system and decision support tools, and the highest scores were reported in the three 
subcomponents of  UN-Habitat‘s MTSIP results-based monitoring (2.3), Reporting on Results 
(2.5), and Use of project implementation (and monitoring) data for the institutional decision-
making process (2.6). UN-Habitat in addition works with IMDIS (Integrated Monitoring and 
Documentation Information System) which is used by all UN Secretariat agencies, and several 
staff members pointed out that this system exists for results-based reporting. Nevertheless, with 
such a high standard deviation, the key question to be raised is whether monitoring of projects is 
implemented in an adhoc manner or whether most projects follow a rigorous M&E protocol.   
 
Figure 5.4: UN-Habitat score in Information Systems and Statistics Capacity 
As shown in Figure 5.4, Information Systems and Statistics Capacity scored 2.3.One of the 
key pillars of the RBM framework is reliance on solid information systems and statistics capacity 
and to be able to incorporate confident baseline and robust input data into the forecast model. All 
these are key components of an RBM performance measurement system. Without good 
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information and indicators, the likelihood to show failure or success is limited. All the 
dimensions averaged 2.3, which by definition indicate that all data are available for some priority 
sectors and data are available for almost the entire institutional planning.  However the levels of 
quality and usability are still low. 
 
Figure 5.5:  UN-Habitat score in Leadership and Accountability 
 
Figure 5.5 show that Leadership and Accountability scored 2.6.There is enough empirical 
evidence to prove that the possibility to succeed in RBM is limited without leadership and 
accountability. Leadership skills are required to make adoption and implementation sustainable 
in the long run and to remain consistent across the institution, the evidence, and the performance-
driven decision-making process. Leadership entails the following concepts: commitment, 
responsibility and accountability to partners. Since UN-Habitat, as well as most of the UN 
Development Group‘s institutions, are donor dependent, RBM policy innovation in many cases 
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is donor driven with the result that the level of transparency and accountability is very high with 
donors. A UN-Habitat section head had this to say: 
UN-Habitat should move beyond collecting data for reporting to donors only and also give high 
priority to address the disconnect between its various results-focused data collection, reporting 
and monitoring tools in order to foster the availability of reliable data that can be used by the 
organization, including its evaluation function. A strategy to strengthen feedback links between 
the three results-based management pillars of planning, monitoring and evaluation to ensure 
effective learning, performance improvement, management decision-making and policy should be 
strengthened as at the moment it is very weak. 
 
c)  Competent Programme Officers as tool for successful RBM transfer 
UN-Habitat recruited internationally and had a huge pool of first-class programme officers with 
superior qualifications and vast experience in urbanisation, economic planning and research 
methods, which was a huge advantage for RBM policy innovation transfer as a management tool. 
The high quality of programme officers was evident in all field sites as a result of UN-Habitat‘s 
rigorous recruitment processes, with most of the programme officers holding Master‘s and 
Doctoral degrees. In the words of one former UN-Habitat division director: ―UN-Habitat‘s 
technologies are now being used in some developed countries, which are a rare example of 
South-North transfer of technology.‖ 
 
Arguably, if programme officers at UN-Habitat were persuaded and saw value and reward in the 
use of RBM policy innovation, there seemed to be potential that the same professional 
competency they embrace could be exhibited in their use of the tool. In the words of a Senior 
UN-Habitat Programme Officer in charge of RBM: ―While it is apparent that most program 
officers are aware of RBM, that is, they had heard about it, most seemed to lack enough details 
to fully appreciate it.‖  




There seemed to be many unanswered questions about value added and individual involvement 
in using the approach, and questions about required time demands, relevance, competencies, and 
needed changes. There were a few who seemed to be at the stage of showing interest, who 
desired to know more about what RBM was, how it was applied, and the potential benefits and 
effects. Others seemed to be at the evaluative stage, mentally weighing it against existing 
practices to determine the added value of the approach, with UN-Habitat HQ and Africa region 
piloting only incrementally based on its appreciation of previous smaller applications. A Senior 
Programme Officer at UN-Habitat at one of the sites that were visited said: ―Much of the 
resistance seems to come from misunderstandings and an inability to see the value added from 
RBM.‖ 
 
However, despite the above setback, Programme Officers at UN-Habitat presented another 
potential for transfer in that, while research methods used in RBM to monitor and evaluate 
programme progress on indicators posed the greatest challenge to most development 
organisations trying to adopt the management approach, they already had superior research skills 
and vast experience. Issues of data reliability and credibility, which are critical in RBM for 
information to be useful in programme decision-making, were often undermined by lack of skill 
in research methods. UN-Habitat would have an obvious advantage in this area, being a 
distinguished organisation with a pool of programme officers with vast research and planning 
experience. Moreover, with the more recent external by donors and internal emphasis on results 
by UN-Habitat‘s management, it was likely that both management and other section heads would 
be looking for a tool that would create coherence in the mix of responsibilities across regions and 
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globally. Further, UN-Habitat was more likely to accept RBM as a tool that drives the 
organisation to systematically manage in ways that explicitly define expected results in all 
processes and relationships, and that made its seemingly fragmented projects and programme 
results more coherent as well. In any case, structural, strategic, and cultural changes at UN-
Habitat—instituted to improve coherence, alignment, and ultimately improve organisational 
effectiveness and efficiency—needed a tool that could monitor and measure progress. 
 
There was also a high likelihood that programme officers would commit themselves to RBM 
policy innovation if they saw the benefits and were supported by a good reward system, and if 
management took a serious lead and asked for results; committed funds to training and 
education; and developed systems that would support the process and the programme officers. A 
team of committed Programme Officers would easily localise the tool, and would have the 
ability to discern the aspects of RBM that were congruent with UN-Habitat‘s culture and those 
that needed modification. 
 
5.2.8 Empowerment and accountability at UN-Habitat as tool for successful RBM 
transfer 
RBM advocates for the institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving 
results within their spheres of control. Accountability at UN-Habitat, for instance, means that 
programmes have the responsibility of influencing the outcomes or results being sought while 
recognising that achievement of outcomes and impacts requires joint action on the parts of many 
actors, including government, National Urban Authorities and municipalities, the private sector, 
communities, and donors. RBM obliges individuals to demonstrate what outcome results have 
been accomplished. An accountability culture is one that causes individuals to report specifically 
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on the extent an outcome is being or has been accomplished, or on accounting for significant and 
valuable achievements that have contributed to the success of the overall outcome, hence, 
demonstrating that probability of success is important enough to justify expending organisational 
resources.  
 
Consistent with the RBM values, findings indicated that UN-Habitat had decentralised power 
and responsibility to those nearest the front-lines. It had empowered Regional Directors and 
delegated authority to make them accountable for programme results (UN-Habitat, 2012). In 
addition, it empowered them with the flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift 
resources to better performing activities. This was an RBM value that UN-Habitat fully 
embraced and practised at all three field sites that were visited. 
 
In keeping with the RBM principle of accountability, documents like work plans and interviews 
at UN-Habitat revealed that staff had defined the roles and responsibilities and the results to be 
delivered by each individual. Findings further indicated that, although team-based management 
was encouraged at UN-Habitat, individual performance was critical to the section‘s overall 
performance. Accountability for outcomes in an RBM system is not an individual‘s 
responsibility, but a shared responsibility among partners. An individual‘s output or even a 
cluster of outputs will often not guarantee the achievement of an outcome, since the contribution 
of a wider group of partners is usually essential. Effective partnerships occur where there is a 
clear understanding of the contribution of each individual to agreed outcomes.  
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Through performance contracts designed by UN-Habitat management, staff were given 
performance specifications that made them understand the results that they were expected to 
produce and the standards they were expected to meet. The performance contracts were based on 
staff‘s knowledge and the skills required to achieve the expected results. The section heads 
ensured that there were sufficient resources (budget, equipment, and staff) and through frequent 
appraisal meetings ensured that staff knew when they were realising important results and when 
their work was not adding value. 
 
At UN-Habitat HQ those interviewed said there was a high sense of openness and transparency, 
and contentious issues were openly discussed. Respondents said that there were no surprises 
even when it came to performance appraisals. One particular section head was especially popular 
for his down-to-earth approach to management and was described by one of the staff in the 
following manner: ―XX is down to earth and tries to come to our level—he not only hears the 
words, but feels the emotions behind the words.‖ 
The UN-Habitat section heads were said by most respondents to manage staff fears, 
expectations, and conflicts in a win-win manner. One example given was when there were issues 
of budget cuts that threatened people‘s jobs: ―All scenarios and possibilities were explored and 
discussed in the open, and because of this, the staff understood the situation from the section 
head‘s perspective.‖ 
The empathy shown by one of the UN-Habitat section heads seemed to pay off well in terms of 
staff commitment. A programme Officer said: ―Such comforting clarity reduces negative politics 
and the anxiety staff often felt about careers, and encouraged a focus on results.‖  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
Most interviewed staff seemed to have a covenant with their work, and this was evident in their 
broader sense of handling responsibilities and their ability to persevere even in the face of 
―frustrations and setbacks‖. A Programme Officer expressed this in, ―not just to be able to 
perform well in tasks, but to ensure what it takes to stay on when the wider organisation decides 
to separate the wheat from the chaff.‖  
Such mutual loyalty and dependency seemed to have created a fear-free environment and 
transfer of some RBM-enhanced performance. A Programme Officer had this to say, ―People 
envy UN-Habitat staff.‖ UN-Habitat was perceived by most national staff as one of the ―best 
places to work‖ because ―the managers cared for their staff.‖  
 
5.2.9 Participatory and team-based management as tool for successful RBM transfer 
In an RBM system, stakeholder participation is important in that it expands the information base 
needed for programme/project design and planning. Identifying, defining, and measuring 
results/risks hinges on the collection of comprehensive information. Bringing together 
project/programme stakeholder‘s helps to ensure that the information and knowledge held by 
stakeholders are identified, coordinated and used to fine-tune and inform programming. 
Observations and document reviews showed that team-based management and participatory 
methods at UN-Habitat were evident in project teams, thematic teams, and the many team-
building activities that took place, for instance, annual planning and review meetings and 
communities of practice.  
 
Externally, UN-Habitat boasted more than 100 synergetic partnerships and alliances across the 
world and it internally was constantly looking at new ways of eliciting more participation and 
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feedback across field sites and regions (UN-Habitat, 2011b). Although these practices were not 
as systematic as would be required in an RBM process, they still were not incongruent with 
RBM, and this was another window of opportunity for successful RBM policy innovation 
transfer. 
 
The essence of participation in RBM is that those involved, that is, the stakeholders, define 
expected results and develop indicators to show progress, and to have the indicators accepted by 
all. When there is mutual acceptance and ownership, there is a higher likelihood that there will 
be a commitment to moving towards the desired results and less criticism of and resistance to the 
RBM process. A full understanding of factors that might affect the realisation of outcomes 
becomes very crucial. A document review of the Executive Director‘s opening remarks revealed 
evidence of stakeholder participation in the 2014-2018 strategic planning process; where he had 
this to say,  
I am pleased to welcome members of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Mayors, 
and Government Urban Planners to contribute to UN-Habitat‘s work for the period 2014 – 2048. 
Your voices will be very important in defining the impact of UN-Habitat activities on urban poor.   
 
According to RBM policy innovation, accountability is applicable at all levels, from the top 
down. The executive heads and the heads of major organisational units are therefore the first to 
be held accountable for the results that they are expected to deliver: 
Evidence from document reviews (UN-Habitat, 2011a) and interviews with staff strongly 
suggested that accountability focuses almost exclusively at the level of the Executive Director. A 
senior Programme Officer at UN-Habitat HQ had this to say:  
Program staff do perceive that they are accountable for delivery of project outputs, but nobody is 
identified as accountable for ensuring that projects and programs are managed to maximize their 
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contributions to achievement of the outcome which is the key aspect expected in the results based 
management system. 
 
Full participation to foster support for implementation of RBM is a key ingredient in the transfer 
process, and the subculture at UN-Habitat HQ attained the greatest hope for transfer of the policy 
innovation. Data indicated that there was a high level of involvement in programme planning and 
implementation at UN-Habitat HQ (UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008-2013). Inclusion and participation 
of key stakeholders is critical in defining expected results in a RBM system. The Chairman of 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) stated: ―We told UN-Habitat management, 
for the 2014 - 2018 strategic plan, we want to see full participation of member countries through 
the CPR.‖ 
 
5.2.10 UN-Habitat as a learning organisation as tool for successful RBM transfer 
RBM involves continuous learning about what works, what does not work, and why, and 
spending more time on high leverage, value-adding work. UN-Habitat is a learning organisation, 
and this was evident from the strategic plans and the many changes continually instituted. 
Change occurred as a result of learning that some things were not working well. The Deputy 
Executive Director explained: ―As an organization, UN-Habitat is continuously learning and 
transforming itself in response to internal and external realities. This kind of learning is 
expanding individual and organizational horizons and was empowering.‖  
 
Further, assessing and learning took place formally during the annual planning and review 
meetings and took place when working with partners to transform inputs into outputs, and as the 
organisation assessed whether the outputs were enough to achieve stated objectives. Reporting 
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on progress on performance and conducting formative and summative evaluations were all 
avenues of learning. 
 
This study showed that a lot of research is conducted at UN-Habitat, which gives it a competitive 
advantage, as another form of learning; every year more than 50 articles containing lessons and 
best practices were published in renowned world, peer-reviewed journals. While publishing was 
a valued output by stakeholders, RBM would go a step further with the question ―so what?‖ ―So 
what if you published in the best journals? How was that getting you closer to your mission? Are 
you measuring? What are you measuring? Where is the evidence?‖ Value for money and 
measurable results would be the purpose for learning, according to the RBM system. 
 
While learning at UN-Habitat did not seem systematic, with outcomes of learning defined in 
advance as required by the RBM system, the practice was in tandem with RBM‘s principle of 
learning as you go along. Learning in RBM aims at better management for enterprise success and 
so was the learning that is occurring at UN-Habitat. 
 
UN-Habitat‘s supported learning was evident in their investment in communication technology, 
which enhanced learning globally across regions and partners. The support that management 
gave to communities of practice also provided evidence of a high level of commitment to 
learning. Learning at UN-Habitat was, therefore, consistent with RBM values and principles. 
 
There was evidence across the three field sites that were visited that learning occurred, but, as in 
the case of the Headquarters, it was not occurring in any organised or systematic manner. There 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
162 
 
was sharing of lessons of experience between headquarters and field sites. In sharing knowledge 
with the regions, the senior human settlement officers in the African region, UN-Habitat section 
heads, and a Programme Officer in the Programme & Budget Department at UN Headquarters in 
the New York office were cited in one site as exemplary.  
 
Transparency as UN-Habitat‘s core value is a key RBM value and principle. People using RBM 
are empowered out of necessity; there is tremendous power in measuring performance. People 
are required and permitted to think, use common sense or good judgment, and make decisions 
that are transparent. The good governance value of openness and transparency, which are key 
RBM values, were also two of UN-Habitat‘s core values. Transparency in an RBM process 
means data-based or evidence-based decision-making with regard to budget use and other 
resources, management of people, and number of people to be targeted by the programme. 
Decisions must be supported by data as evidence. 
 
While acknowledging that values are ideals that organisations aspire to attain and often are 
receding targets, there was evidence that UN-Habitat had some commitment to transparency. For 
example, one notable occasion where management showed exemplary transparency was during 
the Strategic Planning meeting in which the Executive Director guided the decision-making 
process in the allocation of Department of Foreign International Development (DFID) funds. 
This kind of budget transparency was unprecedented and was applauded by most. While the 
budget allocation decisions were not made on strict RBM principles, where data as evidence of 
results or plans guided allocation, there were indications from reviewed documents as well as 
and management remarks that it was the preferred future direction. In the evaluative words of the 
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Executive Director, ―This is the first time we have had an open and transparent negotiation 
process. There was an open and transparent evaluation of our budgets, and people were making 
their cases.‖  
 
One Programme Officer spoke for most of the others when he said, ―I must say I really liked the 
transparent way that the budget has been discussed this time, I wish we had this method of open 
decision making earlier in our programs and in UN-Habitat.‖ 
 
Another notable case of transparency was the process of restructuring. A series of documents 
showed detailed communication from the office of the Executive Director, specifying the 
process, roles, and responsibilities and inviting comments and suggestions. Another example was 
in the recruitment processes of the Directors. Openness, rigorous procedures, and highly 
transparent processes characterised the exercise.  
 
UN-Habitat‘s on-going reforms in appraisal systems; guidelines on grievances; non-
discriminatory policies; zero tolerance of financial misappropriation; and harassment policies, if 
adhered to, were all meant to enhance transparency in decision-making. Hence, the potential for 
RBM transfer would be high, given that it would only add value. Transparency was not an easily 
observable behaviour at the field sites, given the short time the Section Heads spent there.  
 
UN-Habitat‘s Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices: RBM is an iterative 
tool that relies heavily on feedback from monitoring and evaluation for programme learning, 
decision-making and redesign for improved effectiveness and efficiency. RBM literature further 
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suggests that the starting point for any improvement is to realise that a current position was 
unsatisfactory and something better and achievable existed.  
 
Evidence from documents, especially those originating from the senior leadership team 
(Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director, Section Heads and Regional Directors); 
observations, bi-annual review documents, reports of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR) and donor programme review meetings; and interviews with programme 
officers indicated that UN-Habitat had a strong self-assessment and self-alignment culture. 
Interview evidence revealed a high level of self-awareness, especially of things that did not 
work, and why they did not work. IMDIS data and some of the documents furthermore showed 
the specific proposed solutions identified in team discussions. With all the on-going changes in 
the organisation there was also overwhelming evidence that UN-Habitat continuously adopted 
new practices that were intended to improve its performance and, in so doing, continually strived 
to transform itself, hence aligning itself externally and internally. In the words of the Executive 
Director: ―We have to adjust the way we do business while responding to the external 
environment. We are trying to maintain funding, while at the same time looking at 
improvements.‖ 
 
This inclination to reflect, consider, analyse, and self-critique by UN-Habitat was congruent with 
RBM values and principles and this provided good ground for successful transfer. The self-
assessment and self-alignment of internal and external realities running through the organisation 
was evident, for instance, when the Chairperson of the UN-Habitat‘s CPR commented on the 
restructuring process with:  
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The funding climate was changing fast with more organizations competing for less and less 
resources. Staff salaries at UN-Habitat started to get affected. UN-Habitat realized if it did not 
change it was going to perish. Business as usual was over—we had to change or we die. 
 
On the same subject of restructuring, the CPR‘s chairperson went on and explained the situation 
in the following words: 
For a long time UN-Habitat used to be the best. We had a lot of donors, good program officers, 
and were the only game in town. Then, all of a sudden, we found out we were no longer the best, 
and even, not the only game in town. Of course that was threatening. We realized that answers to 
yesterday‘s questions were not going to solve today‘s problems. The new challenges called for 
new and entrepreneurial approaches. UN-Habitat had to reinvent itself. 
 
In a different forum, the Executive Director echoed the words of the Chairperson to the CPR 
when he said: ―The world is changing. UN-Habitat has to adapt to an extremely versatile external 
environment. The ability to adapt to these changes will be crucial to our future survival.‖ 
 
This kind of external and internal assessment and self-alignment was evident in many of the 
changes UN-Habitat had instituted. From changes in top management, to programmatic 
realignment, to recruiting, to mentoring, to outsourcing, all were open admissions that what was 
in place was not working well and management was open to better ways of doing things. For 
instance, regarding the restructuring of the Research and Development Divisions, the 
Chairperson of the UN-Habitat CPR explained:  
The organization felt it was living a contradiction by separating research and developments. To 
create a continuum and harmony, research had to marry development—a liaison that has not been 
fully accepted by some at UN-Habitat and by some partners outside. 
This inclination towards self-assessment and concern for things that eroded efficiency and 
effectiveness was further evident during interviews, as programme officers criticised what they 
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perceived as declining research quality; lack of knowledge management systems; poor 
communication; inadequate involvement in decision making by management and so on. This 
ability to reflect and critically and objectively look at things with the intent of righting them was 
in full congruence with the RBM principle of questioning value for money and results that were 
of value to the organisation and stakeholders.  
 
5.3  POTENTIAL FOR RBM TRANSFER AT UNDP 
The adoption and implementation of results-based management has been a challenge to many 
donor-fund recipients and development partners. The World Bank 2006 annual report on 
evaluation of operations reviewed progress with managing for results. The report found that the 
World Bank and other partners, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations 
Development Programme instituted policies and procedures to manage better for results. These 
policies translated into improved practices at the operational level, but managers and operational 
staff in these organisations were still struggling to link goals to operations. Performance 
indicators were often inadequate and many staff were unclear about how to use performance 
information in their day-to-day work and the culture acted as a disincentive to managing for 
results. These findings resonate with the challenges faced by the UNDP referred to by the UNDP 
management in all interviews. 
 
The findings from this research indicate that the UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011, took RBM 
policy innovation a step further by providing an instrument that: (a) clearly articulated UNDP 
priorities, objectives, targets and performance indicators; (b) created a solid basis for internal 
resource allocation; and (c) set a stronger platform for comprehensive results management. This 
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simplified framework sharpened the UNDP focus, clarified areas of comparative advantage, and 
facilitated the measurement of and reporting on results. For each focus area, the UNDP spelled 
out its key results areas and outcomes with a view to further strengthening alignment. 
 
A further general lesson that emerged was the importance of stressing management over 
measurement. The fundamental goal of results-based management is to improve development 
effectiveness, which requires helping managers to manage better. In comparing RBM systems, 
the distinction is sometimes made between managing by results and managing for results. The 
former is principally oriented towards accountability and external reporting; the latter focuses on 
a cycle of planning, periodic performance and organisational learning. In implementing RBM, 
the UNDP made a deliberate decision to emphasise management and learning. RBM has to aim 
explicitly aim at changing the way the organisation is managed, fostering a strategic orientation 
and a culture of performance. Improved external reporting was approached as very important, 
but a secondary benefit. 
 
The UNDP country resident representative commented: 
Strategic results frameworks have assisted our managers to judge whether the overall results of 
UNDP assistance meet the goals, principles and standards set out in the mission statement and 
business plans as well as in operational and thematic policies. As such, have improved UNDP‘s 
substantive accountability to national stakeholders and the Executive Board and, for the first time, 
laid the basis for a funding strategy to support approved programs based on results that are clearly 
identified and monitored. 
 
Findings indicated that tools and systems for RBM policy innovation evolved without a 
comprehensive design, creating a five-year period of rolling innovation, redesign and change.  
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The documents (UNDP Country Programme Document, 2010-2014) showed a shift towards a 
results focus, although it was not necessarily referred to as RBM. The strategic objectives have 
been developed to help focus the programme, whilst also improving communication with 
external stakeholders. Alignment of programmes to strategic goals was promoted by a shift in the 
results focus from outputs to outcomes. In parallel, the balanced scorecard was a response to 
change the culture of the organisation and report against a broad range of physical and financial 
indicators of operational change. Developments in reporting were led by the Results Oriented 
Annual Reports (ROAR), but monitoring lagged behind in terms of policy and tools to help 
monitor progress towards country outcomes. Adjustment of programmes was expected to take 
place mainly through annual and country programme cycles.  Links to learning were supposed to 
occur through the shift from project to programme outcome evaluations and interactions with the 
practice areas and networks. An accountability framework was developed with provisions for 
individual, managerial and true organisational accountability. 
 
Strategic plans should articulate the programme‘s theory of change clearly. Findings indicated 
that UNDP results frameworks did not convincingly link results directly with the achievement of 
specified goals. The UNDP country resident representative explained:  
One of our challenges in improving the strength of practice is the quality and evaluability [sic] of 
planning and programming frameworks upon which RBM relies. The outcome evaluations we 
have conducted highlighted the lack of clearly defined and measurable objectives supported by 
appropriate indicators, and data streams have restrained the accurate assessment of results for 
program and project learning and accountability. I think the planning horizon in UNDP may be 
too short to be able to meaningfully assess progress with outcomes. Whereas outcomes may 
easily take 5-10 years to materialize, most programs are designed for a 2- 4 year duration, 
intentionally being kept within the timeframe of the Country Program Document (CPD). Our 
challenge has been to identify methodologies, standards and indicators that meaningfully capture 
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performance and attribution within the timeframe of the operational horizon. Sometimes the link 
between our projects and programs is weak due to political and donor pressure – we‘re forced to 
implement projects that don‘t contribute to the realization of program results. 
 
The findings from the UNDP results matrices revealed that there is fairly good identification of 
risks and assumptions; targets and timelines are set; outputs are linked to those accountable; and 
indicators are properly identified. The outcomes were specific so that there was a suitable 
practical indicator to show whether the outcome had been achieved or not, all of which are 
critical elements for a RBM system.   
The deputy resident representative operations lamented:  
Organization‘s resources are supposed to be well aligned with its long-term objectives. At 
present, ensuring coherence and compatibility between budgeting and programming decisions 
(for example, any budget cuts should correspond to specific and identified program cuts) is 
difficult since programming and budgeting planning cycles are separate.  
 
There is evidence that, even when opportunity existed to allocate funds (i.e. within thematic trust 
funds) and core resources on the basis of priorities and results, this has not been done. At the 
Kenya country office, interviews with senior management and the review of documents suggest 
that there was no systematic tool for doing this. 
 
In performance measurement, harmonising donor performance information requirements with 
the organisational performance monitoring and reporting systems is critical. Evidence from 
reviewed records indicates some harmonisation around (driven by) other donor systems (i.e. the 
DFID-funded Elections project).  
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Findings indicated that interaction between the UNDP and the Government of Kenya and non-
government actors in performance measurement was found to be limited; yet the UNDP‘s RBM 
initial core principle is national ownership, which supports the RBM principle of stakeholder 
participation. With few exceptions, the UNDP‘s activities were found to be focused solely on its 
own programmes, despite often managing and supporting RBM-related initiatives. 
 
RBM literature (OECD, 2001) identifies three primary uses of performance information, namely 
learning, management improvement and accountability for results. In terms of the UNDP and its 
primary partners‘ own use, the Country Resident Representative commented on the use of 
evaluations by saying:  
The majority of evaluations conducted have enabled senior management to determine and 
respond to aspects of quality of the delivery, strengths and weaknesses, potential gaps and 
identified future needs. The Kenya country office is using the findings of the evaluations for 
strategic and programmatic adjustment and development. These include the drafting of new 
strategic results frameworks and country program documents, and in one case for the complete 
reassessment of work arrangements, approach, staff needs and advocacy in the area attended by 
the evaluation. The wide scope of outcome evaluation, beyond the traditional sectoral boundaries, 
has in other cases identified the lack of cross-fertilization of knowledge and ideas within UNDP 
and beyond. 
The findings identify five main uses: first, internal CO [country office] operational planning and 
management (to feed into staff meetings, retreats, performance assessment); second, corporate 
reporting (e.g. strategic results frameworks, ad hoc headquarters requests for information); third, 
partner/counterpart liaison, consultations and decision-making (e.g. steering committee 
meetings); fourth, resource mobilisation (project briefs, proposals, ‗success stories‘); and fifth, as 
substantive contributions in participation in Government/donor consultation groupings and UN 
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inter agency working groups. Less evidence was found on dissemination of lessons learned for 
global and cross-national learning. 
 
In most of the cases, information derived from the monitoring function was found to be confined 
to a small cadre of operational staff within the arrangement of implementing agency, the UNDP 
and government, who serviced the input and activity tracking functions. The notion of 
participation in this context often hinged only upon the involvement of these ‗internal‘ 
stakeholders, and thus relates, even unintentionally, largely to the control function of projects. 
However, where regular feedback mechanisms were found, where steering committees and 
tripartite reviews are systematically practised and located within broader programmatic 
structures, the information generated was found to be of wider operational and strategic 
relevance.‖  
 
The value of the RBM ―results chain‖ is that it makes explicit the underlying assumption of all 
development programming, i.e. that no project or programme should be undertaken if a 
reasonable case cannot be made at the outset that it will contribute to development outcomes, 
and no on-going project or programme should continue to operate as initially designed if it 
becomes clear during implementation that it is unlikely to produce development outcomes. 
 
Because development organisations and partners are acting more in concert, development results 
most likely will not be attributable directly to any one development organisation or partner, but 
the UNDP can show how its projects and programmes have contributed to the overall results. 
The deputy resident representative for programmes had this to say: 
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What is important is that lasting development results be achieved, not that they be attributed 
directly to the intervention of any particular organization. This type of reporting would reinforce 
UNDP‘s move to focus more on development results, and would improve learning and 
performance improvements for the effective use of donor funds. 
 
RBM policy innovation encourages a shift in programming towards ―contribution‖ as opposed to 
focusing on ―attributing‖ results (OECD, 2003). What is important is that development results 
have been achieved but not who achieved, and that results are achieved through the collective 
effort of different stakeholders.  
 
5.4  SUMMARY 
Findings from the previous discussion have demonstrated the relevance and significance of the 
theoretical model (Figure 2.3) for any successful RBM policy innovation transfer. The analysis 
and discussion of the variable ‗enablers‘ of the theoretical model showed that UN-Habitat had 
many opportunities that were conducive to the successful transfer and adoption of RBM policy 
innovation technology.  First, the existence of in-house RBM expertise; UN-Habitat‘s Self-
Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices; the existence of Good Communication 
Channels and Competent Programme officers the Ideological Commonalities of the RBM 
Components and Principles and UN-Habitat‘s Espoused Values and Governance Practices; and 
participatory and team-based management were precursors to the successful implementation of 
RBM innovation technology at the UN-Habitat offices.  In addition, UN-Habitat being a learning 
organization strengthens the innovativeness of adaptation of the RBM policy innovation.  
Furthermore, it was found that RBM was able to promote transparency, hence empowering the 
accountability process.  Donor pressure also helped UN-Habitat to adapt to the RBM policy 
innovation technology, even if it was to receive resistance, as human beings always resist 
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change.  The result was emerging political support from senior leadership and internal 
institutional capacity. 
 




BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL TRANSFER OF RBM IN UN-HABITAT 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the identified barriers in the successful transfer of RBM policy innovation. 
The chapter therefore presents RBM policy innovation variables/factors (Figure 2.3) not 
appropriately realised and hence becoming barriers to successful RBM policy innovation 
transfer. Any enabler not realised or inappropriately realised becomes a barrier to successful 
transfer of RBM policy innovation. Barriers can be seen or unseen impediments that cause 
difficulties in the process of transfer.   Transfer of any technology is not just technical, but is also 
social and political. As a result, transfer and adoption of western management concepts, 
structures, and instruments often face cultural barriers and problems of misfit, which can be 
characterised as technical and institutional inconsistencies (Dorota & Jankowicz, 2002).  
 
The chapter presents inappropriately realised enablers (hence barriers) for RBM policy 
innovation transfer as developed and presented in (Figure 2.3): A theoretical model for 
successful RBM Policy Innovation Transfer. When these enablers are inappropriately realised, 
they become barriers to RBM policy innovation transfer and this chapter presents those 
inappropriately realised enablers as ―barriers‖. The identified barriers include inappropriate 
realisation of governance values; a counterproductive reward system and internal capacity; 
ineffective roll-out of participatory management; and inappropriate in-house RBM expertise.  
RBM systems are sustained by the organisational culture characterised by good governance 
reflecting itself in transparent, participatory and inclusive decision making and a poor reward 
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system.  Other barriers relate to how management gives rewards for work done and the extent of 
knowledge and skills in using the performance measurement system. The chapter also presents 
other variable barriers not identified in the theoretical model (represented by ―β‖ in model 2.3) as 
a result of model under-identification.  These additional barriers that affected successful transfer 
of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat include: inability to actively promote impartiality; 
inequality and inappropriate politics of change; and inappropriate RBM policy innovation 
supporting systems and structures. 
 
6.2  BARRIERS TO TRANSFER OF RBM TECHNOLOGY 
Current management research literature cautions that the process of transfer of management 
knowledge is complex, and that knowledge cannot be transferred easily across national, cultural, 
and institutional boundaries and implemented unproblematically within organisations (Jackson, 
2005). Organisations are not always rational machine-like entities. Rather, organisations often 
are irrational, hypocritical, uncoordinated, and highly political miniature societies (Brown, 
1998). Only when the irrational, ambiguous, and unpredictable nature of the organisation is 
understood, can one introduce change. The transfer-receiving culture or user environment is 
often the primary determining factor for whether a transferred technology sustains or fails. 
 
 In stark contrast to the huge potential and good intentions that existed at UN-Habitat, the 
prevailing informal culture, as described by most of the respondents at the time of the study, 
seemed largely negative. Some RBM policy innovation success variables/factors in the model 
(Figure 2.3) were inappropriately realised: Governance values were inappropriately realised and 
was a significant variable in the RBM transfer process and hence an ―inappropriate realization of 
Governance Values as barrier to successful transfer of RBM‖;  In-house RBM expertise and 
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internal institutional capacity also hindered successful transfer of RBM and hence were 
―Inappropriate  in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity as tool for successful 
RBM transfer‖; Participatory and team-based management was also lacking at UN-Habitat and 
hence ―ineffective roll-out of participatory and team-based management‖; and the reward  
system was not well thought through, and thus ―Counterproductive  reward system as barriers to 
successful transfer of RBM". 
 
The researcher categorised the data on the informal practices in four broad categories of barriers 
to successful transfer of RBM policy innovation, namely; 
(a) Inappropriate realisation of Governance Values as barrier to successful transfer of RBM 
(b) Inappropriate in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity as tool for 
successful RBM transfer 
(c) Ineffective roll-out of participatory and team-based management 
(d) Counter-productive reward system as barriers to successful transfer of RBM 
 
6.2.1  Inappropriate realisation of Governance Values as a barrier 
Good governance issues relate to transparency in decision making, which involves following 
rules and regulations and giving enough information about decisions. It also includes being 
participatory and inclusive in decision making (Argyris, 1999), being accountable for decisions 
and finances (Watts, Flanagan& Little, 2005), and actively promoting impartiality and equity 
(Ölund Wingqvist & Slunge, 2013), with views of the minority being taken into account in 
decision making. 
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According to the OECD (2001), RBM systems are sustained by an organisational culture that is 
characterised by good governance structures. Culture is ―how things are done around any 
particular place‖ (Schein, 2000).It includes values and beliefs that inform practice and 
behaviour—rules that guide people‘s choices and how they behave. Culture drives an 
organisation and its actions. It is a little like the operating system of the computer. It is deep, and 
wide and complex; and dynamic and fluid (Spencer-Oatey, 2012). Some aspects of the culture 
are visible and tangible, and others are intangible and unconscious. This study bracketed off 
organisational action and management attention as often being the strongest indicators of culture. 
Schein (2000) asserts that the way different issues are handled by management creates new 
norms, values, and working procedures, and reveals important underlying assumptions. Informal 
messages, for example, are sent to staff members by the way senior management handles 
situations. 
 
Most respondents indicated that there was a high level of frustration among staff members as a 
result of the lack of common practices in doing things and inconsistencies in following the 
policies and procedures that have been put in place. This sometimes led to frustration among the 
workers. One respondent who had served UN-Habitat for more than 12 years remarked: 
If you come from the US or Europe or the World Bank, you come with your own culture on 
how to do things. There is no on-boarding or orientation to the policies or guidelines on many 
things. Good or bad practices are largely personal decisions—there is no orientation to the 
culture and the way of doing business at UN-Habitat. 
Good governance refers to the effective, honest, equitable, and accountable exercise of power in 
a transparent fashion by organisations and institutions. A professional administrative cadre and 
recognition of the limits of an organisation‘s actions are important elements of good governance. 
Good governance refers mainly to the fashion in which we exercise power, but it also includes 
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the adoption of sound management policies which promote growth with equity and which places 
appropriate limits on expenditure. Barriers to transfer touched on three key good governance 
practices, namely following of rules and regulations. Giving enough information about decisions 
that are made; and active promotion of impartiality and equity. 
 
a) Non-observation of rules and regulations  
An organisation‘s culture is defined by its practices. Every organisation, regardless of its size and 
complexity, has a political structure and culture that greatly impacts its behaviour (Schein, 2000; 
Hofstede, 1997). Cultural issues are not clean, but are intricately wired to political, social, 
historical and especially to personal contexts. Organisational culture and structure are, indeed, 
often the major reason why organisations experience difficulties or become dysfunctional 
(Schein, 2000).  
 
According to OECD (2001) RBM literature, policies and procedures govern organisational 
behaviour, thus providing a means for norming practices. Management systems are put in place 
to save time on supervision and giving directions through memos or meetings, and that allows 
individuals to be more proactive regarding critical matters. People know what is expected of 
them at different times and for different things. Process requirements are made clear with written 
guidelines, and most importantly, there is someone to monitor and enforce standards.  
 
However, according to the perceptions of respondents, rules and regulations laid down at UN-
Habitat were not always adhered to strictly in decision-making, and hence undermined the full 
development of transparency as a key value in good governance. Remarks from most 
respondents portrayed policies at UN-Habitat as ―amorphous,‖ and that although procedures and 
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policies existed on paper, incidents of ethical lapses and un-procedural practices sometimes went 
unnoticed and without consequences from management. One respondent who had been with the 
organisation for more than 20 years explained: 
Policies are ambiguous, and there is ambiguity in most things. There are inconsistencies in 
practice and some things are just not in writing anywhere. There are no guidelines to help you 
make decisions as simple as taking your car on a trip. People have learned how to go around strict 
UN guidelines on employment for short-term and long-term positions and it is a disaster–it is just 
a big joke. Existing rules are not followed by anybody and if you try to follow, you find out 
everybody else out there is laughing at you. 
Another respondent with nearly 25 years‘ experience at UN-Habitat shared similar sentiments: 
―People are never sure of management thought or direction. There is no consistency in systems, 
things are started and forgotten halfway when new priorities emerge.‖ 
 
Although a document review revealed many written organisational policies and procedures at the 
UN-Habitat, the perceived lack of transparency seemed to emanate from lack of consistency and 
adherence. This seemed to create an erosion of trust in management, which, in turn, seemed to 
promote gossip, speculation, insecurity, and politics, which wasted people‘s time.  
Management literature (Jackson, 2005) state that management‘s clarity of rules and policies help 
reduce the anxiety people feel about their careers. But in situations where management sends out 
mixed signals about rewards, promotion, career paths, and criteria for termination, there 
inevitably is a lot of gossip, game-playing, and unproductive expenditure of energy. In the words 
of one Programme Officer: 
Staffs [sic] are not using much of their time and energy on work related things, but on politics and 
seeking opportunities elsewhere. Especially during this time of restructuring, commitment is 
actually very low. 
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Some respondents indicated that the state of ―chaos‖ and ―ambiguity‖ that was perceived to exist 
at UN-Habitat was sustained because it served some individuals. In the words of a UN-Habitat 
Programme Officer: ―Being without systems and ambiguity serves some people well; it gives 
them power, so they will resist any change.‖ 
 
While most respondents consistently cited lack of following guidelines on decision-making and 
―ambiguity‖, none cited financial misappropriation. On the contrary, most respondents cited the 
―zero tolerance to financial mismanagement‖ policy as one of UN-Habitat‘s most adhered to 
governance practices. In the words of one respondent from the Senior Management Team: ―We 
can‘t tolerate financial mismanagement—we just cannot survive a financial scandal.‖ 
This assertion was supported by the existence of a number of qualified finance staff who ensured 
financial accountability and limited audit vulnerability. Documents revealed the use of UN 
Office of Oversight and Inspection, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, an internationally reputable 
audit firm, as the preferred firm for audited financial reports at UN-Habitat.  
 
However, without consistently and strictly following most procedures as laid down, management 
was seen as not precisely transparent and open but as arbitrary in decision-making, both in the 
management of people and in financial decisions. The frequently cited non-adherence to existing 
procedures and absence of cultural orientation (to define the organisations spoken and unspoken 
Do‘s and Don‘ts clearly) at UN-Habitat seemed to have made organisational life capricious for 
some. 
 
b) Not giving enough information:  
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Although UN-Habitat has cutting-edge communication systems, including internal newsletters 
and a website, responses suggested that many aspects of communication remained a big 
challenge. Issues around delayed information, relevance, and openness remained. A respondent 
who had been with the organisation for nearly 20 years summarised what several respondents 
had said: 
There are no records; no reference files; no order and no systems for tracking information 
gathered on urbanization issues or financial commitment. You can‘t track anything. With 
digital files-information is individual-to-individual. If you are out of the loop, you do not 
know anything. Nobody knows what is going on; there is no single system that informs 
everybody. 
Another respondent complained: ―Management is always reactive; they lack crucial and timely 
information—the organization is always in one form of crisis or another.‖ 
During the time of the study, many examples were given of instances where management 
exhibited ―a lot of unnecessary secrecy‖ about issues that could easily have been discussed in the 
open, and instances where decisions were made without communicating them to those affected. 
This was seen to have caused a breakdown of trust in management. One respondent put it this 
way: ―Management is not open, it‘s not transparent; I wouldn‘t say they lie but there is a lot of 
withholding of information . . . that causes speculations and mistrust.‖  
Further, there were complaints of too many ―unnecessary‖ e-mails. In the words of one 
Programme Officer: 
There is e-mail fatigue at UN-Habitat. Programme Officers have too many e-mails, sometimes, 
hundreds of them, and titles are often misleading and discouraging. People do not have time to 
read everything…. There should be a sign indicating if sender wants reply, because people are 
often tired and can‘t read everything. Posting jobs should not even be done on e-mails. 
The channel of communication seemed to be cumbersome; when there is communication, the 
individual spends a lot of time reading and filtering out what concerns him or her, which may be 
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seen as positive in one respect, but fatiguing to others who must implement activities rather than 
spend time reading and sorting email. One Senior Programme Officer commented: ―There is too 
much unnecessary communication by e-mail, which takes a lot of manager‘s time. On average I 
have about 400 unopened e-mails.‖ 
 
Others that cited poor governance practices that stood in the way of transparency were ―habitual 
delay in decision-making by management on important matters‖ as well as ―procrastination‖, 
which was said to cause ―a lot of unnecessary tensions‖. One respondent described 
management‘s decision-making process in the following manner: 
Top leadership has reflective decision-making methods –and cannot be called very decisive. That 
indecisiveness is what slows down things around here—decisions take a long time—a simple 
issue has to be looked at from 50 perspectives before a decision is made. 
One Programme Officer described UN-Habitat‘s management communication style as, ―Very 
bad, very slow, and not productive at all.‖ Others felt that management ―does not listen‖. Other 
respondents indicated that, although there was communication from management, it was often 
―after the fact‖. 
 
However, not all of those interviewed shared the negative sentiments. One Senior Programme 
Officer who had been with the organisation for nearly 15 years said: ―Management means well, 
but they are poor communicators. They make many silly mistakes and often don‘t give timely 
feedback on critical issues.‖ 
 
Meanwhile, the management indicated that they felt equally frustrated that often when they 
solicited feedback from staff on important issues, the ―response was quite poor‖. An admission 
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from some respondents indicated that messages from management many times are deleted 
without being read, and that some staff would not respond when leadership asked for opinions, 
whether verbally or by e-mail. One respondent felt that top leadership was often misunderstood 
and explained it in the following manner: 
The Executive Director listens a lot, but doesn‘t tell you what to do with your good ideas. He 
expects you to take them and run with them, but most people do not understand this and they just 
sit and wait for his feedback. 
These sentiments seem to frustrate management who have tried as hard as possible to be open 
but seem not to be understood by junior staff. This was echoed by a member of senior 
management who argued that: ―Leadership is always open to discussion. If you make a good 
case, they will eventually turn around—but definitely they are not pushovers.‖ 
 
All in all, senior management admitted that there were problems with communication. They said 
that they had tried repeatedly to address them, but they seemed to persist. One of the directors 
explained that ―The formal information flow seems to be a challenge. But it is not that we do not 
try, we just don‘t seem to get it right.‖  
At the time of this study, management was still testing new methods of improving 
communication. One member of senior management confirmed this when he said: ―There are 
issues of poor staff feedback. We are now trying to get opinions using blind questionnaires since 
people are afraid of being open. We also have introduced a suggestion box.‖ 
 
6.2.2  Inappropriate in-house expertise and internal institutional capacity as barriers to 
successful transfer of RBM 
RBM literature indicates that successful implementation is dependent on managers and staff 
having the necessary knowledge, skills, and attitude to develop and use the performance 
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measurement system. The lesson had been to provide training for nearly all those involved in 
RBM policy innovation transfer. Training was also suggested as crucial in changing the 
organisational culture.  
 
Because of lack of appreciation of RBM, most programme officers seemed to regard RBM as 
synonymous with inflexible and time-frozen Logical Frameworks matrices. Such misconceptions 
about the RBM concept seemed to limit their appreciation of the approach and resulted in 
negative perceptions. While an RBM culture could have been cultivated by training, UN-Habitat 
indicated that it did not have the curriculum to tailor capacity building, which was another 
barrier. The RBM Senior Programme Officer has this to say; ―The organization still has no RBM 
training curriculum, the trainings are adhoc and demand driven. I have budgeted for a consultant 
to help us develop RBM curriculum‖. 
 
 Furthermore, there seemed to be little RBM experience and expertise in other similar 
organisations, which meant that there were no best practices or lessons learned to guide UN-
Habitat, especially in the development of RBM systems and urbanisation indicators.  
 
Successful RBM implementation requires clear, consistent and visible support and active 
involvement of senior leadership as critical ingredients (World Bank, 2004). Without the 
leadership‘s support, there would be no impetus for change. Yet, one of the reasons the 
leadership gave for the need to adopt RBM was compliance, not merit in the approach.  
―If we don‘t do it, donors will catch up with us sooner or later‖, explained the Executive 
Director. On the basis of his rationale, the researcher concluded that the use of RBM was largely 
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based more on compliance with demands of one of the major donors, not yet a conversion, and 
therefore the changes that were incorporated risked being just superficial with little depth. It 
seemed that reasons for adopting RBM policy innovation were not yet motivating enough for 
programme officers to develop enduring ways of thinking. At the time of the study it moreover 
seemed that RBM was quite incongruent with the interests of most individual programme 
officers. According to RBM literature (OECD, 2001), however, it was strengthening values like 
transparency, accountability, participation and teamwork, learning, diversity, and a focus on 
results that helped anchor RBM in an organisation.  
 
OECD (2001) literature considers training and education as key ingredients for successful 
transfer of RBM innovation. Among leaders of results-based management, training is listed as an 
essential ingredient for reform (OECD, 2001). A major hurdle in implementing results-based 
management is the relative lack of experience and expertise (UNDP, 2009; Mascarenhas, 1996). 
 
6.2.3 Ineffective participatory and team-based management as a barrier 
Participation in an RBM process concerns the active involvement of people in decisions that 
affect them. The objective of participation is to improve the quality of decisions and to ensure 
that the decisions have the support that is needed to succeed. One of UN-Habitat‘s espoused 
values was teamwork. Teamwork and participation at UN-Habitat represents a belief that 
sections and regions are more effective when they work collaboratively than when they work in 
isolation. Participation is encouraged in bi-annual joint planning, which also ensures that plans 
are vetted with those who have a stake or interest in them, and it ensures ownership and support 
for actions. 
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Teams at UN-Habitat were used for many different purposes. Some had specific long-term tasks 
and others were short term, with full-time members and part-time members. Use of teams was 
supposed to ensure better decisions, more effective processes, and commitment to defined 
results. Some good examples of these were the programming teams, and management taskforces. 
 
While participation systems seemed to be in place, including websites, e-mail and newsletters, 
most respondents indicated that they were excluded from decision-making on important issues: 
―Attempts to be consultative by management are perceived as not genuine but a way of rubber 
stamping changes, and wanting to appear democratic.‖ 
While acknowledging that the use of teams was supposed to ensure better decisions; more 
effective processes; and commitment to defined results, the restructuring exercise that was taking 
place was cited as one example where most staff felt excluded by management. Some members 
of senior management were said to have often ―made up minds‖ by the time they consulted staff. 
One key respondent echoed what many had said in the following remark: ―We would have liked 
to see a sense of transparency and inclusiveness by top leadership and not directives.‖ 
This statement is contrary to what was reviewed in the documents on the restructuring process 
that revealed comprehensive details of the change process, including requests from the Executive 
Director‘s office to staff for feedback on the process. 
 
Team approaches cut across the three field sites that the researcher visited; the levels of staff 
involvement varied, however, and in some field sites like Fukuoka where there were no regular 
staff meetings, participation was cited as being particularly low. A Senior Programme Officer at 
the Fukuoka field site had this to say; 
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 …we know RBM needs a team effort to succeed but our projects are funded by different donors 
and are fragmented. It is difficult to bring staff together to plan as different donors expect 
different outputs from the projects they fund. Staff are also busy and don‘t have time for 
meetings. 
A document review further revealed that city Mayors from member states, Ministers of Planning, 
and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) were invited to participate in the 
strategic planning process. Despite stakeholder participation in the development of the 2014-
2018 strategic plans, it was not possible to ascertain whether people that participated understood 
the responsibility and accountability that went with the participation.  Participation was not 
viewed as inclusive by a majority at UN-Habitat, as indicated in this remark by one programme 
officer: ―Despite the appearance of participation and consultations, sometimes decisions are 
already made and many proposals are written without our input.‖  
 
UN-Habitat section heads confirmed this and explained that projects were designed without a 
participatory approach in some cases, especially when there were ―unrealistic deadlines‖ from 
donors to be met for submitting funding proposals or concept papers for funding considerations. 
During such times, it was explained, it would be impractical to use participatory approaches 
given that they are very time-consuming, labour intensive in nature, while at the same time 
having to meet the deadlines. 
 
Another reason for making decisions that were not participatory was that, while donors talked a 
lot about RBM and participatory methods, the cost of the process was never factored into the 
project and programme designs. The extent and depth of the participation across each 
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programme / project and each step of RBM was difficult to determine from documents, given 
that projects and documents were ―highly fragmented,‖ as confirmed by findings.  
 
6.2.4 Counterproductive reward system as barrier to successful transfer of RBM 
According to management literature (Argyris, 1999), leaders transmit the culture of an 
organisation. What leadership does sets the trends in the organisation and what they reward gets 
done or re-enforced. The actions of management, therefore, have symbolic meanings, and they 
send informal messages to the rest of the organisation. As a rule, what is done is always more 
important than what is said. Management actions, hence, are very telling, revealing and 
indicative, and much organisational behaviour is created by what management rewards or 
punishes. 
 
Research findings in this study portrayed UN-Habitat management as living some major 
contradictions and inconsistencies in some of its practices, and the behaviour seemed to 
undermine rather than promote the desired organisational results. Most of what has been cited as 
undesirable behaviour at UN-Habitat could be traced back to the formal or informal reward and 
punishment systems. In some instances, UN-Habitat seemed to unconsciously drive the 
behaviour of the organisation by formally and informally rewarding or sanctioning some wrong 
things. For instance, while the change theory and strategy statements showed the organisation as 
promoting human development and environmentally sound urban-management practices, the 
reward system was portrayed as mostly favouring and promoting the creation of urban 
knowledge. Consequences for failure to publish were immediate and obvious; individual 
appraisals and professional advancement at UN-Habitat were largely based on the number of 
individual publications. 




Furthermore, there seemed to be disharmony between individual interests and organisational 
objectives at UN-Habitat as well. In the words of a member of senior management: ―At UN-
Habitat, program officers do what they want, when they want and with whom they want. It is 
time Program Officers stopped working for them and started working for UN-Habitat.‖ 
Consequences for not showing evidence of progress towards the intended outcomes of projects 
and programmes were rare, and one respondent echoed what others had said when he made the 
following remark: 
We are a human settlements organization and not inclined to development. If RBM is going to 
take the time I should be using for reducing slums, I will not use it. I am evaluated on number of 
slum houses upgraded. There must be a system that recognizes and rewards human development 
results for RBM to institutionalize, and right now there is none. 
The literature that was reviewed, though not exhaustive, suggested that the reward system at UN-
Habitat was partly driven by donors and the CPR, who hoped for human development results and 
a visible contribution towards the Millennium Development Goals, yet seemed to reward good 
and prompt reports. These reward systems seemed to cause UN-Habitat to appear to care about 
the wrong things, instead of caring for actions that guaranteed the attainment of development 
results.  
 
a) Rewarding the best team members instead of the team 
Team building was promoted in the organisation as a necessary ingredient for RBM‘s success, as 
well as one of UN-Habitat‘s core values. But while teamwork does not imply suspending the 
notion of individual responsibility, the formal system appeared to reward individual effort and 
the best team members, as opposed to rewarding both team and individual effort. Hence, 
evidence portrayed some people as still thinking of themselves as individuals working on their 
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planned outputs, rather than as people working together to accomplish desired outcomes. Full 
performance benefits of operating as teams appeared somewhat undermined as a result of such 
oversights. Existing management systems seemed to unconsciously undermine the quality of 
urbanisation by having top urban specialists spend most of their quality time on management 
issues, as evident in the following: ―We have our best urban experts running around writing 
proposals, fundraising, and writing donor reports, and not doing urbanization.‖  
 
Furthermore, by informally making management a less rewarded task than the work of urban 
specialists, the system unconsciously sanctioned and promoted bad management practices that 
findings suggested generated low morale, which is a performance-undermining factor. While 
RBM and development were people-centred, emphasising the role of people as both means and 
end in the development process requiring high people-skills for the accomplishment of social 
change, most urban experts indicated that they detested managing people, with their primary 
interest being urban planning and design. 
 
b) Rewarding avoidance of criticism.  
UN-Habitat strives to be a learning organisation. Learning is important for transformational 
change and is a key component of successful RBM. In learning, and to develop sustainable 
solutions, there must be freedom to challenge the status quo and to question decisions; hence, 
people must go outside the box to create new ideas. According to research (Worley, 2001) 
learning organisational cultures promote openness, creativity, freedom to try new things, risking 
failure, and learning from mistakes to change and improve themselves and the organisation. 
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While there was sufficient evidence that UN-Habitat had a practice of learning, most programme 
officers seemed inhibited in observed meetings, especially when it came to giving contradictory 
opinion or feedback to senior management or colleagues. Management was said to verbally 
encourage openness while implicitly encouraging what one programme officer called 
―maintaining civility or political correctness‖ and another termed ―a dignified silence‖. Observed 
evidence from planning meetings showed that some highly contested issues were often discussed 
outside meeting rooms in small groups, mostly during coffee breaks, but many of them never 
made their way back to the plenary. Management was said to demand and reward what was 
referred to as ―conspicuous loyalty‖, and was said to be sensitive to criticism. In the words of 
one programme officer, ―Professionalism and excellence alone cannot guarantee you a job at 
UN-Habitat. People are very sensitive here and loyalty to the system is what really matters.‖ 
 
While the ―hard to match‖ salary packages and benefits at UN-Habitat were meant to keep and 
attract the internationally best in the field, documents reviewed, although not exhaustive, 
suggested that there was also an implicit expectation of hard work, professionalism, and loyalty 
to the organisation. But they cited over sensitivity to criticism, constructive or otherwise, 
unconsciously inhibited learning, creativity, and innovation, which are factors that stood in the 
way of learning as is required in a successful RBM system. Evidence from findings suggested 
that, instead of learning, repressing criticism and negative feedback seemed to have created staff 
that was deferential in front of management but angry, unmotivated, and bitter behind the scenes. 
 
When the researcher asked respondents what exactly the commonly cited ―loyalty‖ that was 
implicitly demanded by UN-Habitat meant, Focus Group respondents –  Senior Programme 
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Officers and Programme Officers – gave varying responses, such as: ―respecting and not 
challenging the pecking order‖, ―keeping one‘s head down‖, ―keeping invisible on hot issues and 
being non-controversial‖, ―not criticizing or questioning management decisions‖, ―being 
agreeable and appreciative in regard to status quo‖, ―working diligently and keeping timid with 
your superiors‖, ―being blind to injustices and remaining mute when the scales of justice are 
unfairly tilted against you‖, ―keeping politically correct company‖, and ―an ability to endure 
unjustified pain with a dignified silence‖, amongst others. One bitter respondent had the 
following to say: ―Of course, we cannot give our all and our best to an organization that demeans 
and dehumanizes us into robots without emotions.‖ 
 
RBM literature (OECD/DAC, 2001) indicates that successful transfer is dependent on the 
organisation‘s ability to create a culture that is focused on learning. Both the transfer of 
technology and RBM literature indicate that the informal factors in an organisation are more 
determinants of transfers than the formal ones, and while the formal is important, no change will 
be permanent without support from the informal. 
 
6.3  UNDER-IDENTIFIED BARRIERS/ENABLERS IN THE THEORETICAL 
MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL RBM POLICY INNOVATION TRANSFER 
The theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) includes 
unidentified variables ―β = other variables that might have been omitted from the 
barriers/enablers model and hence resulting in under-identification of the model‖. Other 
variables not identified ―β‖ either are the result of model under-identification or are context 
specific. The findings and analysis in the identified additional barriers that affects successful 
transfer of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat. However, the study did not establish 
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significant levels of their contribution to successful RBM policy innovation transfer and hence 
the barriers kept under ―β‖.  These barriers are: inability to actively promote impartiality and 
inequality; inappropriate politics of change as a barrier; and inappropriate RBM policy 
innovation-supporting systems and structures. 
 
6.3.1  Inability to actively promote impartiality and Equity 
Diversity was one of UN-Habitat‘s espoused values and was supported by policies like ―zero 
tolerance to racism‖, ―equal opportunity employer‖, ―non-discrimination HIV/AIDS policy‖, and 
a ―grievance procedure‖ policy. The good governance practice of valuing diversity is closely 
related to the value of participation and inclusiveness. Valuing diversity reflects a belief that 
there is more than one way to look at the world and that work will improve if we consciously 
seek to take into account the diversity of views, experience, skills, capabilities, and beliefs of 
those affected. Diversity is about creating synergy and the benefits of bringing together people of 
different backgrounds and skills to accomplish the mission. In an RBM system, valuing diversity 
is demonstrated by respecting team members or individual inputs, regardless of ethnicity, 
nationality, sex, and organisational status. 
 
While UN-Habitat seemed to have a good record externally and among CPR members on racial 
and professional diversity among programme officers and staff, respondents and management 
admitted to several serious ―inequity issues‖, ―an existing culture of fear and intimidation‖, and 
―power distance between national staff and international staff‖. Some respondents cited concerns 
such as gender equity, segregation, and exclusion. But while some indicated that they thought 
segregation, in particular, was a ―racial thing and others felt it was about academic 
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credentials,(―here at UN-Habitat, you are nobody without a PhD‖), there yet were those who 
strongly felt it was ―a power thing‖. In the words of one respondent:  
Segregation at UN-Habitat is not about national staff versus international staff. It might even 
look like it is racial, but it is actually not. Segregation here is a power thing—and power here, 
is predominantly male and white. Those who have power try to exclude those without it. 
UN-Habitat was further portrayed as two organisations in one. National staff members came 
through as a category with particularly ―high social interests,‖ and ―need for inclusion‖, which 
management did not seem to care much about, while the professional international staff‘s 
concerns were mostly about ―academic freedom and professional advancement, and individual 
space‖. 
 
One senior human settlements officer, in explaining partiality at UN-Habitat, summarised what 
most respondents had said with the following remark: ―At UN-Habitat, some people are allowed 
to do certain things and some are not—you therefore have to figure out for yourself whether you 
are among those who can do forbidden things with impunity, or not.‖ 
Consequences for similar irregular behaviour were said to be inconsistent and subjective, and in 
the words of one respondent: 
Although there are incidents where people are punished for non-adherence to rules in the staff 
manual, this is very subjective, and it depends on a lot of factors. Grievance procedures exist, 
but do not work because there is inconsistency in application—everything around here is so 
subjective. Judgment is often not neutral.  
The organisation was depicted as unequal, with most respondents describing situations where 
rules and procedures were applied selectively and inequitably. Some staff members were 
described as ―protected‖ and others as leadership‘s ―blue-eyed-boys‖. Some respondents 
indicated that most of their opinions often were not taken into consideration. 




The researcher, however, noted that any attempt by management to be fair and inclusive was 
viewed by many with cynicism. A good example of extreme cynicism was a remark by a key 
respondent regarding management‘s involvement of national staff in donor cocktail events, 
which went as follows: ―That management invited local staff to a social event, a cocktail 
organized for donors during the donor consultations was just a public relations stunt staged to 
impress international visitors.‖ 
 
Senior management seemed aware of this cynicism among staff, as indicated by a remark by a 
member of the senior management: ―There is suspicion that what management says and does is 
for show and that deep inside we don‘t care. Staffs feel that management action is largely 
ceremonial.‖ 
 
To further illustrate some existing inequities, some respondents cited situations where staff did 
work for ―several people‖ and yet were not rewarded accordingly. Other incidents involved 
―undeserving‖ people who were promoted, and the hard workers were left out. Regarding this, 
management was implicitly aware of it and was already trying to address the situation by 
eliciting the services of an international management consultant to look at ―staff development‖. 
They openly admitted that ―there are a lot of inequities‖, but hoped to have in place what they 
called a ―one staff concept,‖ which allowed career progression for staff. 
 
Some respondents cited some good governance practices that were already in place, though, and 
that were intended to close the equity gap, such as the ―open-door-policy‖, but indicated that 
they were slowly losing their meaning. One respondent had the following to say:  
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What you see is not always what you get at UN-Habitat; they say it is an open door policy and 
that people can call each other by their first names, but reality is far from it—we actually have a 
lot of social distance here and calling each other by first names has not closed that distance—
doors remain closed even when they are physically open. 
 
6.3.2 Inappropriate politics of change as a barrier to transfer of RBM 
UN-Habitat appears to be a highly complex, unpredictable, and highly political place. This 
question explored UN-Habitat‘s culture for possible barriers that would undermine the transfer of 
RBM. The researcher tried to understand how things were done formally and informally at UN-
Habitat and, in addition, tried to observe whether the culture at the headquarters office in 
Nairobi-Kenya was reflected in the three field sites that were studied.  
 
RBM policy innovation transfer depends on change being accepted and supported, not simply 
complied with. Findings indicated that low acceptance and lack of support of RBM by the wider 
system was based on prejudices and stereotypes rather than factual information. People did not 
fully appreciate RBM and did not fully understand it.  
 
For transfer to have a higher chance of success, it should begin with changing people‘s attitudes 
by making them understand the concepts, language, benefits, and demands of the process. 
Rogers (2008) warns that new knowledge unless it becomes part of the person‘s life, is useful 
only for the performance of mechanical tasks rather than for creative problem solving, which is 
the real purpose of learning. 
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6.3.3  Inappropriate RBM policy innovation supporting systems and structures 
In analysing the supporting environment for RBM, the study focused on culture, or how things 
are done at UN-Habitat, and structure, or how work is done. An organisation is only as effective 
as its processes, and every work is a process. Superior performance in an RBM system lies in the 
way work is done and why it is done the way it is done. Staff at each level should have a ―clear 
line of sight‖ to desired results. They should understand each of the other levels, how they relate 
to one another, and where they individually contribute on the ―line of sight‖ towards desired 
results. People have to understand why they are doing the things they are doing. One pessimistic 
respondent from one of the field sites had the following to say about the adoption of RBM: 
―RBM will be conceived but will soon be a stillbirth. There are no systems to sustain it—I have 
been trained in many things, which I do not use. RBM will only add to the pile.‖ 
While many aspects of RBM seemed evident in UN-Habitat‘s strategic plans, the reality was that 
only the two section heads and the Programme officer were conversant enough with the RBM 
terminology and application of the results chain and performance measures. Most of the lower 
level staff (below officer level or below P2) respondents (70%) did not have understanding of 
RBM despite having attended RBM training, and were not aware of the available support tools 
like RBM literature, RBM Senior Programme officer and focal persons in the organisation. Most 
of the interviewed staff confessed that they did not ―know enough‖ of RBM to comment 
authoritatively about the process and confessed to have ―attended trainings on RBM but have not 
practised‖. 
 
Given the adhoc manner in which documents were archived at UN-Habitat HQ, and the informal 
manner in which the transfer process of the RBM system seemed to have been carried out, it was 
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difficult to trace all the project/programme processes. For instance, when the researcher 
requested to see monitoring reports from the regions, only two narrative reports on activities 
carried out and completed within the quarter could be located. In explaining the situation, one 
UN-Habitat section head indicated that they found it rather unrealistic for the researcher to 
expect to locate files for programmes spanning 120 countries in all regions: ―UN-Habitat work is 
undertaken in 120 countries. How could you expect to find all the documentation in my office?‖  
But there was a repeated remark from most respondents from UN-Habitat HQ and field sites 
indicating that ―Everything [projects] at UN-Habitat is very fragmented.‖ 
 
At two of the sites, there seemed to be confusion and disharmony in terminology, which was 
indicative of limited understanding of the results concepts and principles, which could have been 
attributed to the fact that all programme staff members were not RBM trained. As one of the UN-
Habitat HQ section heads lamented: 
Too much time is used arguing about terminologies in RBM. What is important is for people to 
understand the concept and principles and not vocabulary. Only then will people appreciate the 
RBM approach as a useful tool for managing their program and projects. 
Johnson et al. (1997) observed that, for innovations to be transferred successfully, both 
knowledge and the technology being transferred must be conceptually adapted. It was evident 
that there were too many tasks to be accomplished in very little time. Later the UN-Habitat 
section head remarked to the researcher: ―People have too many things, tasks, and meetings and 
the quality is lost in process. We sometimes end up giving quick and dirty jobs.‖ 
 
Further, reports and other programme-related documents at UN-Habitat HQ depicted disharmony 
between the use of RBM language and vocabulary. This was partly explained by the fact that 
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donor agencies did not have commonly accepted definitions and terminologies for RBM 
processes, which the researcher believed to be true, and partly could have been explained by the 
fact that the staff lacked RBM proficiency.  
 
Organizations‘ use of inconsistent definitions for their programme‘s measures could hamper 
decision makers‘ use of data collected from those measures in planning, comparing performance, 
and reporting on performance achieved (IFAD, 2009; Casey, 2007; USGAO, 1997).  A standard 
set of definitions is said to help minimise misunderstandings and will foster consistency 
throughout the organisation (OECD/DAC, 2001). 
 
6.4  DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS REGARDING THE BARRIERS 
UN-Habitat has many good intentions, highly competent staff, and good systems, but the 
potential for RBM policy innovation transfer and sustainability lies in programme officer‘ 
voluntary acceptance of the policy innovation technology and higher adherence to existing 
systems. There have been multiple corrective measures addressing perceived problems at UN-
Habitat. However, the new interventions should be viewed from a systems perspective—where 
all things are interconnected, and a dysfunction in one area affecting the whole, with piecemeal 
and isolated improvement processes risking failure. This will require a change in the corporate 
culture and for existing management systems to get aligned to support the policy innovation 
technology. Since some of RBM‘s systems are already in place, there will be no radical and 
revolutionary change processes, but rather building on what is in place, and that, in itself, offers 
huge potential for a successful policy innovation technology grafting process.  
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The fact that most responses indicated that there was no participatory and team-based 
management with the leadership often taking authoritarian action on important issues; issuing 
―directives‖; and trying to standalone meant that this type of culture in the UN-Habitat is a 
barrier to the smooth and quick adoption of all the components of RBM. They were said to often 
not share in crucial decision-making, were not open and transparent, and instead dominated the 
process of decision-making. This contradiction of expectations seemed to have eroded staff trust 
in leadership and created many incidents of overt and strained compliance in the view of 
management, alongside resentment and secret non-compliance. One angry programme officer 
put it this way: 
As program officers we do not want to be told what to do. If UN-Habitat wants people to instruct, 
they should not go for experts; they should go for technicians. Experts are employed to think and 
not to take orders and directives. 
Some remarks at one bi-annual planning meeting (Bi-annual planning meeting report, 2012) 
indicated that it was possible that consultations were not as inclusive as intended, as evidenced 
from the following remark from the field sites: 
Focus areas are not strictly headquarters issues. Can we be told what criteria were used to come 
up with these focus areas? Can we in future have guidelines to ensure transparency?—and can we 
have a transparent and participatory process of choosing focus area teams. The way things are 
being done is not inclusive at all. 
In spite of evidence collected by the researcher during management and planning meetings and 
reviewed documents denoting a courteous and solicitous approach to decision-making by 
leadership, most respondents felt differently. One programme officer summarised what most had 
said with the following remarks: 
Decision-making here is very top down—and by the CPR. This includes policy, allocation of 
funds, priorities, and direction—and there is desire for a more participatory approach.—The 
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Executive Director talks a lot about the need to be participatory, but is rarely seen to be 
participatory in practice—often he gets into the micromanagement of things. 
 
Another overly cited incident that was meant to signify poor governance practices involved the 
laying-off of some staff. There was a general sense among most respondents that the process was 
not done in a sensitive manner, and as one particularly dissatisfied programme officer put it, 
―You cannot carry out an exercise of that nature without the involvement of the program officers 
the staffs have been serving. In future let us recruit for UN-Habitat and not for individuals.‖ 
When management was asked about such comments, the Deputy Executive Director responded 
that there were lessons to be learnt from this particular restructuring process, and they would be 
documented to avoid a repeat of similar mistakes in future. However, they reaffirmed that, ―the 
decisions were right, but it is in the implementation we went wrong.‖ They were committed to 
introducing and managing the change process in ways that minimise the pain of those affected. 
 
Management, in responding to issues of poor communication, expressed frustration that their 
efforts to be participatory were sometimes discouraged by staff non-response and indicated that 
messages often went without response for weeks. When they finally got a response, the feedback 
sometimes was ―not a quality one.‖ As summarised by one top manager;  
Silence on contentious issues especially during meetings is a red flag at UN-Habitat. It often does 
not mean content or consent, but is often an indication of repressed opposing views. Management 
is however, unable or unwilling to read this signal. 
There was frustration that management sometimes asked for feedback on too many things within 
a very short time, without considering the fact that meaningful feedback often took time. Further, 
some said it is hard to respond to urgent messages when ―priorities at UN-Habitat change by the 
hour‖. When the researcher asked why some programme officers did not participate in 
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discussions but seemed reserved, self-conscious, and inhibited during the bi-annual planning 
meetings, some of the responses went like this: 
Most people were quiet in meetings because they are insecure. They don‘t want to rock the boat 
especially when they are not good performers. When you are a good performer and your results 
were visible, fear does not come into play. It is when you do minimums and know you are easily 
dispensable that you fear to speak out. 
Another comment that captures what many respondents felt went like this: 
There is a lot of game playing in most face-to-face meetings. There is a lot of competition and 
self-alignment among staff. Some of the discussions at the planning meetings are meant to 
impress the Executive Director. Some people are always positioning themselves and looking for 
favours. 
However, another Director, one of the senior management members, had a different view:  
People do not want to waste time in meetings contradicting top leadership—whose mind is 
already made [up] about most things anyway. Why engage in an intellectual debate while you 
know that any of the recommendations and largely the whole planning exercise has no 
seriousness? People do not want to prolong debates, they want the planning meetings to get done 
and they can move on and do other things. 
Regarding the national staff‘s appearance of apprehension, one respondent summarised the 
situation in the following manner:  
There is a lot of fear and apathy here. You witness this in meetings especially when management 
asks whether there are questions and we all keep quiet—while inside we are seething with anger 
and have a million questions we would like answered. But again, one dares not. 
One key respondent had the following to say about the feeling of uncertainty that prevailed 
among staff during the period of the study: 
Uncertainty at UN-Habitat as far as professional staffs are concerned is not really about funding; 
it is about leadership. You do not know whether tomorrow the finger points at you and your job 
is gone. But if leadership was rallying behind the organisation, it would win people‘s 
confidence—but right now; most people are suspicious about management. Secondly, people 
want to feel they are in a quality ship, the captain is confident, and the crew is with them. But 
when the captain is forever looking worried, sweating, constantly looking through the manuals, 
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that does not inspire passenger‘s confidence. People at UN-Habitat are busy looking for jobs 
elsewhere. 
On this, management had a different view, and had the following to say: 
The problem with most people at UN-Habitat is that even if they can see the boat is overheating, 
smoking, and about to blow up, very few are willing to alert the captain. They would prefer to see 
the boat blow up and the captain to look bad. Unfortunately, they don‘t seem to realise that when 
the boat sinks, it will sink with all of us in it. 
 
6.5  SUMMARY 
Although RBM is appreciated by all at UN-habitat, the study showed that there are 
organisational cultures that hinder the acceptance of RBM.  These rotated around three issues, 
namely governance, the reward system and internal capacity.  The active promotion of 
impartiality and equity plus the politics of change all seemed to be barriers to RBM transfer.  
These can be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to open up, 
and management failure to read between the lines about what makes the staff close up. The 
conflict between local and international staff and the issue of academic qualifications for those 
who seem not to have PhDs are some of the barriers.  The PhD holders want to advance 
professionally while others want to ensure that work is done.  There also seemed to be a culture 
of fear, especially around when you notice something, open up and lose your job as the next 
thing. Lastly, the study found out that management is doing everything possible to balance the 
power dynamics by wanting to recruit a consultant to sort out the differences. 




ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 presented enabling conditions for transfer of RBM policy innovation in UN-Habitat.  
These concerned expert human capital; good communication channels; ideal ideological 
commonalities; and the on-going learning and donor pressure.  Chapter 6 looked at the barriers to 
successful transfer of policy innovation.  These involved inappropriate governance values and 
internal institutional capacity; suspicious participatory and team-based management; and a 
counterproductive reward system. Chapter 7 now presents the six steps of RBM policy 
innovation transfer.  This is followed by a discussion and summary of the chapter. 
 
The theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) presented steps 
for successful RBM transfer and enablers and/or barriers to RBM transfer. This chapter however, 
also looks at and provides an analysis and assessment of the findings from UN-Habitat offices 
based on the six steps for successful transfer of the RBM policy innovation technology.   In 
addition, it provides possible ways (recommendations) for future technological policy innovation 
transfer between the developed and developing countries.  In examining the findings, the study 
investigated the extent to which UN-Habitat had cast off or modified previous ideas, practices 
and ways of thinking and adopted RBM systems. The study further looked at the extent to which 
the old management style was combining with the new RBM style. 
The case study sought to extend the frontiers of knowledge on the complexities, practicalities, 
and peculiarities related to the transfer of RBM policy innovation from western developers, to a 
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non-profit international human settlements and development organisation located in a developing 
country. Transfer in this study does not just include the appropriation of new technical 
knowledge, but also new ways of thinking about and understanding new discourses, and, more 
profoundly, the values, beliefs, and assumptions on which the new practices were found and 
adopted (Clark &Geppert, 2002). 
 
In structuring the answer to the question, the study examined how RBM implementation is 
aligned with the six key steps in OECD/DAC (2001) literature that define the RBM system, UN-
Habitat‘s infrastructure, and observed practices in the visited field sites. A synthesis of the 
findings was carried out with reflection on adoption and diffusion literature (Rogers, 2008), and 
transfer literature (Johnsonet al., 1997). A detailed discussion is presented in section 7.3. 
 
7.2  THE SIX STEPS FOR SUCCESSFUL RBM POLICY INNOVATION TRANSFER 
 
The six key steps that define the RBM system, as defined in the OECD (2001) literature, are:  
(a) Clearly defining expected results in a measurable manner;    
(b) Identifying and monitoring risks over time;  
(c) Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure progress 
towards results and to judge performance;  
(d) Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect performance 
information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual 
results vis-à-vis the targeted results); 
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(e) Integrating formative evaluations to provide complementary performance not readily 
available from performance monitoring systems; 
(f) Use of performance information for learning, management improvements also called 
decision-making processes, and internal management accountability including external 
performance reporting to stakeholders and partners. 
 
The first three steps or processes generally relate to a results-oriented planning approach and are 
sometimes referred to as strategic planning.  The first five steps or processes together are usually 
included in the concept of performance measurement, while a combination of all six steps is 
referred to as performance management and is essential to effective transfer of an RBM system. 
Integrating complementary information from both evaluations and performance measurement 
systems and ensuring use of this information is viewed as critical aspects of Results-Based 
Management (RBM). The detailed explanation and findings under each of these steps is 
presented here. 
 
7.2.1 Step One: Defining Expected Results in a Measurable Manner 
Defining results in a measurable manner is a central part in an RBM process, and according to 
RBM literature, the better defined the expected results in a plan, the better the monitoring and the 
better designed the interventions and linkages. This is the stage where intervention theory of 
change is established.  
 
The study examined and reviewed the Medium Term Strategic Institutional Plans (MTSIP) (UN-
Habitat MTSIP, 2008 – 2013; MTSP, 2014 -2018), which is based on six-year forward planning 
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schedules, and the bi-annual work programmes and budgets, and findings indicated that UN-
Habitat HQ had made considerable efforts to explicitly define expected results. For instance, 
short-term, medium-term, and long-term results and milestones to be realised within the planning 
period had been clearly identified. Indicators to measure progress and targets to be realised had 
been developed as well, and the activities that were to produce the outputs had been clearly 
outlined.  
 
The strategy planning tools of the United Nations Secretariat of which UN-Habitat is part, are 
MTSIP; bi-annual strategic frameworks; work programmes; and budget, with the associated 
templates and the format predetermined. The United Nations Secretariat system was somewhat 
different from the RBM system, and this made it particularly difficult to locate some aspects of 
RBM in this ―rolling‖ Medium-Term Strategic Institutional Plans (MTSIP) (2008-2013, 2014-
2018). The MTSIP was/is always developed two years before its implementation to allow time 
for its approval processes. How each plan evolved to the next was easy to trace, and was helpful 
to the researcher (UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008-2013, 2014-2018). For example, objectives, outputs, 
and indicators were the same in each document, and while some documents had information on 
key aspects like risk analysis, there was no evidence of risk monitoring. The documents were 
well written and it was easy to access the information in both soft and hard form from the UN-
Habitat offices.  (UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008-2013, 2014-2018). In the same way, the planning 
horizons specified time frames for different levels of results in the strategic document, which 
was a critical element, given RBM‘s emphasis on efficiency and accountability for results 
(ST/SGB/200/8; UN-Office of Planning and Budgeting, 2012). 
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The UN-Habitat Programme had well developed results framework matrixes. The results 
framework is a favourite tool used by developers of RBM policy innovation and is used for 
conceptualising a project‘s expected results/objectives and the strategies that would be used to 
attain these results/objectives. Using the logic chart and results maps proved to be very helpful in 
the development and identification of expected results, indicators, and risks (OECD/DAC, 2001). 
It also facilitated the task of conceptualising projects/programmes in terms of inputs, outputs, 
and outcomes. It helped verify the logical consequences of cause-and-effect linkages and, hence, 
the theory of change and level of attribution (Casey, 2007; Plantzet al., 1997). This is a 
particularly useful tool for stakeholders that are not familiar with results-based management 
because it illustrates how RBM works. A further advantage that proponents still claimed for the 
results framework is that the identification of risks helped to structure the uncontrollable factors 
separating outcomes from output.  
 
The frameworks (Bi-annual programme of Work results framework, 2012-2013, MTSIP results 
framework 2008-2013, 2014-2017) at UN-Habitat specifically showed the activities that were to 
produce the desired outputs and how the outputs would contribute to delivering the desired 
outcomes, and indicators at output and outcome levels had been selected. However, the 
relationship between strategy planning and execution was not always well articulated. One of the 
observed contradictions of the results framework was that different projects were not linked to 
various expected outcomes – ―expected accomplishments‖. However, strategy planning at UN-
Habitat is commendable, though it still needs to articulate and establish the relationship between 
strategy planning, which takes place at programme level, and strategy execution that involves the 
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planning, implementation, management of different projects to realise programme results, 
including establishment of partnership arrangements.   
 
One of the UN-Habitat heads of section had this to say: 
Staff at the organisation do not understand their roles and contribution to the MTSIP, they 
understand the results they have agreed with their particular donors. This lack of understanding is 
not helpful to the establishment of RBM. The processes of planning in UN-Habitat are too donor-
driven, especially regarding the constant insistence on the use of results frameworks to display 
expected results without explaining to staff their roles and contributions to the bigger picture and 
focusing on real change that the projects and programmes were expected to cause and selection of 
projects to implement was driven by donor and not based on needs. 
A Lake Victoria water and sanitation project engineer had this to say:  
I am not sure my project is part of this HQ MTSIP…….. What is important for me is to meet 
donor targets and provide numbers they want to share with their governments. Donors want their 
numbers; they don‘t care about MTSIP and have nothing to do with HQ. They come here to talk 
to me. 
Individuals who interviewed most were probably thought that RBM began and ended with the 
results frameworks and the plans were never executed with the same rigor that was applied in 
developing them. In the words of one of the UN-Habitat section heads: 
I think there is a fundamental error donors thinking that if you have a results framework you have 
results. While under pressure from their capitals or wherever, and they think if they don‘t push 
recipients to get the numbers, they will not sell the project. Most programme actions cannot be 
explained in simple RBM results framework linear terms. There is a lot of thought process and 
intuition, which cannot be explained and put in a results framework.  
The fact that the results framework was not always seen by most as a ―living document‖ but a 
fixed document, created a lot of concern. As one programme officer pointed out: ―Why can‘t 
donors who insist on results frameworks see that projects cannot stay fixed for a six-year 
planning horizon when the environment continues to change?‖ 




Some of the more experienced UN-Habitat HQ staff members felt that they often had rich 
intuitions about complex processes and systems that could not fit into the RBM logic of 
explanation.  
One Senior Programme Officer had this to say:  ―obvious pre-decided solutions‖, especially for a 
research and human settlement programme, could sometimes cause more harm than good by 
restraining staff to having to explain their ideas in ―simple linear cause and effect language‖ of 
the RBM logic. 
 
7.2.2 Step Two: Identifying and Monitoring Assumptions and Risks over Time 
In the design of an RBM system, risks and assumptions on which the theory of change is based  
have to be stipulated (UN-Office of Planning and Budgeting, 2012), as well as the economic, 
social, cultural, physical, and other contexts in which the programme functions (OECD, 2003). A 
plan for risk monitoring and mitigation is critical, especially for risks that might prevent outputs 
producing outcomes.  
 
Findings indicate that, although UN-Habitat might have had knowledge of the critical 
assumptions and risks of the programme, they were not systematically tracked or reported. In the 
words of one of the regional directors: 
Donors are interested in value for money – they want to see results but are not interested in 
listening to issues related to issues and risks. We have learned to deal with issues and risks 
internally while demonstrating value for money and this has helped take care of donor needs. 
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7.2.3 Step Three: Identifying/ Selecting Performance Indicators to Measure Progress 
towards Results 
In an RBM process, programme/project must identify and select performance indicators to 
measure progress towards results and to judge performance.  From the available documents and 
interviews with the staff at UN-Habitat, it was discovered that UN-Habitat had very well-
developed performance standards and measures (Bi-annual programme of Work results 
framework, 2012-2013; MTSIP results framework 2008 – 2013, 2014-2017). These were 
evidence from the reviewed plans that showed well-stipulated results over planned periods and 
targets to be achieved progressively each year (UN-Habitat, 2011b).  
 
Use of baseline data as a basis to set targets: The indicator targets in an RBM system have to be 
based on baseline data (where are we now?) and would have to be very specific (how much 
change within what period of time?). Findings indicated that most performance information 
contained in available reports was without context or clear baseline information, and that could 
lead to incorrect conclusions about programme success or failure, more so, in the case of an 
external evaluator. In addition, there was little indication of the existence of a systematic 
approach to performance tracking, receiving of feedback, or lesson learning/experience. Worse 
still, there were no guidelines for setting targets. The relationship between project and 
programme targets was never clear. 
 
Performance standards and targets: According to OECD RBM literature, performance 
indicators are qualitative or quantitative measures of resource use; the extent of reach; and 
developmental results achieved, and were used to monitor programme/project performance. The 
indicator targets specify what to measure along a scale or according to a dimension in order to 
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gauge progress. The relative importance of indicator types, however, is likely to change over the 
period of the project‘s life cycle, with more emphasis on input and process indicators at first, 
then shifting to output and outcome (purpose level) and (impact-level) indicators later as the 
project matures. 
 
At the outcomes level, the information collected on performance indicators is analysed and used 
for management decision-making to keep the programme and associated projects on track and 
moving toward the achievement of the programme‘s purpose (UN-Habitat, 2011a). Information 
collected on the indicators constituted evidence regarding programme/project success or failure 
at termination. In an RBM process, emphasis is on measuring the achievement of developmental 
results as opposed to the use of resources ―implementation monitoring‖.  
 
UN-Habitat HQ plans, for instance, showed a greater focus on process or implementation 
indicator targets than transformational indicator results (UN-Habitat, 2012). They showed 
identified output and desired outcomes at process level (means) but did not indicate outcomes 
related to the human development results (end) as required by an RBM process. However, there 
seemed to be a realisation that human development results would not be attained in the two years 
of the bi-annual planning horizons as this requires between five and ten years.  It was not 
possible to verify from document and interviews at what point they would develop and to trace 
human development indicators. As one critique of UN-Habitat HQ indicated: ―We tend to focus 
more on the number of housing units. However, the Slum Upgrading section head is the one who 
has a people focus and tends to question the effect of organizational work on targeted 
beneficiaries‘ lives.‖ 




Furthermore, the Executive Director had this to say: ―We realised we could not achieve 
meaningful results within the bi-annual planning frameworks. Meaningful results can only be 
achieved during the MTSIP planning horizon. Bi-annual work programmes and budgets are, 
therefore, milestones to realizing MTSIP results‖. 
 
Because of the fact that UN-Habitat HQ was not a new program, process results of previous 
years, with time, could be expected to yield human development results based on cause and 
effect relations (OECD, 2003), but that had to be tracked. In explaining the situation, one UN-
Habitat section head said, ―We have no standards for measuring quality, and it is really difficult 
to develop appropriate measurable outcome and impact indicators for human settlements 
programmes.‖  
 
Human settlement programming is still a new field with no established measures, especially at 
outcome and impact levels (UN-Habitat, 2012) and this has posed a challenge to UN-Habitat‘s 
ability to measure its contribution to development results.  
 
There also seemed to be some conflict between what UN-Habitat section heads understood as 
good management practices that would help them better realise desired results and what the 
donor agencies wanted to see. The UN-Habitat Section Head admitted that there was a lot at UN-
Habitat HQ that was ―donor driven,‖ and that seemed to put a limit to what they could do or put 
in their plans and what they could not do. In an RBM system, selected activities should have the 
greatest potential to achieve desired outputs, which should also have the greatest potential to 
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contribute to the realisation of desired outcomes and these outcomes should have the greatest 
potential to contribute to realising desired impact. This cause-and-effect relationship, or the ―if-
then‖, would be difficult to realise if activities are donor driven. 
 
It should, therefore, be noted that transfers, like RBM policy innovation, often were long-term 
processes, as opposed to events, and measures of transfers range from short-term, to medium-
term, to long-term. For instance, in an RBM system, it takes a long time to have a results-
oriented organisation, develop indicators, and align these indicators to management systems; it 
may take up to 10 years before planned development impacts are realised. 
 
7.2.4 Step Four: Developing Performance Monitoring Systems to Collect Performance 
Information on Actual Results, Review, Analyse and Report Performance 
At the heart of the RBM approach is performance measurement (OECD, 2001). Findings, 
however, indicated that, although UN-Habitat had solid technical skills in data collection and 
analysis, it seemed to be making less than optimum use of these with regard to monitoring. There 
was continuous ―giving‖ of information and technologies to city municipalities and partners, but 
there were no systems that actively and systematically sought their feedback on the 
consequences of the actions. Existing RBM components seemed weak and informal, especially 
in collecting data around indicators that show progress on desired outcomes.  
 
Although the UN-Habitat HQ office was a coordinating office and not an implementing office, it 
was responsible for the implementation of the UN-Habitat global strategy, including monitoring 
of the processes and results. RBM literature suggests that, when performance measurement is 
undertaken on a continuous basis during implementation, it empowers managers and 
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stakeholders with ―real-time‖ information about the use of resources, the extent of reach, and the 
achievement of developmental results.  
 
Findings, however, identified Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System 
(IMDIS) as the main monitoring tool (UN-Habitat, 2010); all project staff self-reported their 
project performance in this system. One of the draw-backs of the IMDIS system was lack of data 
validation (UN-Habitat, 2011a). Other informal monitoring systems existed. For instance, there 
were indications that periodic participatory project reviews were conducted with stakeholders; 
the project review committee (PRC) meetings provided project quality assurance at entry (UN-
Habitat, 2010) – it ensured that projects that were developed contributed to at least one of the 
MTSIP expected results, had measurable indicators with baselines and targets, and this seemed 
to serve as one of the monitoring tools ((UN-Habitat, 2011b). Documentary evidence indicated 
that the planning and evaluation sections routinely trained section heads on RBM. Periodic 
reports to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) and donors also served as another 
way of monitoring progress, but there was little indication that the performance information 
collected was around indicators of risks; there was no evidence of risk analysis and mitigation. 
One Human Settlement Officer had this to say:  
―Human settlements programming has no major risks to be monitored, and that is where I 
have problems with RBM assuming everything has risks.‖   
Annual planning and review meetings, in addition, served as both monitoring and evaluation 
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a)  Credible performance information  
For performance information to be useful, it must be valid and reliable. The information will 
simply not be accepted or used if it is biased or inaccurate (IFAD, 2009; IEG, 2012b). Even the 
perceived possibility that the information could be falsified can impair the usefulness of the 
system (IEG, 2012a). For RBM to fulfil its continuous performance measurement function, two 
types of information are collected. With the first type, performance information is collected 
around the indicators developed during the planning and design of the programme/project. With 
the second type, risk information is collected by using the risk indicators. The performance 
information is analysed in the context of risk information. All stakeholders, including the 
beneficiaries, where feasible, should review the project/programme at least once a year and 
should draw conclusions about its performance. For this reason, it is crucial that the information 
collected is accurate and reliable. Without good performance information, the organisation 
cannot learn effectively. 
 
Indications were that was greater focus at UN-Habitat on implementation monitoring rather than 
performance monitoring, that is, execution or compliance questions about whether 
projects/programmes have done what they said they would do in their plans. While this is 
important, it did not say much about the success or failure of a project, programme, or policy, 
however. In an RBM system, even when all activities are completed within given timeframes, it 
does not necessarily mean that the desired outcome has been achieved. Activities are 
necessary—just not sufficient. RBM asks what transformational changes have resulted in the 
lives of the target group as a result of UN-Habitat‘s intervention or actions. It is about answering 
the question, ―So what?‖ So what if activities have taken place? So what if outputs have been 
generated? So what if the outputs have been counted? What are the consequences of UN-Habitat 
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actions? Are the actions of Programme Officers at UN-Habitat making a difference in the lives 
of urban dwellers, especially those living in slums? How do we know? Can we prove the 
causality? Is the change measurable and observable?  In explaining the IMDIS inability to 
answer the so what question, the Deputy Executive Director said:  
It is difficult to know whether our programmes are having impacts on the lives of the 
beneficiaries. Every quarter we are told of the number of people trained, number of low cost 
housing units constructed, but no one has ever talked about how UN-Habitat has changed the 
lives of urban poor. I hope with the organization adopting RBM the measurement people will 
now tell us [what] impact our interventions are making.   
RBM consequently goes beyond the traditional task monitoring, and demands that 
transformational results be monitored alongside the implementation process. In an RBM system, 
annual planning and review meetings are about progress in implementation and, more 
importantly, about results achievement. The key question to ask is whether the proposed theory 
of change is working, that is, whether activities are producing planned outputs progressively and 
whether outputs are causing outcomes and whether the planning assumptions are still holding. If 
they are not, why and what lessons could be learnt from the experience? If you are succeeding, 
can you rule out any rival explanations to the success? Do programme officers have persuasive 
evidence that A has caused B beyond any reasonable doubt?  
 
b)  Data-driven systems’ requirement for adequate resources  
UN-Habitat seemed to have very limited resources for implementing the RBM system. The UN-
Habitat Planning Unit responsible for implementation of RBM had an annual budget of $460,000 
constituting 0.05% (UN-Habitat, 2012). A performance measurement unit budget should always 
constitute 3-5% of organisational budget (UNDP, 2010; OECD, 2003).  Literature warns that 
there is a cost associated with implementation, and organisations do not necessarily have the 
capacity to adopt a new system (Grinstead, 2009). The cost of data collection also has to be 
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properly factored into planning and budgeting, otherwise, the planning gets disconnected from 
the context under which it is operating. Financial allocation is one of the key indicators of top 
leadership support. A peer review of the UN-Habitat monitoring and evaluation function (2011) 
revealed that less than 5% of the projects were evaluated. The Senior Programme Officer in 
charge of RBM at UN-Habitat explained: ―We don‘t carry out many studies because it is costly 
given our limited budget, especially data collection. A few studies we have conducted cost on 
average $150,000 and over 70% of study money goes on data collection.‖ 
 
Data indicated huge gaps between monitoring, available human and financial resources, and 
time, which seemed to undermine the monitoring process. For instance, time-wise, records 
showed that one of the UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading section heads, spent on average between 50 
and 70 days per year on work-related travel, and an equal number of days writing proposals and 
donor project reports; attending management committee meetings; and participating in various 
other committees and task forces not to mention time spent on issues delegated for action or 
opinion by senior management. A review of supervision reports by UN-Habitat 2012 Slum 
Upgrading Section heads indicated that six days were spent in monitoring projects. In explaining 
the situation, one programme officer said: ―[Programme] officers were already overworked. 
Activities listed in our plans would realistically take 18 months, but they have been scheduled to 
be accomplished in 12 months.‖  
 
Another programme officer, in explaining how they had to overstretch themselves to meet 
objectives, said: ―People put in an average of 70 hours a week. ―The section head at UN-Habitat 
indicated that they were already overworked. In his words: 
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People have too many tasks to accomplish and there are too many meetings. Reports are hurriedly 
done to meet deadlines and quality in the process is always lost. We often end up giving ‘quick 
and dirty jobs‘. There is limited staffing and limited funds for all these grandiose plans we were 
trying to implement. Management has told us to do more with less. 
As a report by the UN-Habitat programme officer indicated, ―one of the problems we have is 
tailoring reports each time, since the reporting formats are not the same as our internal operating 
system‖ 
In the words of a section head,  
There is too much travel and no support for most things. . . . you do your own fundraising, 
monitoring, reporting. . . . Quality doesn‘t seem to be important at UN-Habitat anymore. There is 
too much going on at any one time—you can‘t get quality things done‖. 
RBM comprises a systematic approach to doing things, and that requires constant monitoring and 
reflection on the balance between results, resources, and reach. However, findings indicated that 
staff and section heads had little time to reflect, consider, examine, analyse, contemplate, or 
critique situations as they implemented programmes. Section heads were often overwhelmed and 
bombarded with competing priorities and had very limited support. 
 
7.2.5 Step Five: Integrating Formative Evaluations to Provide Complementary 
Performance not Readily Available from Performance Monitoring Systems 
Performance information alone does not provide the complete performance picture (IEG, 2011a; 
Poate, 1997). Evaluations complete the performance picture by providing the depth of analysis 
needed to explain why targets are not met or why they are exceeded. They also provide the 
information managers need to improve operations. Identifying and communicating the reasons 
that programmes do not perform or perform at expected levels also clearly is the province of 
programme evaluation (UNEG, 2010; Poate, 1997). 




When the researcher asked for evaluation reports, the data showed that 5% of the programme 
components and projects were evaluated, and 98% of the evaluations conducted were either 
requested by the committee of permanent representatives (CPR) or the donors (UN-Habitat, 
2011a). This complemented the informal monitoring, and there was evidence to show that 
feedback from these particular evaluations was fed into UN-Habitat programme redesign and 
management decision-making. From interviews with staff respondents and document reviews, 
reports on other programme-specific formative evaluations that could have been undertaken, 
were not available to the researcher. However, there was no systematic conduct of programme, 
outcomes, and thematic evaluations that would inform organisation strategy. 
 
7.2.6 Step Six: Use of Performance Information for Internal Management, 
Accountability, Learning and Decision-making Processes 
Learning from performance information and feedback is critical in an RBM system. The 
collected performance information has to be useful (OECD, 2002). It has to illustrate that it is 
worth the cost incurred to collect the data (Itell, 1998). As data usage increases and produces real 
benefits, the more confidence individuals will have in the data (IEG, 2011a; Gibson &Boisvert, 
1997). In most instances at UN-Habitat, however, it was not possible to ascertain whether 
programme implementation and budgetary decisions were data-driven, or were of a personal 
nature or influenced by other factors and not based on evidence. Some programme decisions, 
UN-Habitat section heads admitted, were not based on learning but were donor-driven. One 
section head said, ―Here at UN-Habitat, donors fund projects which are of interest to their 
countries and are often not based on needs of our beneficiaries.‖ 
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Knowledge sharing and learning was encouraged through training whereby experts in different 
technical areas were always invited to give presentations during lunch hours – the ―brown bag 
lunch hour‖ – once a week and staff were encouraged to ask questions, and a website existed at 
UN-Habitat on which different articles and presentations were posted solely for this purpose. 
Communities of practice, for example the RBM and knowledge management, slum upgrading, 
water and sanitation at UN-Habitat, brought together like-minded internal and external experts 
for learning and sharing of best practices. 
 
Notable was that UN-Habitat had tried to build staff capacity on RBM through its website. 
Information that staff could access was posted, but in the absence of a formal arrangement for 
rewarding newly acquired knowledge, or an expectation to demonstrate RBM understanding on 
the job, the researcher was doubtful that staff would become motivated to use time and effort in 
that direction. 
 
RBM literature (IFAD, 2009) tells us that the effectiveness of the RBM approach depends on the 
extent to which good performance and risk information are collected, used by managers, and 
then monitored again through a series of performance information feedback loops. Performance 
information is used to make adjustments in programmes/projects in three key ways: where 
results were being achieved, actions can be taken to strengthen them; where progress is difficult, 
different approaches can be tried or activities added; and where outputs from activities were 
considered to be obsolete, they should be abandoned. Performance information can also be used 
to examine strategic trade-offs between resource use, extent of reach, and the achievement of 
developmental results. This process of data analysis and examination of trade-offs enhances 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
222 
 
organisational learning.  A controversial scene between one UN-Habitat section head and the top 
management that was witnessed by the researcher at UN-Habitat‘s Strategic Planning meeting 
illustrated best the extent of pressures UN-Habitat staff had to sometimes face in the course of 
their work. The revealing emotional response by the Programme Officer to the top 
management‘s request to have more done went like this: 
I think you have to consider trade-offs when you give us all these things to do. We need guidance 
from you on priorities. Sorry I am getting emotional here—but I have the donor briefing papers to 
write, I have proposals, and the budget to prepare and now the performance framework—how 
much am I supposed to take as a section head? 
 
Learning, reviewing, and adjusting performance measurement systems. To ensure continued 
success, the performance measurement system must be monitored and improved continuously. 
This will translate into a responsive system that reflects the changing environment in which it 
operates (Casey, 2007; Poate, 1997; Plantz, Greenway & Hendricks, 1997). The system should 
not be static. It should reflect changes in the organisation and changes to programmes. This 
corresponds to the two management functions of continuous performance measurement and 
iterative implementation: the collecting of performance information and the management 
decisions based on the analysis of this information. In iterative management, implementation 
decisions are based on the lessons learned which are then re-assessed. Based on the performance 
information collected, corrective action has to be taken to adjust the programme/project. From 
the behavioural perspective ―what gets measured and reported gets managed and shapes 
organisational behaviours‖. 
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7.3  DISCUSSION OF THE SYNTHESIS 
The transfer process in this study comes from developers and users of the policy innovation 
technology. This study tried to trace the extent of RBM transfer to UN-Habitat, following the 
steps and enablers presented in the theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation 
transfer (Figure 2.3) and by literature on adoption and diffusion. A cursory look at the field sites 
did not show much in terms of varying practices, but attitudes differed significantly.  
 
First, findings regarding this question indicated that UN-Habitat is operating in a highly 
complex, dynamic, and internally political environment. However, varying degrees of transfer 
have successfully been accomplished, and perhaps much more than the study was able to get 
from the limited number of available documents. Many RBM components were not entirely new 
to UN-Habitat programming. More than anything else, RBM at UN-Habitat HQ, and as a 
concept, largely represented a shift from a focus on inputs and outputs to a focus on outcomes 
and long-term development results in which changes in the lives of people and communities 
could be expected. There has been a significant shift at UN-Habitat from focusing on inputs to 
focusing on measuring the effectives or results of interventions (UN-Habitat, 2012) 
 
Secondly, the transfer seemed a complex process, requiring attention to many factors. Rogers 
(2008) says time is a major factor for real transformations to take place. Installing new 
management systems at UN-Habitat means changing some of the existing ones, and getting 
strong enough support and prolonged attention for new ones to take root and sustain—a process 
that seemed more political than technical. The transfer processes seemed to demand inestimable 
amounts of time, finance, skills, and knowledge that were not obvious in the theory. Adjusting 
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the transfer components for compatibility with a human settlement-based organisation posed a 
great challenge, as the process of urbanisation and human settlements could not be confined to 
the time-bound requirements of planning within an RBM system.  
 
Further, when attempting to innovate, as in human settlements and in creating social change, it 
seemed difficult to predict how long something would take, and how much it would cost (it 
probably will take longer and cost more than planned). Hence, it was necessary for leaders and 
donors to prepare to accept serious departures from plans. If donors and organisational leaders 
were to reward innovations and creativity, they could not measure performance according to 
strictly planned activities and outputs. Creativity and innovation will often take programmes and 
organisations out of the ―box‖ as they explore new and better ways of doing things. Creativity 
and innovation are some of the drawbacks of RBM, which emphasises learning and performance 
improvements, yet donors are keen on accountability for results, which instead discourages 
innovations and learning. 
 
These findings were consistent with Lang and Steger‘s (2000) assertion that transfer of 
knowledge can no longer be considered as a simple adoption of well-proved ―best practices‖ but 
must rather be considered a dynamic process of learning, re-interpreting, evaluation, 
remodelling, and recombining with existing concepts, structures, and instruments to create new 
practices. 
 
Thirdly, some of the challenges that faced section heads at UN-Habitat headquarters (HQ) 
seemed to largely emanate from the fact that projects were fragmented, and programmes 
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sprawled across 120 different countries in Africa, South East Asia, South Asia, and Latin 
America. There existed no formal systems to support RBM; human, time, and financial resources 
were limited and, in addition, the diversity of projects was very wide. UN-Habitat‘s programme 
officer‘s further contention involved their multiple donors (as many as 25), whose project 
reporting procedures, formats, and timeframes varied widely; CPR members that had to be 
briefed quarterly through a Programme of Work and Budget (POWB); and an MTSIP that was a 
requirement of the Governing Council, all situations processes that were very time consuming 
and left little time for a systematic RBM transfer process. Interferences and the irrational 
demands from policy innovation developers derailed the transfer process. 
 
There also seemed to be variations in terms of how things were managed at UN-Habitat HQ and 
across field-sites, and this seemed to have undermined the speed of the transfer process. UN-
Habitat projects furthermore were implemented by different partners, all of varying capacities, 
and linkages with partners seemed weak, hence affecting accountability. UN-Habitat HQ seemed 
to also face the problems of standard indicators that could be aggregated across all its projects as 
well as capacity to monitor all its programme indicators.  
 
Fourthly, findings indicated that RBM at UN-Habitat was based largely on one individual‘s 
inclination and enthusiasm, and lack of common understanding undermined the 
institutionalisation process. RBM at UN-Habitat was a personal passion and inclination on the 
part of one of the section heads, without any formal support from the organisation-wide systems. 
There was a strong indication that much of what was installed would collapse if the UN-Habitat 
section head in charge of RBM left the organisation. In the end, the RBM technology in the 
whole of UN-Habitat was equated with him. Transfer literature (Schein, 2000) warns that, for 
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new ideas and behaviours to transfer and normalise, they must be supported by management 
action (reward systems, hiring, firing, knowledge, and information management systems, etc.) 
and words.  
 
In addition, the transfer process seemed like a secondary task amid other pressing priorities. UN-
Habitat section heads expressed their feelings of frustration with the bombardment of donor, 
CPR, and UN Secretariat reporting requirements; fundraising proposals, meetings; and 
fundraising and monitoring travel, all without adequate support, which left little time to manage 
the RBM process. As one of the UN-Habitat section heads put it: 
We can‘t concentrate on our work, there is too much demand on our time by things that don‘t 
contribute directly to the results we are accountable for . . . the reporting demands from CPR, UN 
Secretariat and donors are in particular overwhelming and burdensome. 
 
A review of documents revealed the UN-Habitat programme officer‘s further contention about 
their multiple donors (as many as 25), whose project reporting procedures, formats, and 
timeframes varied widely; a CPR that had to be briefed quarterly through a Programme of Work 
and Budget (POWB) reviews; and an MTSIP that was a requirement of the Governing Council, 
all situation processes that were very time consuming. UN-Habitat‘s section heads indicated that 
both the CPR and the UN Secretariat reporting requirements could not be used to report to 
donors, as they did not meet donor expectations about reporting on outcomes and impacts. UN-
Habitat had on many occasions appealed to the UN Secretariat‘s management to bring the issue 
of harmonising planning and reporting formats to the attention of the CPR and donors, which 
would help with operating efficiently, and to suggest an RBM format for planning and reporting. 
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In all, UN-Habitat HQ had been incrementally implementing RBM for nearly 10 years. The 
installation did not seem like a planned change. Staff assessments, preparedness for use, and 
acceptance of the policy innovation technology was not done formally. Readiness assessment 
and timing is an important factor to consider during implementation (World Bank, 2004). Given 
that RBM policy innovation is about people and what they know, the lack of knowledge was a 
huge impediment to the greater use and full acceptance of the tool. Since the staff did not yet 
fully understand how different RBM concepts work, they had not fully appreciated its full 
potential. According to Jackson (2005), users of a policy have to first be made aware formally of 
the innovation to want to know more about it. This had not happened at UN-Habitat, as one of 
the section heads explained: ―Most donors do not give capacity building money to implementing 
organisations. It would be hard to get money for RBM training.‖ 
 
Real transformations at UN-Habitat will take time, but some positive changes seemed to be 
happening within the senior level management at the time of this study, and one of the UN-
Habitat directors applauded them in the remark: ―Our new Deputy Executive Director‘s 
progressing reforms in our planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and reporting 
frameworks, and the initiatives by the CPR to ensure greater impact and efficiency, as well as 
reduced burden, is most welcome.‖ 
 
UN-Habitat, like the UNDP, moved to introduce a results-based management approach. The 
research study identified a number of areas where greater progress could have been made, but 
even under perfect conditions it would have been unlikely that both UN-Habitat and the UNDP 
could have fully institutionalised a results-based management approach within six and eight 
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years respectively. Subsequent conclusions and recommendations therefore focus on the key 
challenges for UN-Habitat and UNDP.  The challenges faced by UN-Habitat included a weak 
culture of results; fear of change among staff; and inadequate internal capacities to adopt and 
manage RBM policy innovation.  
 
a)  UN-Habitat and UNDP have a weak culture of results. 
Adopting results-based management was a logical continuation of the management reforms that 
occurred in the 1990s and a response to pressure to improve performance across the United 
Nations as a whole. Significant progress has been made on a number of fronts in both 
organisations, sensitising staff to results and creating the tools to enable a fast and efficient flow 
of information. Managing for results has proved harder to achieve. In particular, the strong 
emphasis on resource mobilisation and delivery; a culture that does not support risk taking; 
systems that do not provide adequate information at the country programme level; a lack of clear 
lines of accountability; and a lack of a staff incentive structures all work against building a strong 
culture of results. 
 
b) The corporatist approach has only had a limited effect on development effectiveness at the 
country level. 
The UNDP adopted a systems approach to stimulate managing for results, which meant that 
change was to be driven by the implementation of centrally designed and prescribed systems. 
These were developed primarily to enable aggregate reporting of UNDP performance to the 
Executive Board while at the same time creating a clearer focus for the programme. In practice, 
the corporate goals and service lines set by headquarters proved too numerous, with very 
permissive definitions. This led to country offices manipulating their programmes to fit into 
corporate service lines; diverted attention away from country needs; and made reporting to the 
Executive Board more about process than substance. There is little evidence that this approach 
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has significantly affected the shape of country-level programmes, but there is significant 
evidence that it has imposed unnecessary transaction costs at the country level. A notable 
omission is the lack of oversight systems that focus on tracking whether programmes use results 
to adjust resources such as people, money and partnerships in order to improve future results. 
 
c) Results-based management has been misinterpreted as not supporting the decentralized way 
in which UN-Habitat works. 
UN-Habitat works in a strongly decentralised way, yet the results frameworks in the MTSIP 
were not geared to country processes. Emerging new systems following the reform of country 
programmes including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) have 
the potential to create objectives for United Nations organisations that are aligned with national 
plans and are responsive to country needs. Decentralisation has been accompanied by delegation 
of authority over the country programme. Under current procedures, country programmes are not 
scrutinised for development potential by regional management, an abdication of responsibility.  
 
As a result, evaluation and auditing are the only means for checking that country programmes are 
contributing to corporate goals. The ‗top-down‘ approach has inadvertently fuelled concerns that 
having corporate goals is a means of imposing upon programmes at the country level. The role of 
results-based management is not to constrain the ways in which programmes are negotiated at 
the country level, but to provide a framework, so that the organisation works within its mandates 
and ensures that resources are aligned with achieving results. Once programmes are agreed upon 
at the country level, results-based management should provide standards for dialogue about how 
to set realistic outcomes; select objective indicators that demonstrate progress towards 
development objectives; and jointly monitor progress. 




7.3.1 RBM in building a results-based culture 
There are strong perceptions within the UNDP that financial administration and management 
systems have improved. There is little evidence, however, that these systems have led to an 
increased focus on managing for outcomes. There are also concerns that systems have become 
too complex and time-consuming. Results systems have been designed mainly to meet the 
demand for reporting to the Executive Board, rather than to manage outcomes. Yet the UNDP 
has not developed a system for reporting on its contribution towards development results. This 
reflects a number of issues. The corporate-level results frameworks have never included high-
level goals with substantive measurable and agreed-upon indicators against which to assess pro 
goal-level reporting by UNDP and contrasts starkly with the objectivity of reporting against the 
Millennium Development Goals. The UNDP has developed a reporting system that aggregates 
whether or not results will be delivered when expected. This approach has limitations: the 
country programme outcomes against which the UNDP is expected to deliver are poorly defined; 
the logic linking outputs delivered by the UNDP with achievement of the outcomes is often not 
explained and this reporting system therefore fails to report on UNDP performance relative to 
what it is accountable for. 
 
Regarding the UNDP, the drive was visible, but consistent senior-level support was needed for 
results-based management. Relationships stand out as the most critical: the country resident 
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7.3.2 RBM conceptuality complexity and user friendliness 
Findings indicate that adoption/transfer of RBM is complex and requires time and attention to 
many factors. Part of the resistance to transfer can be closely linked to its tendency to complicate 
rather than simplify management processes. For instance, although complied with, RBM is 
obviously seen as a burden to an already overloaded system. According to Jackson (2005) and 
Hall and Hord (1987), the more the concerns end-users have concerning a technology, the lesser 
the degree of acceptance. 
 
In an RBM transfer process, for instance, if there is no buy-in and there is too little time, the 
proposed changes will end up as adornments lacking depth and coherence. People might comply 
with new systems, but the systems will not change people‘s mental modes. Successful RBM 
transfer, therefore, calls for fundamental change that goes beyond fine-tuning the status quo; it 
requires change in the way organisation staff perceive, think, and behave at work. It is about 
changing assumptions, philosophies, and the values of the organisation. Successful transfer of 
RBM, for instance, will depend on the ability of individual programme officers and support staff 
to voluntarily think in a results-oriented manner without the coercion of management systems. 
Until changes in a transfer process sink down deeply into the culture of an organisation, which 
can take a long time, new approaches like RBM remain fragile and subject to regression. The 
notion that ―good‖ or promising technologies would sell themselves needs to be re-examined. 
 
7.3.3 The technology and how to understand and address the social aspects 
In keeping with earlier studies on transfer (Jackson, 2005; Johnsonet al., 1997), findings from 
this study indicated that the informal part of the receiving culture is the key determinant of the 
successful transfer of any technology. Social factors had to be considered together with technical 
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aspects for a successful transfer. Practices, values, and beliefs of people were the biggest barriers 
to the transfer process, as opposed to difficulties resulting from the technology. A bad culture 
took the focus away from important things. And according to Schein (2000), real change only 
occurs when the informal organisation and all its behaviours and practices are radically altered. 
Fundamentally, change that occurs at the formal level rarely penetrates deep inside the 
organisation in such a way as to improve effectiveness or performance capacity. 
 
The UN-Habitat HQ seemed to have been positioned in an unfavourable culture, and the transfer 
faced extra challenges because the dominant human settlement-based culture was too strong. The 
study showed that perceptions about development and RBM in particular were largely negative, 
and although some policies and procedures that would support the transfer existed, they were 
flouted with ―impunity‖. Most barriers to the transfer manifested themselves in informal 
components of the organisation. 
 
The study further supports Jackson (2005) view that changes is bound to fail if managers focus 
on the technical aspects of change only and fail to see the organisation as a community of 
humans. They say that technology does not stand alone but is political, social, economic, and 
cultural, and these could be barriers in a successful transfer and adoption process. For a new 
transfer culture to take root, the existing culture has to be fully analysed for compatibility. The 
technical aspects will not be effective if the social aspects are not understood and addressed. 
Likewise, change that embraced or acknowledged aspects of a prevailing culture while 
incorporating newly adopted knowledge is often better embraced than revolutionary change.  
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7.3.4 Institutionalizing RBM transfer and the role of senior management  
The importance of leadership to drive results-based management forward has been noted by 
several study respondents. A good example of effective leadership was the role of senior 
management at UN-Habitat in appointing a section head responsible for RBM in the 
organisation, together with a strong personal commitment supported by a single and consistent 
message on resource mobilisation that was communicated to both internal and external 
audiences; development of systems to track, measure and report managers‘ success in mobilising 
resources; and a clearly perceived link between successful resource mobilisation and 
advancement within the organisation. 
 
Findings from this study furthermore indicated that individual inclinations and enthusiasm about 
the transfer of a technology is not enough to institutionalise it. Literature dealing with transfer 
(Hall &Hord, 2001) warns that, for new ideas and behaviours to transfer and normalise, they 
must be supported by management actions (reward systems, hiring, firing, knowledge and 
information management systems, etc.) and words. The literature further suggests that the 
measures by which performance is evaluated are primary shapers of employees‘ values and 
beliefs. To take but one example, people would believe that RBM is important when it is 
rewarded. The results of this study showed that, regardless of the UN-Habitat section head‘s 
enthusiasm in communicating optimism and clarity in the transfer of RBM in a way that inspired 
others, the process did not enjoy the support of senior management, nor did it have the support of 
organisation-wide systems. Senior management was taking too long to warm up to the idea, and 
there were strong indications that, if the UN-Habitat section head left the organisation, much of 
what was installed would collapse. In the end, RBM was equated with section head but was seen 
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as a burden by most. Senior management must lead the change towards institutionalisation of 
RBM. 
 
7.3.5 Complexity, Dynamism, and Uncertainty in an Organisation is a Threat to the 
Transfer and Survival of Technology 
Organisations are complex and transitional; how they are today can be very different in six 
months. The findings indicated that there multiple changes were taking place simultaneously that 
affected the transfer process at UN-Habitat HQ. Restructuring resulted in changes in roles and 
that meant management had less direct involvement and control over those who worked under 
them, and their power to influence RBM was undermined by the fact that they no longer 
conducted individual performance appraisals. Staff cut-backs increased the uncertainty of staff, 
and changing political systems increased the complexity and dynamism of the environment. All 
these changes affected different aspects of the transfer process, and there was no guarantee that 
what had been transferred was sustainable unless UN-Habitat would be stable for a considerable 
period of time. 
 
7.4  SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented peculiarities and complexities with regard to the transfer of RBM 
policy innovation.  The synthesis of the findings first discussed the six steps presented in the 
theoretical model (Figure 2.3) which are prerequisite for the effective adoption of RBM.  These 
are summarised in the model as: defining expected results in a measurable manner; identification 
of the monitoring risks; selecting the performance indicators; developing performance 
monitoring systems for collecting performance information, reviewing, analysing and reporting 
performance; integrating additional formative evaluations to provide complementary 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
235 
 
performance; use of performance information for learning, management improvement in 
‗decision-making processes‘, and internal management accountability including  external 
performance reporting to stakeholders and partners. RBM value addition is therefore summarised 
as: 
 
 (i) RBM is important, useful and necessary ... There is a strong sense among staff and 
management responsible for multilateral institutional support that RBM provides a valuable 
framework for planning, managing and describing their work. In particular, it is seen as 
providing a firm basis for: 
 Seeing and understanding the ―big picture‖ within which individual programmes fit; 
 Prioritising tasks and organising a work programme; 
 Identifying and managing programme risks; 
 Explaining why UN-Habitat and the UNDP are involved in development work and what 
can be accomplished by such work. 
In brief, the general concepts and broad principles of RBM are appreciated by programme staff. 
They welcome the opportunity it provides, within the annual cycle of programme activity, to step 
back and take stock of their work; to reflect on the ―fit‖ of what they are doing with higher-level 
objectives; to evaluate policy and operational strategies; and to learn lessons relevant to future 
work. 
(ii) ... but it must be better adapted to development work. 
While appreciating RBM‘s value as a management tool, many staff feel that it provides an 
inadequate framework for reporting on what they do. A programme officer had this to say: 
―RBM‘s narrow focus on change, causality and attribution, all in the context of annual reporting, 
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is a touch with the reality of multilateralism drive and with UNDP‘s donor dependency in 
particular‖. 
 
―The last thing we‘d want,‖ said one officer ―would be for people to stop focusing on things that 
are important to us but that can‘t be measured.‖ 
Said another, ―You start to think twice about getting involved in doing things that you feel are 
worth doing, but where you know it will be difficult to measure results. The attitude becomes 
‗can‘t measure: shouldn‘t do‘‖. Such concerns are well founded. There is a substantial body of 
research literature concerning the unintended, harmful effects on an organisation resulting from 
performance measurement that is out of tune with the things that the organisation values. The 
American Economic Review(May, 1997)concluded that the goal of bringing market-like 
incentives to government or private bureaucracies has much rhetorical appeal, especially in an 
era of tight budgets. 
 
(iii) Perverse effects of performance measurement 
A cautionary note to multilateral practitioners about the unintended negative effects of an RBM 
policy innovation framework that is poorly adapted to the reality of the work of an organisation 
like UN-Habitat‘s came from one officer: ―You start to think twice about getting involved in 
doing things that you feel are worth doing, but where you know it will be difficult to measure 
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(iv) Not “whether”, but “how” 
There is strong acceptance within UN-Habitat and the UNDP in Kenya of the importance of 
focusing on results and accountability. The concerns regarding RBM are not about whether 
managing for results is important, or whether accountability is important. Instead, there is 
concern about finding ways to discuss results and be accountable that are well adapted to the 
organisation‘s work. The UN-Habitat and UNDP Kenya case is interesting because it is based on 
explicit acceptance of fundamental problems related to measuring results and attributing them to 
their work. It is a pragmatic option that focuses on the level of results that UN-Habitat and 
UNDP can measure and control (and therefore take responsibility for). 




SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the understanding that has been gained from this study. The chapter 
synthesises the case study against the backdrop of an organisation-wide cultural context and 
draws extensively on the theoretical concepts of the transfer and adoption of technologies, 
diffusion of innovations, and RBM literature described in Chapter 2.  The chapter begins with a 
summary of the main findings that emerged from answers to the research questions and then 
goes on to compare emerging conclusions with existing research on the transfer of knowledge. 
The chapter‘s final section considers suggestions for practice, policy and further research. 
 
8.1.1  THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
One of the gaps this study wanted to look at is the how the Billions of dollars are spent each year 
on development programmes but no considerable progress being achieved. From the study it was 
discovered that most development donor agencies had though that successful transfer of RBM 
systems to development programmes was the plausible solution to problems of development 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and poor accountability to stakeholders.  However, the study has 
showed that the failure to adopt RBM innovations more effectively was as a result of failure to 
study the situation in the receiving economies, the non-anticipation of barriers to adoptions RBM 
not having piloted out the methodology before roling it out to the recipient organizations 
remained the greatest hurdles in the implementation of RBM as observed in Chapter 6.  
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8.1.2  PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Chapter 2 was able to address the specific objective 1 as it reviewed and analysed the existing 
literature on how RBM has been used in planning and measuring the performance of projects by 
different recipients supported by international donors. The study looked at factors that determine 
success  that is Chapter 5 specific objective 2;  or failures in the transfer of RBM that is Chapter 
6 specific objective 3;  while chapter 7 looked at the process of policy management innovation  
transfer using RBM systems from developers in western countries to end-users in developing 
countries.  The UN-Habitat programme was used as the case study in answering the study 
objectives explained in chapter 4.  Chapter 8 addresses the specific objective 4 that is it provides 
recommendations for the best way on how to use RBM; brings in the candidate proposed theory 
of change as a contribution to academic and practical knowledge. 
 
 
8.2  OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The summary of findings has been presented chapter by chapter and each chapter represents a 
different objective/ research question in the study. Chapter 2 analysed the existing literature on 
how RBM has been used by the different recipients of donor funds on planning and measuring 
performance of the projects and on transfer of new policy management innovation like RBM.  
Literature that was review revealed that successful transfer of policy management innovation like 
RBM and its implementation is dependent on the organisation‘s ability to create a management 
culture that is focused on results. Jankowicz (2000) argues that it requires more than the adoption 
of new administrative and operational systems. Adopting RBM policy innovation requires an 
organisation to change its culture, and understand the context in terms of barriers and enablers or 
opportunities that support it. The literature guided the study in answering the research questions. 
Chapter 2 presents a model of enablers for successful transfer of RBM policy innovation. The 
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enablers that are a prerequisite for successful RBM transfer include the following: Ideological 
Commonalities between the RBM Components and Principles, and an organisation‘s Espoused 
Values and Governance Practices; Donor Pressure; Emerging Political Support from Senior 
Leadership, including resource allocation; Existence of good communication channels; A results 
focus which includes a focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services; Lessons of 
experience from pilot programmes; Governance values; Existence of in-house RBM expertise 
and internal institutional capacity; Empowerment and accountability which includes institutional 
mechanisms for holding managers accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control 
and Managers with delegated authority to the management level are held accountable for results, 
and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources to better 
performing activities; Participatory and team-based management; Inclusiveness and partnership 
in all aspects of performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and 
understanding of development objectives; Creation of a learning organisation; and An effective 
reward system. 
 
Chapter 3 presented the methodology used in the study. A case study approach has the potential 
to deal with simple to complex situations. It helped to answer ―how‖ and ―why‖ type questions, 
while taking into consideration how a phenomenon, ‗RBM policy innovation‘ adoption, is 
influenced by the context within which it is situated.  It enabled the gathering of data from a 
variety of sources and converging the data to illuminate the case. The study design chosen for this 
study was influenced by the nature of the research problem and the questions being asked. What 
the researcher wanted to know and the types of research questions to be answered in a study are 
the deciding factors in a research design. 




The limitations of this research study were those associated with case studies.  Usually case 
studies may not be easily replicable, thus the difficulty in designing the survey tool. Case studies 
have been faulted for their lack of rigor in the collection and the analysis of empirical material, 
and because lack of rigor is linked to researcher bias and others involved in the case, hence 
raising the question of ethics, trustworthiness, validity, generalisation, and basic data integrity.  
This case study was limited in several ways.  First, by mainly using the qualitative paradigm, 
some aspects may have required quantification, which was not the case.  There should be no one 
research methodology assuming the status of ―truth‖— indeed, these approaches are all about a 
challenge to the notion that there is a ―truth‖ to be ―discovered‖ or a ―true path‖ to follow in 
creating, constructing, or uncovering knowledge. 
Deliberate efforts were made to apply methods like data triangulation and detailed verifiable 
processes to avoid such possible errors. 
 
Chapter 4 reveals that UN-Habitat is a highly complex, dynamic, image-conscious, political, and 
unpredictable organisation. UN-Habitat appears to have many established habits, but at the same 
time is able to continually reflect, self-assess, and align itself with the external environment. UN-
Habitat‘s formal components represent that part that can be seen and informal components are 
those that lie beneath, unseen, unknown, undetected, yet clearly recognisable as organisational 
elements. These consist of personal perceptions of the organisation; the informal power 
structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, and risk-taking 
behaviour; and the relationship between managers and employees. The way different issues are 
handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures for the whole 
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organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions. Informal messages are sent to staff 
members by the way senior management handles situations. 
 
Prior to the evolutionary changes, power and accountability were concentrated at headquarters 
and the bureaucratic approval system slowed down the implementation of activities; there was a 
general lack of accountability for resources and results and this affected the UN-Habitat donor 
base who eventually demanded the adoption of RBM; UN- Habitat operated in only 20 countries 
and there was a growing demand for more urbanisation of initiatives; IMDIS, the UN-Habitat 
performance measurement system, only monitored and reported at output level. This 
performance measurement system did not address the ―so what‖ questions in which donors and 
other stakeholders are interested, while stakeholders in programmes are interested in seeing 
development changes and not outputs. The evaluation unit was more involved with conducting 
meta-analysis for performance reports instead of evaluating the effectiveness of programmes and 
strategies. There was a limited results culture at UN-Habitat. Capacity for RBM was also limited 
at the organisation. UN-Habitat practised resource-based budgeting as opposed to results-based 
budgeting. It was thus important for UN-Habitat to undergo evolutionary changes. The 
introduction of MTSIP and hence RBM moved the organisation to a results orientation and 
communication channels were equally defined. 
 
Chapter 5 reveals that the UN-Habitat programme had many advantages that were conducive to 
the successful transfer and adoption of the RBM technology.  These were the existence of in-
house RBM expertise, UN-Habitat‘s Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices, 
the existence of good communication channels and competent programme officers, the 
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ideological commonalities between RBM‘s Components and Principles and UN-Habitat‘s 
Espoused Values and Governance Practices, and the participatory and team-based management 
were precursor to the successful implementation of RBM technology at the UN-habitat offices.  
In addition, UN-Habitat being a learning organisation strengthens the innovativeness of the 
adaptation of RBM policy innovation.  Furthermore it was found that RBM was able to promote 
transparency, hence empowering the accountability process.  Donor pressure also helped UN-
Habitat to adapt to the RBM technology, even if it was to receive resistance.  The result was 
emerging political support from senior leadership and internal institutional capacity. 
 
The RBM policy innovation transfer process at UN-Habitat had been incremental, and was 
partially successful, but remained largely incomplete. Some critical components like systematic 
monitoring systems had not been transferred, and others, like results-oriented budgeting, were 
still in the early stages of the transfer process.  Although RBM is appreciated by all in the UN-
Habitat programme, there are organisational cultures which hinder the acceptance of RBM. 
These cultures are about governance, the reward system, and internal capacity, which may be 
summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to speak out, as well as 
management‘s failure to read between the lines to discover what prevents the staff speaking out.  
 
Chapter 6 showed that, although RBM is appreciated by all in the UN-Habitat programme, some 
organisational cultures hinder the acceptance of RBM, These rotate around governance, a reward 
system and internal capacity which may be summarised as staff not trusting management, which 
results into failure to open up, and management‘s failure to read through the lines on what makes 
the staff close. As indicated in the enablers and barriers model in Figure 2.3, the governance 
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values, reward system, in-house capacities, conflict between local and international staff and the 
issue of academic qualification were some of the barriers that hindered successful transfer of 
RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat.   
 
The study revealed that the transfer of RBM policy innovation faced several barriers related to a 
lack of compatibility and congruence with the organisation-wide systems and individual 
programme officer‘s interests. It came across strongly that UN-Habitat, being but a piece of the 
larger organisation, needed support from the wider system for RBM to be successfully installed 
and sustained. It was evident that the transfer process did not enjoy formal back-up of top 
leadership, nor did it enjoy full peer support. In addition, the transfer process appeared to be a 
more complex and difficult task than it seemed in theory, especially in an organisation that 
already seemed overloaded and resource constrained, and RBM was perceived as a tool that 
complicated rather than simplified the complex situation. The preparations for use and 
acceptance were not obviously planned for, and the transfer seemed adhoc. Organisation-wide 
social factors seemed to have had a huge effect on the transfer process. The organisation‘s 
complexity, dynamism, and state of uncertainty seemed to pose a threat to the adoption and 
survival of the transferred technology. Acceptance of the technology, which included perceived 
profitability and congruence of the RBM policy innovation, was low. According to Rogers 
(2008), acceptance has to precede the technical installation phase for a successful transfer 
process, and that had not happened at UN-Habitat.  
 
Chapter 7 presented the peculiarities and complexities in the transfer process of RBM.  The six 
steps which are pre-requite for the effective adoption of the RBM can be summarised as: 
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defining expected results in a measurable manner; identifying the monitoring risks; selecting the 
performance indicators; developing performance monitoring systems for collecting  performance 
information, reviewing, analysing and reporting performance; integrating additional formative 
evaluations to provide complementary performance information; use of performance information 
for learning, management improvements in ‗decision making processes‘; and internal 
management accountability including external performance reporting to stakeholders and 
partners. These six steps were discussed in light of the RBM policy innovation enabler‘s model. 
The chapter exhaustively presented a better understanding of the peculiarities and complexities 
of the transfer of RBM. 
 
8.3  FINDINGS AND KEY CONTRIBUTIONS  
8.3.1 The theoretical model  
The study presents a theoretical model for drivers/ ‗enablers‘ of successful RBM policy 
innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) that reflects the multi-faceted and complicated nature of 
technology transfer that has been absent in earlier RBM transfer attempts and may account for 
some of the failures., The study identified that, for a RBM policy innovation system to transfer 
successfully, it must be supported by a corporate culture characterised by the following enablers:  
(a) Ideological commonalities between the RBM‘s components and principles, and the 
organisation‘s espoused values and governance practices 
(b) Donor pressure  
(c) Emerging political support from senior leadership including resource allocation for 
RBM implementation 
(d) Existence of good communication channels  
(e) Results focus targeted on client satisfaction with goods and services 
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(f) Lessons from experience with pilot programmes  
(g) Governance values  
(h) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity  
(i) Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within 
their spheres of control and managers with delegated authority being held accountable 
for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift 
resources to better performing activities 
(j) Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and the 
management process, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives 
(k) A learning organisation  
(l) The reward system  
Functionally, this can be presented as 
RBM = f (Six RBM policy innovation adoption steps) + f(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i,  j, k, l, m, β) 
Where a, b, c, …,l, m are as stated above, and β being the error term or un-defined variables. 
 
8.3.2. RBM theory of change  
The research developed a theory of change also called the development hypothesis for RBM 
policy innovation strategy (section 8.5.3). The developed theory explains all the major variables 
and things that need to be in place for achieving improved performance and demonstrable results 
for a desired change to occur. It clearly spells out what organisation has need to do to make real 
change happen, and showing the different types of interventions necessary for change to happen; 
implementation of the six RBM policy innovation adoptions steps; agreement on what success 
will look like; identified success factors/enablers‘ (in Figure 2.3) for successful RBM policy 
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innovation transfer are considered during the policy adoption process; key stakeholders are 
involved and own the system; there is continuous measurement of performance and effectiveness 
of the RBM system to enhance learning and continuous feedback to improve policy 
implementation and is functioning ―M&E of the M&E function‖, performance information is 
utilised; assumptions and risks to the success of the policy are identified, monitored and 
mitigated and RBM sustainability elements are identified. 
 
8.3.3 Additional contributions to knowledge  
The study also found that for RBM to be appreciated by both donors and recipients as a tool to 
help organisations succeed, as opposed to a ―policing and control‖ tool, it has to have greater 
buy-in and usefulness. There has to be a balance between RBM policy innovation accountability 
and learning functions. The way RBM is used at the moment is prone to abuse through the 
manipulation of data. As organisations try to please donors of aid, important lessons of failure 
that could benefit others are avoided in the reporting process. Short-term objectives are given 
more emphasis and priority (results that lend themselves to quantification are often preferred) 
and performance measurement (managing by results) takes precedence over issues of 
performance management (managing for results). RBM can only make a major contribution to 
the effectiveness of institutional capacity and development if accountability, risk, and credit are 
shared by both end users and developers. Accountability, a key RBM value, should be lived by 
both developers and end users of transfer. 
 
For successful RBM transfer to occur, recipient organisations have to stop being oversensitive to 
criticism and must recognise that being off balance can provide a moment for learning. Fear must 
be removed from the organisation for successful transfer of any new methodology being 
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introduced in an organisation. However, there are real political limitations to being open and 
democratic, as required by a RBM system, but there are lessons to be learned from failure in all 
organisations. Failure is simply a shortfall, evidence of a gap between vision and reality. Failure 
is an opportunity for learning about strategies that did not work as expected and not about 
unworthiness and powerlessness. A mistake is an event the full benefit of which should be turned 
into advantage. To be a learning organisation, it is necessary to be open to formal and informal 
feedback. In addition, for any transfer process at a democratic organisation, when people express 
doubts, reservations, and sometimes outright opposition to a new direction, senior management 
must make time, seek to listen and take the concerns of resisters and doubters seriously. It must 
learn to respect those it wishes it could silence. Dissent has to be seen as a source of new ideas 
and break through. Being alert to differences is absolutely vital.  
 
The depth of RBM policy innovation transfer at an organisation is the extent to which 
management is willing to go into the organisational culture to solve transfer problems. For any 
technology to transfer and take root, the existing organisational culture has to be fully analysed 
for compatibility. If culture guides how employees think, act, and feel, then it affects the way 
people perceive change. Findings in this study indicated that UN-Habitat had made multiple 
corrective changes in an effort to align the organisational culture with the mission. But while that 
is important, making changes and not changing the thinking that produced the problem in the 
first place can be counterproductive; it only increases stress and the burden of management to 
maintain coherence and direction. To permanently address perceived problems, the root causes 
of the problems must be identified or sought and resolved. When we focus on symptoms where 
the stress is greatest, we repair symptoms.  




RBM policy innovation is never entirely new to recipient organisations like UN-Habitat, but it is 
not always implemented in a systematic and consistent manner.  The adoption of such a policy 
innovation should therefore start with assessment of the existing performance management 
information systems in recipient organisations. 
 
The analysis of the organisation‘s culture is important for successful policy innovation adoption. 
It is always important to recognise that, in recipient organisations like UN-Habitat, formal 
components represent that part that can be seen and informal components are those that lie 
beneath and are unseen, unknown, undetected, yet clearly recognisable as organisational 
elements. These consist of personal perceptions of the organisation; the informal power 
structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, and risk-taking 
behaviour; and the relationship between managers and employees. Often the way different issues 
are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures for the whole 
organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions.  
 
Successful transfer of policy management innovation like RBM and its implementation is 
dependent on the organisation‘s ability to create a management culture that is focused on results. 
Adopting RBM policy innovation requires an organisation to change its culture, understand the 
context in terms of drivers/‗enablers‘, barriers and opportunities that support it. As Jankowicz 
(1998) said, adoption of policy innovation technologies requires more than the adoption of new 
administrative and operational systems but includes understanding of management culture 
focused on results.  




There is a need to establish an institutional mechanism that ensures empowerment and 
accountability by holding managers accountable for achieving results within their spheres of 
control. Accountability means that programmes have the responsibility of influencing outcomes 
or results being sought, while recognising that the achievement of outcomes and impacts requires 
joint action on the part of many actors, including government, national stakeholders, the private 
sector, communities, and donors. RBM policy innovation obliges individuals to demonstrate 
what outcome results have been accomplished. An accountability culture should cause 
individuals to report specifically on the extent that an outcome is being or has been accomplished 
or on accounting for significant and valuable achievements that have contributed to the success 
of the overall outcome. Hence, demonstrating that probability of success is important enough to 
justify expending organisational resources. 
 
 
8.4  CONCLUSION 
The perfect RBM policy innovation transfer does not exist. RBM policy innovation transfer will 
always be a continuous and conscious effort to systematically improve programme efficiency 
and effectiveness that will have no end. Technology designs and end user considerations should 
be discussed between developers and users before the commencement of the transfer process. 
Formal rational approaches like RBM that prescribe what should be done at various stages and 
do not sufficiently explain how to carry out the various planning stages error, principally owing 
to the presumption that RBM is a mechanistic planning and implementation procedure that can 
be carried out without structured methods.  
 




Organisations undergoing change processes like UN-Habitat have to be aware of the fact that 
sheer number of innovations does not assure success. If there is too little time, the changes end 
up as superficial adornments lacking depth and coherence. According to Hall and Hord (2001), 
new insights fail to get put into practice because they conflict deeply with deeply held internal 
perspectives, and that limits staff. People might comply with new systems but the systems will 
not change people‘s mental models. The success of RBM depends on the ability of individuals to 
voluntarily think in a results-oriented manner without the coercion of management systems. 
 
In a transfer process, proximity to the situation does sometimes hinder thinking. Sometimes, 
leverage is not obvious to most people in the system, especially amid pressures and cross-
currents of real life situations. It is hard to see the structures underlying actions, especially when 
the organisation has become accustomed to the ―illogic‖ of doing things. Insiders by themselves 
are often incapable of re-engineering themselves as they often have vested interests, and it would 
be too much to expect that they will overcome their cognitive and institutional biases by 
themselves and embrace radically new ways of doing things. Insiders must work with outside 
experts, otherwise they risk recreating what already exists, with perhaps only a little 
improvement.  
 
RBM policy innovation transfer is a collective effort involving everyone in the organisation, and 
the leadership role should be shared vertically and horizontally so that the process might have the 
depth and sustainability necessary to ensure survival in case of leadership turnover. Nobody, 
even a change facilitator like the section head at UN-Habitat, has all the answers to questions 
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about a successful transfer process. The common assumption by organisational members that the 
leader or management must have the answers or that people at the top should know more, or at 
least would know if they were competent, is wrong. This mentality weakens individuals and 
organisations, and at some level absolves them from responsibility in the transfer process. It 
predisposes staff members to cynicism when events reveal that the top did not have all the 
answers.  
 
The experience of UN-Habitat and the UNDP with introducing RBM policy innovation is similar 
to that of other organisations. UN-Habitat, like the UNDP, moved to introduce RBM approach. 
The findings from the research strongly suggest that the experience of UN-Habitat and the 
UNDP did not diverge significantly from that of many other public-sector organisations. The 
challenges faced by UN-Habitat included a weak culture of results; from the analysis of the 
enablers and barriers to successful RBM policy innovation transfer, it was evident that  
i. The corporatist approach had only a limited effect on development effectiveness at 
the country levels 
ii. RBM was misinterpreted as not supporting the decentralised way in which UN-
Habitat works 
iii. RBM was not helping to build a results-based culture 
iv. RBM was conceptually appealing, but complex and not user friendly 
v. The technology transfer was not effective if the social aspects were not understood 
and addressed 
vi. Institutionalised RBM Transfer will only happen if supported by senior management 
and management systems  
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vii. Complexity, dynamism, and uncertainty in an organisation‘s environment can 
become a threat to the transfer and survival of a transferred technology 
 
All in all, results from this study indicated that RBM transfer or application at UN-Habitat HQ, 
and at large, is complex, expensive, and demanding, and it is critical to consider the scope and 
intensity of tasks before a transfer. The construction of a successful RBM system is a serious 
organisational undertaking and will not happen overnight. Findings also revealed the relevance 
and importance of the receiving culture in a transfer process, and showed that no matter how 
well designed new processes were, they were not going to work and be sustained if the UN-
Habitat‘s culture did not change. 
 
8.5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several recommendations can be made from the findings of this study. It is difficult, however, to 
offer general prescriptions to UN-Habitat HQ or senior management for several reasons. One, 
what a leader or manager ought to do is a function of the specific context that has to be faced 
and, in addition, following a prescription might substitute the manager‘s best judgment, which 
may be more valuable in a given situation. Two, these recommendations are based on both facts 
and opinions of respondents. However, in-depth understanding that has been gained from this 
case study‘s enabler model can, with care, be used to offer a number of insights for managerial 
action. 
 
8. 5.1 Implications for developers of technology (Aid/Western Donors Countries) 
If RBM policy innovation is going to transfer successfully, it should not be made so complex as 
to overload the users‘ management system; otherwise too much time will be spent managing the 
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system and not enough time to use feedback data to achieve desired results. It must be a user-
friendly and a relevant tool for those using it. Findings from this study indicate that most end 
users and potential users view it as a complex, unfriendly, and burdensome tool. 
 
Aid donor agencies, as the developers of RBM policy innovation, should have adequate 
knowledge about and expertise in the transfer and diffusion of technologies and cross-cultural 
issues, among other management knowledge that is required to guide a successful transfer 
process from one point to another. Findings from this study seem to indicate a lack of 
appreciation of the difficulties and complexities involved in the transfer of RBM to a different 
context, and that, in some cases, has created artificial transfers as users compete to keep the 
programme and project resources running. 
 
When transferring RBM policy innovation, aid donor agencies should examine the contextual 
realities of the organisation, and user considerations should be taken into account. The political, 
economic, and weather ambiguity and uncertainty that is prevalent in developing countries does 
create serious challenges for RBM. Programme time schedules which often become unrealistic 
and donor driven, with pressures to meet disbursement targets. With such turbulent environments 
as found in developing countries, where implementing organisations have very little control, 
results rarely happen as planned in the RBM linear systems. Hence, things have to be adjusted to 
field realities. Assumptions on both sides must be examined and discussed openly to examine the 
truth in them—and the likelihood that they will continue holding true. 
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Donors must ensure that their internal businesses, that is, practices and procedures, do not 
impede on the RBM policy innovation transfer effort of recipient organisations. Indications from 
this study are that effectiveness and efficiency are often sacrificed as RBM end users strive to 
meet donor demands of disbursements and reporting. Incentives are often for prompt reporting –
―accountability for results‖ – and not for learning and results – ―management improvements‖. 
Other cited interferences include delayed disbursements; cancellation of financial commitments; 
unsolicited technical support; and donor/ supply-driven projects, all which take time away from 
project preparation and better monitoring to improve results.  
 
Further, aid-donors agencies must establish institutional arrangements in support of the greater 
transfer of RBM policy innovation by designating staff to oversee and support. Staff from the 
same agency sometimes gave conflicting and sometimes contradictory messages, and this 
confused the users of RBM. There should be ways of sharing lessons with recipients in similar 
fields. Measuring effectiveness is not easy given the institutional and environmental constraints 
of some of the recipient organisations. 
 
RBM policy innovation is a donor-driven technology. In this study there is little evidence to 
suggest that end users, although trying to comply, had technical and financial support from 
donors to support them in unlearning their old habits and to help them embrace the new way of 
doing things. The skills, knowledge, and attitude of end-users (human settlement officers) should 
have been addressed for compatibility. Developers should evaluate users for financial and human 
resources available and whether they were sufficient to sustain these technologies as well as the 
existing infrastructure. Further, developers should help the end users to address the barriers. The 
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private sector invests heavily in the training of its personnel to deliver results; donors should 
invest in capacity-building for end users, either at the individual or the organisational level. 
 
RBM policy innovation has to be appreciated by both donors and recipients as a tool to help 
organisations succeed as opposed to a ―policing and control‖ tool, for it to have greater buy-in 
and usefulness. The way RBM is used at the moment is prone to abuse through manipulation of 
data. As organisations try to please aid donors, important lessons of failure that could benefit 
others are avoided in the reporting process. Short-term objectives are given more emphasis and 
priority (results that lend themselves to quantification were preferred). Performance 
measurement (managing by results) takes precedence over issues of performance management 
(managing for results). The cost of data collection is never properly calculated and is not well 
thought out in most instances. RBM becomes disconnected from the context it is operating 
under. RBM can only make a major contribution to the effectiveness of institutional capacity and 
development if accountability, risk, and credit are shared by both end users and developers. 
Accountability, a key RBM value, should be lived by both developers and end users of transfer. 
 
Time is wasted in organisations on arguments about RBM terminologies, which often vary from 
one donor to another. Harmonisation of language and concepts among donors would go a long 
way in making RBM a more user-friendly technology.  
 
8.5.2  Recommendations for UN-Habitat 
While there can never be a recipe for transfer or a step-by-step manual for technologies like 
RBM to transfer successfully and to be sustained, implementing programmes or organisations 
might want to consider ensuring that the following enablers are present: Ideological 
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commonalities between RBM‘s Components and Principles, and the organisation‘s Espoused 
Values and Governance Practices; Donor pressure; Emerging political support from senior 
leadership – allocation of resources; Existence of good communication channels; Results focus: 
A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services; Lessons from experience with 
pilot programmes; Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity; 
Empowerment and accountability; Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for 
achieving results within the spheres of control and Managers with delegated authority to the 
management level being held accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make 
corrective adjustment and to shift resources to better performing activities; Participatory and 
team-based management: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance 
measurement and management process, and shared interest and understanding of development 
objectives;  and being a learning organisation.  
 
  
Strengthening leadership and direction: The overarching recommendation addresses the need 
to capitalise on what has been achieved to date and establish a stronger culture of results. The 
success of this is not dependent upon tools and systems, but leadership and direction. Sustained 
commitment by top management – the executive director – is required. Strong leadership is 
necessary. Attention to the following issues is also needed: a shift in the accountability 
framework from process and compliance to results; outspoken commitment by senior  
management, especially the directors; a change in dialogue throughout the organisation that 
prioritises management for development results and addresses how this will be balanced against 
competing demands such as resource mobilisation; time and space for staff to give feedback on 
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and learn from experiences; a shift in organisational practices to take risks and manage for 
outcomes rather than outputs; and improved capacity to measure results. 
 
Global goals, local solutions—sharpening the role of the strategic results framework: 
Management should adopt a results framework that distinguishes more clearly between corporate 
goals and country programme outcomes. For the seven UN-Habitat focus areas, objectives 
should be based on the key results areas, with indicators of substantive development change 
comparable to those used for the Millennium Development Goals. The corporate key results 
areas contain the basis of what could be measurable goal-level objectives, for example: 
promoting inclusive growth; promoting gender equality; fostering inclusive participation (in 
governance); and empowering the poor, women and youth. This approach will take time. The 
executive director and UN-Habitat should start with those key result areas where internationally 
agreed-upon indicators already exist. 
 
The current practice of setting corporate outcome-level objectives and indicators within the 
strategic plan should end. Instead, outcome objectives and indicators should be set at the country 
programme level, where they should be linked to the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework outcome objectives in the context of agreed-upon national development objectives. 
Comparable outcome objectives should be set within the regional and global programmes. 
 
The change suggested above would reinforce the decentralised nature of UN-Habitat activities 
and build on United Nations reforms. The change would have to be supported by a shift in the 
oversight roles of HQ, senior management and the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
away from compliance with procedures towards ensuring that country programmes implement 
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robust, results-based management approaches and are designed to contribute to the UN-Habitat 
focus areas. 
 
Support managing for outcomes at country offices: 
Managing for outcomes means that managers learn from results and empirical evidence and use 
that evidence to adjust either the projects under their control or the composition of the portfolio 
of projects to maximise the contribution of the organisation to that outcome. Implementing such 
an approach requires that UN-Habitat consider the wider environment at the country level when 
defining outcomes. There is a need for improved guidance on how to balance demands on the 
results-based management system to meet internal UN-Habitat needs with those imposed by the 
wider environment within which UN-Habitat operates at the programmatic level. This includes 
dealing with three core issues raised in this report, namely; 
 Ownership of results at the country level; 
 The implications of harmonising other partners‘ results-based management approaches 
and systems; and 
 UN-Habitat accountability for managing for results. 
Regional and country offices want to be effective and need support in several ways to manage 
for results: 
 A streamlining of systems, aiming for a more user-friendly integrated approach with better 
prioritisation and introduction of new requirements across the organisation   
 Improved practical tools and guidelines to plan how projects will contribute to programme 
outcomes and to improve the specification of indicators 
 A large-scale capacity-development programme to improve staff knowledge and skills 
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 Improved design of programmes based on proven models of intervention that can be tailored to 
regional and country circumstances, managed, monitored and evaluated 
 Introduction of quality assurance to examine UN-Habitat programmes and assess evaluability, 
expand the use of outcome evaluation plans geared to joint evaluations with government and 
development partners 
 Revision of the results-oriented annual report to improve the evidence-base and structure of the 
report  
There is a need to expand investment and use performance information at country and regional 
level. Improving regional and country programmes requires attention to detail and development 
of sound objectives and indicators. A quality assurance process is recommended as an ex ante 
way of scrutinising country programmes. This needs to be supported by independent reviews of 
processes and compliance, along the lines of the current enhanced audits. 
 
The structure of results proposed here places more responsibility on regions and country offices to 
develop programmes that respond to regional and country needs and contribute towards global 
goals. It also frees them from having to fit into centrally determined focus areas. The test, 
therefore, is whether the programmes that are developed contribute to the goals of UN-Habitat. 




   8.5.3  Recommended RBM theory of change for UN-Habitat 
The theory of change for results-based management was derived from literature on the adoption 
of results-based management systems, the theoretical model on successful RBM policy 
innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) and research findings (chapters 5, 6 & 7) . It identifies a causal 
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process with the key six RBM steps and success factors/‗enablers‘ for successful RBM policy 
innovation transfer. The theory of change operationalizes the theoretical model for successful 
RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3). This theory of change provides the structure for 
enquiries and will go a long way in contributing to the body of knowledge on RBM policy 
innovation transfer. It combines the six RBM steps; including continuous measurement of 
performance and effectiveness of the results-based management system; learning and continuous 
feedback to improve implementation and policy; identification, monitoring and mitigation of 
assumptions and risks and enables for successful RBM policy innovation transfer and is 
presented diagrammatically (Figure 8.1).   
 
 
The hypothesis for RBM theory of change 
 
The theoretical model for RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) in chapter two presented 
the six steps for RBM policy innovation transfer and enablers/barriers, which are discussed as 
findings in chapters 5, 6 & 7. From these research findings, the hypothesis for the RBM policy 
innovation transfer can therefore be stated as follows:  
 
IF the causal processes presented by the key six RBM adoptions steps is applied, success 
factors/enablers‘ for successful RBM policy innovation transfer are considered during the policy 
adoption process, key stakeholders are involved and own the system, there is continuous 
measurement of performance and effectiveness of the results-based management system to 
enhance learning and continuous feedback to improve policy implementation and is functioning 
―M&E of the M&E function‖, performance information is utilised, assumptions and risks to the 
success of the policy are identified, monitored and mitigated, RBM sustainability elements are 
integrated into the design THEN organisational management learning, management 
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improvement and accountability will be enhanced and hence there will be organizational 
performance improvements and development effectiveness. 






Managing for results 
RBM policy innovation adoption steps 
1. Clearly defining RBM expected results in a measurable manner
2. Identifying and monitoring risks over time
3. Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure
progress towards results and to judge performance
4. Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect performance
information on actual results, review, analyze and report performance
5. Integrating formative evaluations to provide complementary performance not
readily available from performance monitoring systems
6. Use of performance information for learning, management improvement,
‗decision-making processes‘, and internal management accountability
Plan specific results to provide performance information to 

















1. Identify what RBM policy innovation success looks like, including establishing ways of
measuring RBM policy innovation success
2. Feedback knowledge to re-design or improve implementation and policy decision-making
1. Identify key assumptions and risks to the theory of change that threaten the success of the
RBM policy innovation
2. Develop a risk monitoring and mitigation system
3. Develop policy innovation sustainability elements and strategy
4. Develop RBM policy innovation implementation plan, including an execution timeline
Figure 8.1: The theory of change for results-based management policy 
innovation
Source: Researcher‘s original work 
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The first four steps in the RBM theory of change (Figure 8.1) are concerned with the policy 
innovation strategic planning processes (discussed in Chapter Seven). This theory of change 
steps are operationalized by addressing the five questions below which need to be 
answered when thinking through its logic and design. These questions aim to support 
pol icy  innovat ion  planners and are: 
 What is the p e r f o r m a n c e  m a n a g e m e n t  concern or concerns most 
affecting the organization and other stakeholders? 
 What is the outcome or solution sought? In other words, what would success look 
like? 
 What are known or likely risks which wil l  stop t h e  successfu l  t ransfer  of  
pol icy innovat ion? 
 Can key assumptions be tested and measured with information readily 
available to determine what is, or is not, working? 
 Can  new  pol icy innovat ion  logic and  knowledge, gained from 
implementing RBM, be  regularly  fed  back into  the  po l icy innovat ion  to  
revise  the   design and  implementation plan as necessary? 
 
Agree on desired outcome or solution: Define what success looks like. 
Success is essentially the end point in the theory of change. T h e  v a r i a b l e s  t o  
c o n s i d e r  i n  a d d r e s s i n g  this issue of success, and what it would look like, include: 
Having all the definitions of success on the table; Defining ways of 
measuring success; Agreeing on when success will be achieved; 
Agreeing on definitions of success that are most relevant; and articulate 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
265 
 
the causal model/the theory of change on how to get to that state of 
success.  
 
It is thus important to understand what success would look like; agree that i t  is what 
stakeholders want to see. The organization should establish ways of measuring 
success; articulate the causal model theory of how we will get to that state of success; and 
think through when success will be achieved.  
 
Identify and manage risks to success: There are many factors or risks that can cause success 
not to happen.  Some might be anticipated and we can plan for these; others will not 
―unanticipated consequences of social change‖: The theory of change requires that UN-Habitat 
or any other organization wishing to adopt the RBM policy innovation identify key risks at each 
stage of the theory of change that threaten its success; Decide on how to mitigate these risks 
should they emerge, and ensure the performance measurement system is sufficiently nimble and 
sensitive to picking up data that show the effort is going off track - unanticipated risks 
are emerging. 
 
Test key assumptions with valid information: As indicated in the RBM theory 
of change (Figure 8.1)  and discussed in Chapter Seven , assumptions in this case 
are  all those components of the theory of change which   are   presumed  to  hold  true,   
to  hold  constant,  or  to  hold together  for  the   change  to   eventually  occur.   Each   
assumption should  be  stated explicitly and  then  examined as  to  whether it is likely 
or highly problematic, whether there is research to support it or not, and whether all 
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the  key factors, which  will facilitate  or hinder progress towards the  desired change, 
have  been identified within the  cumulative total of all assumptions. 
 
A theory of change (Figure 8.1) needs to be continually tested to see if the logic 
behind it continues to hold during policy innovation implementation.  To do this, one 
must ask key questions during design and implementation and when the policy 
innovation is being evaluated. 
 
The value of regularly m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  evaluating an RBM system “M&E 
of the M&E”: The theory of change (Figure 8.1) suggests frequent mid-course 
corrections as R B M  system is being designed and implemented will lead to 
additional lessons from experience. Unsurprising, the objective of regularly 
monitoring and evaluating the system is to find out what is working, what is not, and 
why.  This is called monitoring and evaluation of the monitoring and evaluat ion 
function – ―the M&E of the M&E function‖. Such monitoring and evaluation 
provide the opportunity to review both the demand and the supply sides of the 
equation, and to clarify the extent of actual utilization of RBM information, as well 
as the particular ways in which it is being used. 
 
Feedback knowledge during implementation to redesign or improve 
implementation: Testing key assumptions of the theory of change will  produce 
a continuous flow of information which will support better management of the 
RBM policy innovation, and provide a basis for revising (if necessary) the original 
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design. The key considerations to ensure that knowledge acquired during 
implementation is used to improve the chances that the RBM policy innovation 
theory of change will be successful include: 
 Existence of a monitoring system that allows continual feedback to 
decision makers, 
 Appointment of a champion or individual whose job is to assess 
progress towards RBM policy innovation implementation. This  can  be  a  
powerful senior  official who  is able  to  lead  the  push  to  institutionalize 
RBM policy innovation; to  persuade colleagues about  its priority; and,  to  
devote significant resources  to  create an  RBM policy innovation 
system. A  champion needs to  have  some understanding of  RBM policy 
innovation, in terms of  tools and  methods, and  an  appreciation  of  its  
potential  usefulness for the organization, 
 Establishment of fora for discussing implementation results with 
stakeholder, and  
 Ensuring there are opportunities to adjust the theoretical model, 
hence revising the theory of change. 
 
Utilization is the measure of success of an RBM policy innovation 
system: The objective of RBM policy innovation systems is never to 
produce large volumes of performance in format ion , or a large number of high- 
quality evaluations per se - t his would reflect  a supply- driven approach to an 
RBM policy innovation system. The RBM policy innovation objective is 
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therefore to create demand for and utilization of performance information 
to support organization and development effectiveness. Utilization of 
performance information is therefore the measure of success of an RBM 
policy innovation system. 
 
Sustainability 
An RBM policy innovation system should be regarded as a long-term effort, as opposed to an 
episodic effort for a short period or for the duration of a specific project, program, or policy. 
Thus sustainability elements and strategy need to be developed. Sustaining an RBM policy 
innovation system in organizations recognizes the long-term process involved in ensuring 
utility (for without utility, there is no logic for having such a system).Sustainability and use of 
performance management systems (RBM policy innovation) are interdependent. Systems 
that are not used will not be sustainable. The issue of use has to be addressed first. It is the 
prerequisite to RBM policy innovation system sustainability. 
 
Enablers in the RBM theory of change (Figure 8.1) 
Some of the enables that are a prerequisite and constitute part of the RBM policy innovation 
theory of change include: 
Accountability: No part of the organization should be exempt from accountability to 
stakeholders. Donors can play a key role in encouraging transparency and accountability, and 
can even help with providing resources for data collection. 
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Capacity: Sound technical skills in data collection and analysis are necessary for the system‘s 
sustainability. Managerial skills in strategic goal setting and organizational development are also 
needed. Data collection and retrieval systems must be up and running—and modernized. The 
organization will need to commit continuing financial resources to the upkeep and management 
of RBM policy innovation systems. Institutional experience and memory are also helpful in 
the long-term sustainability of these systems. 
 
Incentives: Incentives need to be introduced to encourage use of performance information. This 
means that success needs to be acknowledged and rewarded, and problems need to be addressed, 
and organizational learning is valued 
 
Demand: Demand should not be episodic or haphazard for RBM system to be used and 
sustained. Structured requirements for reporting results, including legislation and regulations can 
help lead to sustained, consistent demand for such systems. 
 
Clear Roles and Responsibilities: Clear roles and responsibilities and formal organizational and 
political lines of authority must be established. The organization and people who will be in 
charge of collecting, analyzing, and reporting performance information must be clearly defined. 
 
Trustworthy and Credible Information: The RBM policy innovation system must be able 
to produce results information that brings both good and bad news. Performance information 
should be transparent and made available to all key stakeholders. Debatable issues should be 
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backed up by trustworthy and credible information, and not by personal opinions and 
presumptions. 
 
Other enablers include: Ideological commonalities between the RBM components and principles, 
and an organisation‘s espoused values and governance practices; Donor pressure; Emerging 
political support from senior leadership, including resource allocation; Existence of good 
communication channels; Lessons of experience from pilot programmes; Governance values; 
Participatory and team-based management; Creation of a learning organisation; and An effective 
reward system (Figure 2.3). 
 
Conclusion 
This theory of change (Figure  8 .1 )  has  addressed the  issue of why  it is important to 
focus on  building  coherent logical  models so as to  be  explicit about:  (i) what  
change is anticipated; (ii) what  risks  there are  to that  change ever  coming  into  being;  
(iii) why  a system of monitoring and evaluation is necessary to  capture relevant data  
on  whether the  change is  emerging as  planned; and,  iv)  how  and  when  relevant 
stakeholders  will  be able  to  decide if the  initiative was a success or not. A 
successful RBM policy innovation needs both a strong design and strong 
implementation.   
 
8.5.4  Recommendations for further research 
 
Researchers should consider the need for more in-depth studies on the process of RBM policy 
innovation transfer to development organisations operating in post-conflict countries. Transfer of 
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technology as an applied field might best be studied through the qualitative method, which will 
tease out and grasp hidden details and non-obvious data missed by standard statistical 
approaches. 
More studies should be conducted on organisations at different stages of RBM policy innovation 
transfer to gain further insight into factors influencing transfer in different settings. Varying 
contexts create different results, and people wanting to implement RBM would best benefit from 
case studies. 
 
Future research should include cases of negative RBM policy innovation transfer experiences to 
prevent public sector organisations and technology developers from repeating mistakes. There 
should also be studies of the transfer of knowledge from the developing countries to developed 
countries and from developing countries to developing countries at different stages of 
development. In addition, there should be studies on the transfer and return of knowledge and 
experiences from South-south transfers.  
 
Western management literature is ethnocentric. Further research is suggested in the area of 
processes of organisational change, and to look at transfer from these four perspectives: transfer 
of best practices; transfer of negative Western experiences to prevent Eastern partners from 
making the same mistakes (Dallago, 1999); transfer of management knowledge between 
developing countries at different stages of development, in spite of traditional rivalries 
(Fine,1999); and, lastly, the transfer and return of transfer of knowledge and experience from the 
East to the West (Thelen & Turner, 1998). 
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Lastly, this study lacked the perspectives of the developers of RBM policy innovation (donor 
government agencies). Future research could be undertaken on developers instead of users to 
find out more about their assumptions and experiences with transfers. 
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APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Participant‘s code ___ 
 
I am a graduate from the School of Public Management and Planning, University of 
Stellenbosch. I am interested in learning more about the transfer of technologies and in particular 
about the implementation of RBM at the organisation.   I would like to understand the process, 
context and complexities of implementing RBM.   Any information that you provide at this 
interview will be treated responsibly and confidentiality will be respected.   I would like your 
permission to record the interview so that we can concentrate on the discussion.   However, feel 
free to let me know if there is anything you do not want me to record or report.   Anyone of you 
of course has the right to not answer any questions and you can terminate the interview at any 
time.   Thank you. 
During this interview I will be looking to see how the six components of RBM have installed at 
organisation, further, I will try to find to what extent factors identified by literature as important 
to successful implementation have been considered. 
 
Expected results must be clearly defined and must be measurable. 
Assumptions and risks must be identified and monitored overtime. 
Performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge 
performance must be selected. 
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Performance monitoring systems must be developed to regularly collect performance 
information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual results vis-
à-vis the targeted results). 
RBM system must integrate formative evaluations to provide complementary performance 
monitoring systems. 
Using performance information for internal management and accountability, learning and 
decision-making processes, and also for external performance reporting to stakeholders and 
partners. 
 
Factors identified by literature as important for successful implementation. 
 
Organisational Factors 
A customised results-based management regime 
Taking time and maintaining momentum 
Linking performance measures to the policy or strategic framework 
Aligning management system to support implementation 
Providing adequate human resources 
Location of stewardship over performance management process 
Pilot project 
Human Factors 
Developing a performance management culture 
A practical understanding of accountability 
Senior management leadership and involvement 
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Full participation by all 
Training and education critical 
Use of expertise to support implementation 
Communicating purpose of measurement system 
 
Developing of Performance Measures 
Use of manageable numbers of indicators 
Clearly defining key terms and concept 
Use of logical charts 
Aligning performance measure with accountability and decision making authority 
Credible performance information 
Performance standards and targets 
Use of baseline data to set standards 
 
Use of Performance Information 
Demonstrable use of performance information 
Use of evaluations and performance measurements 
Incentives towards use of RBM 
Performance reporting for decision-making 
Learning, review and adjustment of performance 
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Since many of these aspects overlap, I will ask you several questions related to the process, and 
you can fill me in with as much detail as you would like.   Please respond as objectively as 
possible.   I may occasionally ask you to illustrate what you are saying with an example. 
 
Before we start, I would like to request you to read and sign the human subject research form.   If 
you would like a copy of the signed copy for your records, I will be happy to make a copy for 
you. 
Thanks, can we begin right now? 






How long have you been working with organisation? 
Check for (Ice-breaker, history) 
Tell me how it is to work for an international programme/organisation like this one and how 
different it is from other places you have worked before.   Illustrate with examples. 
Check for (Perspectives that reveal personal experience and cultural aspects) 
What do you know about Results-Based-Management/MfDR and how did you know about it? 
Check for (Depth of knowledge on concept, training) 
Help me understand the RBM process as you understand it and walk me through the 
implementation process as applied in the organisation? 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
289 
 
Check for (RBM components) 
How and when was RBM introduced to the organisation?   How did you feel about the change? 
Check for (Acceptance level) 
Help me understand how the decision to adopt RBM was made and why?   Who was involved 
and why? 
Check for (process of buy-in) 
Tell about some of the preparation and support that you receive to help you use RBM.    
Check for (training, incentives, management support) 
Tell me about the process or steps the organisation takes in policy making?  Who is involved and 
at what stage?   Illustrate with an example. 
Check for (RBM process involvement, management involvement) 
What factors are salient to RBM implementation and why? 
Check for (lessons of experience) 
Tell me about being a Technical staff here.   Walk me through a typical day here. 
Check for (workload, culture/habits, interactions, RBM activities, teamwork) 
What choices do you routinely make?  Illustrate with an example. 
Check for (Organisation cultural issues) 
What are the rules and what happens when they are violated?  Illustrate with example Check for 
(Organisational cultural issues) 
What gets rewarded and what gets punished and why?  Illustrate with example. 
Check for (RBM innovations, management attention, and culture) 
What have you learned about implementing RBM and about working at the organisation? 
Check for (lessons: complexities, practicalities, factors of success) 
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Describe the culture at the organisation.  What would you tell someone coming to work at the 
organisation when you help them fit within the programme and advance in their career? 
Check for (Organisational culture) 
Tell me some interesting things about RBM.  What are some of the challenges or obstacles that 
you have encountered and how the obstacles have been overcome. 
Check for (Implementation process: complexities, practicalities) 
Is there anything that you would like to add that has come to mind and I did not ask? 
Check for (Other insights) 
 
Thank you for your time 










Scholarly literature indicates that – Management attention is often the strongest indicator of 
culture.   The way things are handled creates new norms, values, working procedures and reveals 
important underlying assumptions.   Informal messages are sent by the way these situations are 
handled.   (This questionnaire was administered to staff that had been at organisation from 4 to 
24 years and those less than one year in the organisation). 
 
Qs.  What 10 words would you use to describe your organisation to an outsider? 
Qs.  What is management most concerned about–or what is emphasised around here? 
What does management pay attention to? 
What does management measure, and control on a regular basis? 
Qs.  Who gets noticed?  What is noticed consistently and commented upon by management? 
Qs.  What kinds of questions does management frequently ask at meetings? 
Qs.  What is most frequently asked at meetings?   Is it important for staff and management to 
agree on issues?  How is this demonstrated? 
Qs.  Who is rewarded?  Rewards happen in what manner? 
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What is rewarded – socially and in performance appraisals?  Risk taking? Creativity?  
Innovation?  Sycophancy?  What criteria are used? 
How is a good employee measured?  Criteria 
Qs.  Who gets promoted?  What are the criteria? 
Qs.  What behaviour is punished?  What will get you into trouble here?  What are the criteria?  
How do you get the feedback?  Punishment is often in what forms? 
Are there consequences for management? 
(Do answers depend on who you ask?)  
Qs.  What are some of the issues/ that preoccupy – controversial – most talked about by people  
Qs.  Are there emotional issues at the organisation – Issues that cause emotional reactions? 
Qs.  Around here, who fits in—or what kinds of people fit in and who does not?  What is the 
criterion? 
Who gets pushed out or isolated?  What is the criterion?  Character/Skills/Knowledge values 
Qs.  Who is envied around here?  Who is the hero and model for behaviour that is acceptable?  
Why?  Who is hated?  What‘s the criterion?  How is this shown? 
Qs.  How is the flow of decision making?  Inclusive?  Bottom up, top bottom?  Who makes 
decisions?  Based on best available data?  Boardroom, golf course, hallway. 
Qs.  Who is invited to the ―grown-ups table‖?  What are the criteria by which leaders recruit? 
Character/skills/knowledge/values 
Who sets the standards for quality of work, behaviour etc.? 
How is the appreciation shown?  Smiles, comments, gestures of kindness 
What criteria by which budget allocated?  Political?  Objective –informed by emerging 
programme intelligence – best available data?  What are the spending practices? 
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Qs.  Organisation‘s strategic direction?  Is it objective?  Political, donor driven?  What are the 
criteria used? 
Qs.  How are agreements – written, verbal (gentlemen‘s agreements) 
Where does it happen?  Boardroom, golf course, hallway- 
Qs.  What happens when you openly express disagreement or challenge your superior?   
Qs.  How are conflicts resolved? 
Qs. How does management react to critical incidents and organisational crisis?  (Crisis is 
important in cultural creation – and what is defined as a crisis by a leader). 
Qs.  Who matters around here –Who does the organisation pay most attention to?  Criteria?  Who 
does not matter? 
Qs.  What are some of the non-negotiable and timeless core values at the organisation?  What are 
organisation‘s values or standards?  How is conformity ensured or enforced? 
Qs.  Does management encourage/discourage feedback?  How does it do this? 
Qs.  What spoken or unspoken rules guide people‘s decisions and choices at the organisation? 
Qs.  How is organisational loyalty shown around here?   And to whom? 
Qs.  Who is treated with dignity and respect and who is not?  (Equality?) 
Qs.  Who jokes with whom – (teasing backslapping, etc)?  Criteria 
Qs.  Who is direct with whom?  Who uses hints, when making criticism or giving feedback? 
Qs.  What happens when one displays negative or offending behaviour?  Insulting, fighting 
criticism. 
Qs.  What kinds of information does management share?  Who is information shared with?  
What doesn‘t it share?  Why? 
Qs.  What are some of the unspoken and killer assumptions in this place?  Criteria for unspoken? 
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How is change perceived around here?  Is change frequent and rapid or is status quo protected?  
Recent changes? 
Qs.  Who is considered higher in status, treated with respect and viewed as distant – most people 
will not laugh with them with some backslapping happening? 
Qs.  Who gets hired around here?  (Adding new member is very telling, who is likely to be 
selected in an interview?  Who does not get selected?  Conservative, revolutionary – male 
female?) 
Qs.  How does management communicate?  (Transfer of thought) Verbal, written email – the 
writing is on the wall – when?  What messages are in the ED‘s or management pronouncements, 
speeches, proclamations or remarks?  (Consistency with behaviour and practice?) 
Qs.  How is information shared?  Grapevine, memos, reading the times or faces? 
Qs.  How are delays handled and infidelity to plans? 
Qs.  What constitutes results or performance around here? 




Who greets who?  Who associates with whom?  What happens if lines are crossed? 
What symbols carry a particular meaning here?  Words gestures, pictures, and physical objects, 
might tell me who is who here, or say I am in trouble?  Etc. memos, e.g., when I dressed in a suit 
everyone understood I had a meeting outside the office most likely a government office.  Jogon- 
dress hairstyle, etc. 
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Qs.  Who drives the culture around here – the cultural gate-keepers?  Socialisation, leader 
transmitted- charisma?  Acting by doing? 
 
What is regularly reviewed around here?  What are the objectives for these reviews? 
Who is powerful around here – mover shaker?  What is the criterion for power? 
Who is feared around here?  Why? 
Where is the fun around here? 
What is great or excellent? 
Where is the pain? 
Qs.  Is there a culture of trust among the various staff? 
– trust is achieved through open communication between individuals and groups.  Trust is 
enhanced where there is a history of ―making decisions in a way that reflects clear and sensitive 
understanding of culture in the organisation – that encourage ―buy-in‖. 
Who are the managers? 
What is your organisation‘s management style? 
Tell me things you like and things you have not liked about this management style. 
What assumptions do the managers make?  Or operate under? 
What do the managers need to manage effectively? 
Managerial Issues 
Qs.  What are the expectations of staff from the management?  What are these expectations 
based on?  Are the expectations met? 
If no – why?  What do people feel?  How have they addressed this issue? 
How do people relate with managers around here? 
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How is performance assessed? 
What is valued? 
What is punished? 
Qs.  Attitude towards work 
What demotivates staff around here?  What motivates them? 
Qs.  Where does manager derive most satisfaction? 
What is difference between national staff and international staff? 
How is the relationship? 




APPENDIX C: SAMPLE DOCUMENT REVIEW GUIDE 
 
PROTOCOL 
DOCUMENT REVIEW GUIDE 
 
The questions in this protocol serve as my reminders and they keep me on track as data 
collection proceeds.  The protocol reminds me of what the case is about and what question I am 
trying to answer in collecting the data evidence.  I will particularly be examining the documents 
identified as critical to RBM‘S successful transfer and components of RBM will guide my 
thinking process as I review the documents 
 
For who was the document authorized? 
 
Research question to be answered: 
 
To what extent has RBM transferred in the organisation‘s programme?  What has changed, how 
and why? 
 
Analytical look through the documents identify variety and frequency of messages any important 
messages between lines/biases 
Look into RBM and transfer of management literature for guidance and insights 
What have been the practices and trends? 
Evidence will be supported by quotes from documents or references to documentary evidence. 




ORGANISATION‘S STRATEGIC PLAN (one before RBM and one AFTER RBM)  
 
Are there differences between the plans before RBM and after?  What were the conditions and 
assumptions when the document was authorized?   
Who is the audience for the plan?  What is the objective that the plan is supposed to achieve? 
Does the most recent plan show knowledge and understanding of the approach? 
 
Has the new plan adopted an RBM approach? 
Involvement of stakeholders in the planning process, 
Identifying expected specific, measurable results with time- frames and systematic sub – 
strategies of achieving them? 
Identifying risks and assumptions and ways of monitoring and mitigating them, 
Identifying progress indicators 
Are there strategies for tracking and monitoring progress? 
Are there guidelines about the approach reporting will take, the frequency and expected 
contents? 
Is RBM explicitly mentioned in the plans as a policy that will guide the planning implementation 
and reporting of the programme? 
Who participated in developing the strategic plan? 
What is the programme‘s structure and are accountability lines? 
(My comments – thoughts and questions to pursue through interviews?  What needs to be 
validated through interviews and observations) 
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Annual work plans & progress reports (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, & 2011) 
What were the conditions and assumptions when the document was authored? 
Who is the author and who is the audience for the plan?  What is the objective that the plan is 
supposed to achieve? 
Do annual plans reflect fidelity to strategy plans and are they RBM compliant? 
What is the nature of the contents in the annual reports? 
Is the process controlled (Time frames) 
What are sources of the information in the plan? 
In what form is progress reported?  Is it fact – based evidence of progress or what? 




APPENDIX D: SAMPLE OBSERVATION GUIDE 
 
OBSERVATION PROTOCOL 
I will observe to have the content, which is a part of the phenomena under investigation.  I will 
focus on behaviour, events, persons and physical context.  I will, for instance find out whether 
actions correspond with words.  Some of the things I will see and hear will become nuggets in 
which to construct some of the questions.  Observation will ideally continue throughout the 
period of data collection 
 
Activities and interactions 
What is going on?  When do people come to work, what time do they leave? 
Is there a definable sequence of activities? 
How do people interact with activities and with one another? 
How are people and activities connected or interrelated?  Either from my point of view or 
participant point of view. 
What norms or rules structure the activities and interrelations?  When did the activity begin?  




What is the physical environment like/attributes? 
What is the context?  What kinds of behaviour is the setting designed for? 
How is space allocated?  What objects, resources technologies are in the setting? 
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What are the relevant characteristics of the participant? 
 
Conversation 
What is the content of conversation in these settings?  Who speaks to whom?  Who listens?  
(Quotes of conversations, paraphrases and summaries of the conversations to be captured, 
silences are be noted and other non-verbal behaviour that adds to the exchange  
 
Subtle factors 
What are the informal and unplanned activities? 
What are the symbolic and connotative meanings of words? 
What do you infer from non-verbal communication such as dress and physical space, unobtrusive 
measures such physical clues.  What does not happen that ought to happen? 
 
My own behaviour 
What is my role?  Observer or observer participant? 
What do I say or do? 
What thought am I having about what is going on (observer comments)? 
How do you feel being in environment? 
 




APPENDIX E: DEFINITION OF CAPACITY BUILDING STAGES  
 








(Early stage)  
Exploration / 
Experimentation 
(Want to learn more) 
Transition  
(Advance stage) 
Full Implementation  
(Consolidated 
process) 
There is a lack of 
knowledge among 
UN-Habitat of 
RBM; there is 
absence of 
knowledge about 
what is UN‘s 
RBM approach, 
hence every UN 
executing agency 
and subprogram 










is aware of, but not 
clearly committed 
to, RBM. Project 
Officers 
acknowledge the 
need to do better 
and wish to operate 
in accordance with 
the principles of 
UN-Habitat begins to 
commit to shifting to 
good management 
practices and explores 
various approaches. In 
this stage, Program 
Officers gather ideas 
from various sources 
and try out new 
methods. 
Experimentation may 
take the form of pilot 
projects and may 
involve studies and 
working groups. One 
problem at this stage is 
lack of homogeneity, 
UN-Habitat has 
committed itself to 
RBM and embarks 
on transition from 
the previous to the 
new methods. 
Individuals begin to 
adopt the new 
practices, perceiving 








RBM is mainstreamed 
into Administration 
practices as a cross-





preparation of the 
budget) conform to the 
new practices. 
Indicators are used to 
monitor UN-Habitat 
action and regular 
reviews lead to 
realignment on 
institutional priorities. 




This stage often 








practices and a 





and lead to the next 
stage.  
and various tools are 
chosen on the basis of 
personal preference. 
Moreover, launching 
multiple initiatives at 
the same time may 
result in pursuing none 
thoroughly. Many 
program officers 
acknowledge that RBM 
is beneficial, provided 
that the approach is 
fully pursued. Their 
number and resolve 
lead to the next stage. 
conversion to a 
results-oriented 
framework implies 





managing change at 
the human level are 
further significant 
issues. The spread 
of the new approach 
on a large scale in 
the Administration 
leads to the next 
stage. 
Managers and staff 
implicated in the 
change are trained and 
prepared to own the 
new management 
tools, which are 
regularly reviewed in 
the light of 
experience. Resource 
allocations ensure the 
sustainability of the 
new methods, whose 









APPENDIX F: AUTHORIZATION LETTER 
 
Dear Participant, 
I am a student from the School of Public Leadership, University of Stellenbosch.  I am 
conducting a study about transfer of technologies and I am in particular interested in the transfer 
process of Results Based Management in this organisation.   
 
You have been purposefully selected to participate in the study as one of the knowledgeable 
people who might deepen my understanding about the transfer process and the organisational 
culture which receives and nurtures the technology.  This will involve me asking you some 
questions, however, your participation is voluntary and you are free to disengage from the study 
at will and for any reason. 
Any information given will be treated responsibly, and what you consider privileged information 
will be protected.  Please feel free to ask any question in regard to the study by contacting me or 
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